Introduction
This article examines the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service’s (SVR) official statements on Armenia. As Armenia re-evaluates its security architecture and deepens ties with Western institutions following the recent Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, Moscow has leveraged messaging to shape domestic discourse. This article examines the SVR statements by reviewing key messages, and provides objective analysis of the events usually conveyed by the service in a misleading and biased manner. GFSISE has also released an introductory article on the SVR’s publications.
The article begins by contextualising SVR publications and Armenia’s broader Russian-language media consumption and linguistic landscape. It is followed by a categorisation of the statements into three themes, highlighting specific language and phrasing used by the SVR to shape the narrative. The third section provides a detailed analysis of the claims made by the SVR in its publications.
Classification of Statements by the Russian Intelligence Service
Public statements issued by the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service count among the overt operational methods defined by federal law. The service makes direct statements only in special cases. The service divides its releases intended for the media into three main categories: ‘The Foreign Intelligence Service of Russia is Authorised to Declare,’ ‘Publications in the Media,’ and ‘Telegrams.’ The majority of the publications from the ‘The SVR is Authorised to Declare’ category begin with the phrase: “Based on information received by the SVR.”
Telegrams mainly include official congratulations, honours, and condolences from the head of the service. Publications there aggregate the service’s statements that have been published by various media outlets. Statements from the first category mentioned above have been published on the service’s current website since 2020, and concern events of particular importance to Russia taking place outside its borders. In this way, the service highlights spheres of interest that are particularly relevant to Russia.
These publications are then regularly supplied to dozens of predominantly Russian-language media outlets that purposefully generate information flows inside and outside Russia.
Russian-Language Media Consumption/Prevalence in Armenia
A study and survey conducted in Armenia in 2024 comprehensively investigated the media environment in Armenia. The research identified the most widely consumed media outlets, as well as the language in which the media is delivered to and absorbed by the population. While Armenian-language TV and radio stations were the most popular in 2023-2024, the study identified that Russian TV channels also held a place among the most popular channels. 88% of the Armenians who were proficient in Armenian stated that they also had a command of Russian, with only 33% stating they have any command of English. In 2024, 53% of the respondents watched Russian TV on a regular basis, while consumption of Russian news websites, vlogs/blogs/podcasts, and Radio channels was 34, 29, and 15 per cent respectively.
By the collapse of the Soviet Union, and at the conception of the Armenian republic, the Russian language was already prevalent and widely used throughout the post-Soviet space. According to the 2001 general census carried out in Armenia, 85% of the population spoke Russian and 13% considered it their native language, although a significant portion of the native speakers were ethnic Russians. This level of prevalence of the Russian language within the Armenian community significantly simplifies the dissemination of Russian narratives.
The Armenian Diaspora in Russia
The Russian Federation has a significant ethnic Armenian diaspora. According to the Office of the High Commissioner for Diaspora Affairs of Armenia, there are 2.5 to 3 million ethnic Armenians living in Russia, 72 Armenian churches, and 45 Armenian media outlets. The High Commissioner’s office was established in 2019, a year that marks the point when the Armenian government began a systemic and methodical approach to its diaspora in the Russian Federation.
Russia has always seen the Armenians in Russia as a tool of leverage over Armenia’s internal politics. On May 29, a week before the 2026 parliamentary elections, Reuters, based on numerous sources, reported that Russia was planning to fund up-to 100 thousand Russian-Armenians (holding dual citizenship) to travel and vote against Pashinyan’s party. In response, the Armenian defence minister publicly stated that any Armenians travelling from Russia to vote would be immediately drafted into compulsory military service.
Statements on Armenia in the Category ‘The Foreign Intelligence Service of Russia is authorized to declare’
The statements in the category ‘The Foreign Intelligence Service of Russia is authorized to declare’ are divided into three thematic sections. The first section concerns statements on the Nagorno-Karabakh situation in 2020. The second section reviews the SVR statements which draw the US as a warmonger in the region. The third section examines statements where the SVR accuses the EU of undermining Armenia’s statehood. The Russian Foreign Intelligence Service addressed Armenia before 2020; however, it has issued only seven statements in this category to date.
The Full List:
- EU Lures Armenia towards Itself, but Cannot Help – 28.07.2026
- Euroantichrists Have Targeted the Russian Orthodox Church in Armenia – 03.06.2026
- A Kiss from Yerevan – 12.11.2025
- Democracy in the American Way – 27.11.2024
- The Americans are Preparing Armenia for Harsh Times – 07.11.2024
- On the Plans of the West to Undermine the Ceasefire in Nagorno-Karabakh – 18.11.2020
- On Developments Surrounding Nagorno-Karabakh – 06.10.2020
The Nagorno-Karabakh Situation
Russia’s Foreign Intelligence Service published two statements concerning developments in the Nagorno-Karabakh region, in October and November 2020. Both statements came during the outbreak of all-out war in Karabakh that, according to various sources, claimed thousands of lives on both the Armenian and Azerbaijani sides. Considering the mutual context, analysing the two would provide a better understanding of the full picture.
According to the first statement ‘On Developments Surrounding Nagorno-Karabakh,’ the chief of the SVR, Sergey Narishkin, said: “Moscow is following the escalation of tensions around Nagorno-Karabakh with concern… We are also by no means indifferent to the fact that, during the fighting, lives are being lost among the Armenian and Azerbaijani peoples, both of whom are friendly to us… We have no doubt that, with the assistance of the international community, the parties to the conflict will ultimately cease the use of force and sit down at the negotiating table. However, we cannot but be concerned that the South Caucasus could become a new staging ground for international terrorist organisations, from where militants could subsequently infiltrate states neighbouring Azerbaijan and Armenia, including Russia.”
The second statement published by the SVR, and titled ‘On the Plans of the West to Undermine the Ceasefire in Nagorno-Karabakh,’ came a week after the hostilities ended. According to the publication: “The leading NATO countries are trying to hide their irritation over the ceasefire agreement in Nagorno-Karabakh reached by Azerbaijan and Armenia with Russia’s active participation. The US and its allies are frustrated that the war was stopped through Moscow’s mediation. After all, this has, in essence, ‘annulled’ their years of work to squeeze Russia out of the South Caucasus. Neither Washington nor a ‘united Europe’ is willing to accept the current balance of power in the region. In order to ‘dismantle’ it, they could think of nothing better than to try once again to instigate disagreement between the peoples of Azerbaijan and Armenia.”
Then the statement claims: “According to information we possess, certain Western countries are, through available channels, provoking Armenian and Azerbaijani nationalists to discredit and disrupt the ceasefire agreement. They are trying to convince the Armenians that peace in Nagorno-Karabakh is a defeat for Yerevan. The idea of the need for a ‘war for victory’ is being spread. Azerbaijanis, on the contrary, are being told that the Kremlin ‘stole victory from them’ when the Azerbaijani army was just a step away from capturing Stepanakert. Such actions are further proof that the United States and its European friends are, as always, pursuing their own objectives at the expense of the interests of ordinary people – this time, the Azerbaijanis and Armenians. The Americans and Europeans are not troubled by the fact that their provocations could lead to new bloodshed and plunge the region into a severe military conflict.”
Framing the US as a Warmonger that Fuels Conflicts
Between 2021 and the first half of 2024, the SVR was quiet on the topic of Armenia. The 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh War and the 2023 developments in the region resulted in Azerbaijan asserting full control over the disputed territories. In its 2020 statements, Moscow put the full blame for Armenia’s “failure” on the US, EU, and PM Nikol Pashinyan, but it waited until late 2024 to begin a new wave of measures ahead of the 2026 elections. These were crucial for Russia to hold onto its influence in Armenia and the wider region. The SVR’s drawing of the US as a warmonger coincided with the 2024 US Presidential election.
The November 2024 statement, titled ‘The Americans are Preparing Armenia for Harsh Times’ began with the claim that the US Department of State had accelerated work on “a complex range of measures to stimulate the activity of pro-Western civil society organisations in Armenia.” Washington, it says, was influencing “the Armenian political elite” to orientate it towards the West, “despite the inevitable consequences.” According to the SVR, the Americans had begun utilising “schemes” previously applied in Ukraine and Moldova, and “the task has been set to give socio-political processes in Armenia a sustained anti-Russian character.”
The statement then continues: “They (Americans) have been expanding training courses and have allocated other resources to Armenia’s governmental departments, and are ‘installing foreign advisors’ in their system. Washington intends to carry out a long-term information and propaganda campaign, providing for, among other things, the discreditation of the prospects for Yerevan’s cooperation with Russia, the EAEU, and the CSTO, and the mass dissemination of materials about the ‘oppression’ of Armenian citizens who came to work in our country.”
The publication goes even further: “For the sake of achieving the ‘high goal’ of joining the so-called civilised community led by the US, the Armenian people, Washington believes, will have to pay by renouncing their own traditions, national social foundations, and stable trade and economic ties with their closest partners from the EAEU, who have ensured the dynamic growth of its economy in recent years. Thus, Washington is persistently pushing Armenia towards national suicide.”
On November 27, 2024, 20 days after the release of the first statement, the SVR released another publication dedicated to Armenia, named ‘Democracy in the American Way.’ According to the statement, the Americans were already doubting Armenia’s loyalty to them, and, considering that Armenians are “good at counting money,” “they would inevitably realise the threat of irreversible damage deriving from turning their backs on traditional regional connections.”
The statement then named a few Armenian political parties as America’s alternatives for replacing Pashinyan, pointing towards Pashinyan being an easily replaceable “puppet of the West.” Then, it continues, these parties will politically strike at Pashinyan’s ruling party if he decides to follow “the example of Georgia by prioritising national interests, traditions, and values.” The SVR claimed that the US went from the “so-called democratisation” of Armenia to a “complete subjugation,” and that Armenia would suffer destruction and “share Ukraine’s fate.”
Statements Accusing the EU of Undermining Armenia’s Statehood
So far, the SRV has released three statements on Armenia where it accuses the EU of interfering in Armenian politics. In its 2025 publication, the SVR introduced France as the culprit and instigator of Armenia’s change of orientation. According to the statement, France, as quoted in the Quai d’Orsay, was pressing Yerevan to “loosen another tie” with Moscow, in particular the import of Russian grain, and to replace it with Ukrainian grain. Russia claimed France was forcing Armenia to move to grain imports from Ukraine, despite it being “50% more expensive.” Europe said it would reimburse extra costs for Armenia in exchange for Armenia’s “support for Ukraine” and for its cutting further ties with Moscow. In this publication, Moscow also introduced the narrative of the EU’s “socio-economic crisis,” and claimed that it is “on the brink of economic collapse,” with empty budgets.
The SVR issued another statement, ‘Euroantichrists Have Targeted the Russian Orthodox Church in Armenia,’ on June 3, 2026, three days prior to the Armenian parliamentary elections. Narishkyn’s agency stated that “the management of the EU was aggressively pressing for the removal of the Russian Orthodox Church from Armenia.” According to the information “received” by the service, the EU has made the breakup of “Russo-Armenian centuries-old religious-spiritual connections” a mandatory prerequisite for Armenia’s accession to the EU. The publication continues: “The NGOs fed by Brussels accused the priest of interfering in the June 7 parliamentary elections in Armenia. According to the SVR’s data, the so-called European ‘partners’ are fabricating ‘kompromat’ related to the Yerevan-Armenian eparchy of the Russian Orthodox Church…”
It went on: “We would like to remind the ‘Eurobureocrats’ [ed.: the exact Russian term here is ‘есовцы,’ which bears similarity with another term frequently utilised by Russian officials, Eurobureocrats, yet which is far more derogatory] that Armenia’s history of relations with Russia is considerably longer than its history of relations with the EU. The spiritual-religious connections of our ‘brotherly’ nations are deeper and more robust than any political technology project. They have overcome much, and will overcome attacks of the ‘есовцев’ (Eurobureocrats) who do not remember their ancestry.”
The SVR’s most recent statement, ‘The EU Lures Armenia towards Itself, but Cannot Help,’ was published in July 2026. It claimed that the EU was drawing Armenia towards itself while knowing that leaving the Russian-led Eurasian Economic Union would be detrimental to Yerevan. According to Naryshkin’s office, the EU, suffering a significant economic crisis due to the “maniacal desire of Euro Bureaucrats to wage war in Ukraine,” will be unable to compensate Armenia for billions in losses after it drifts away from Russia. Naryshkin’s service claimed that “Many European countries have already signalled to the EU leadership their unpreparedness to open their markets to goods from Armenia at the expense of national producers.” They suggest that it is the EU member states who oppose Yerevan’s path towards EU integration.
Dissecting the Key Messages
The Main Culprit of the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict
Prior to the outbreak of the full-scale war in the Nagorno-Karabakh region in 2020, when clashes were scarce but prevalent, the SVR entered the scene by “expressing concerns” over the developments. The publication drew Russia as a neutral and peaceful actor looking forward to immediate negotiations. The SVR also highlighted that it was Russia that had achieved an effective ceasefire between the parties. However, the facts point towards Russia being the primary instigator of this conflict.
Since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Russia has used the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict as a leverage of influence over Armenia and Azerbaijan, with the goal of maintaining strategic positions in the region. While the disputed region has been internationally recognised as part of Azerbaijan, Russia consistently stirred sentiments related to Karabakh among the Armenians in both Armenia and the Nagorno-Karabakh region through vigorous political and media activities.
The leaders of the self-proclaimed “Artsakh” were always affiliated with and supported by Russia. Pashinyan’s opponents, most notably Samvel Karapetyan, who were officially backed by Russia, were drawing on the outcomes of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict as Pashinyan’s fault. Russia has pursued a similar “neutral” and “peacekeeping” role in conflicts that emerged after the collapse of the Soviet Union, in Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali region in Georgia, in Moldova’s Transnistria, and, later, in Ukraine’s Donbass.
It has since been proven in all cases that Russia was indeed the primary instigator between the local “ethnic conflicts,” and used them to strengthen its positions in the surrounding regions. Therefore, the SVR claiming that “Moscow is following the escalation of tension around Nagorno-Karabakh with concern” is an outright falsehood.
The West Trying to “Squeeze Russia out of the South-Caucasus”
In its first two statements, Russia blamed the US and its allies for trying to squeeze Russia out of the region, although Russia’s influence and popularity in Armenia had in fact begun to decline prior to the 2020 war. For instance, in a 2013 sociological survey conducted in Armenia, respondents were asked whether Armenia should primarily focus on developing relations with the European Union, or with Russia. Over 67% supported Russia. Additionally, 72.3% considered Russia a more reliable partner than the EU.
In April 2016, the four-day war between Azerbaijan and Armenia spiked public dissatisfaction with Russia. In just the few years leading up to the April conflict, Azerbaijan had procured weapons worth over USD$4 billion from Russia. Armenia’s then-President, Serzh Sargsyan, stated that Azerbaijan had used the entirety of weapons purchased from Russia against Armenia. This, of course, conflicted with the intent of Russia’s bilateral agreements with Armenia, and the role of the Russian Armed Forces stationed in the country: Russia was supplying arms to both Armenia and Azerbaijan.
By 2017, attitudes had shifted, and only 34% of respondents regarded Russia as Armenia’s strategic ally. That same year, more respondents felt that Russia had a negative influence on Armenia regarding the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Russia’s military presence in the Karabakh region, through the so-called “peace-keeping mission,” did not deter Azerbaijan from establishing its sovereignty over Karabakh through force; nor did Russia fulfill its bilateral obligations with Armenia when Azerbaijani forces struck Armenian territory during the 2020 war, despite Armenian Prime-Minister’s multiple requests of military support, mainly for air-defence. In a 2025 survey conducted by the International Republican Institute, only 27% of respondents evaluated relations with Russia as “good,” with just 4% rating them as “very good.”
The decline of Russian influence came about despite Russia’s official federal “soft power” programme worth over $160 million, launched in 2025. The key focus of this programme in 2026 was Armenia’s parliamentary elections. Sergey Kirienko, the First Deputy Chief of Staff of the Presidential Administration of Russia, oversaw the implementation of programme activities. He was tasked with advancing Russian interests in the country’s parliamentary elections through “soft power” instruments.
“The West against Traditional Values”
In January 2026, several media outlets reported that Pashinyan’s most formidable opponent, the Russian–Armenian oligarch Samvel Karapetyan, had recruited Moshe Klughaft, a political campaign manager, for the upcoming elections. Since 2018, Klughaft had worked for Georgia’s ruling party, Georgian Dream, on multiple election campaigns. According to numerous sources, he co-authored Georgian Dream’s aggressive and defamatory political campaigns in Georgia, which also encompassed painting the opposition parties, non-governmental organisations, activists, and the collective West as “amoral” and against Georgia’s traditional (family) values.
It is an interesting observation that soon after the rumours of Karapetyan recruiting Klughaft to work for his political campaign were shared, several media outlets claimed that Pashinyan had greenlighted the LGBTQ+ Pride March in Yerevan, and declared Pashinyan as pro-Western, and thus standing against traditional values (as per the Russian narrative). Pashinyan’s office quickly issued an official statement denying the aforementioned claims.
Karapetyan, born in the Armenian SSR, moved to Russia and earned his fortune in various industries, ultimately accumulating over $4 billion in net worth. He is well known in Armenia and among the Armenian diaspora in Russia for his “charity work” – for reconstruction of old and the construction of new churches both in Armenia and Russia. He has also been known for his particularly close affiliation and friendship with the Armenian Orthodox Patriarch Garegin II. Garegin II is a keen opponent of Armenia’s current Prime-Minister, Nikol Pashinyan.
An article published by the investigative-media outlet The Insider found proof that not only was Samvel Karapetyan supported by Russia, but that he had been employed by the FSB at some point in the past: the documents attached to the foreign passport issued to him by the Russian government in 1999 indicated the FSB (Russian Federal Security Service) as Karapetyan’s employer.
Prior to the 2026 elections, ex-Speaker of the Armenian Parliament Alen Simonyan stated in an interview with Deutsche Welle that the anti-EU narrative in Armenia heavily relied on anti-LGBTQ+ statements. He claimed that the choice during the elections stood between “traditional values” and a “Western way of life devoid of morality.” Simonyan brought Georgia as an example, where similar methods have been actively utilised in politics.
The EU in “Deep Socio-Economic Crisis”
In its publications, the SVR highlighted numerous times that the EU had undergone an irreversible, deep socio-economic crisis, suggesting it was pending collapse, and that Armenia is being deceived and manipulated towards poverty, while Russia and the Eurasian Economic Union have no alternative for Armenia’s welfare. Such disinformation has been pushed by the Kremlin throughout its sphere of influence traversing Armenia, and has been actively utilised in anti-Western political campaigns in Georgian and Moldovan media too.
Following the 2026 elections, the pro-Russian social-media pages and Telegram channels began circulating disinformation that the EU had successfully deceived Armenia, and now it “was rejecting the import of Armenian food products.”
“Ukrainisation of Armenia”
In these publications, the SVR has insisted that the US and the West have been leading Armenia towards Ukrainisation. This was directly voiced by Russian president Vladimir Putin days before the 2026 Armenian parliamentary elections, seeing him directly threatening Armenia by stating that, due to its Western aspirations, it could expect a “Ukrainian scenario.” However, pro-Russian propaganda sources had been spreading this narrative inside Armenia months prior to June 2026, implying that Pashinyan was preparing Armenia for war against Russia. All of this was meant to demoralise and demotivate Armenian voters from supporting declared pro-Western candidates in the elections.
Pashinian’s pro-Russian political opponents, Samvel Karapetyan and Robert Kocharyan, have been calling Pashinyan a “puppet of the West,” who is “turning Armenia into a battleground between West and Russia,” and applying the “Ukrainian scenario” in Armenia. Armenia is not the only country where this narrative has been actively pushed. Similar phrases have been widely utilised in Georgia’s domestic politics, predominantly by Georgia’s ruling party and pro-government media outlets, and particularly since the beginning of the full-scale war in Ukraine. The SVR named Georgia’s recent anti-Western, and clearly Russia-favouring, path as an example for Armenia to pursue.
“National Suicide”
Russia pushes its narrative of the collective West undermining traditional and national values and forcing the Armenian nation to renouncing its identity in a way that will ultimately “end with Armenia’s national suicide.” The phrase “national suicide,” presented by the SVR in one of its publications, ‘Armenia Is Committing National Suicide’ was widely adopted and repeated by Russian-language media outlets. For instance, an article published on ‘dzen.ru’ claimed that “russophobic” Pashinyan was “driving Armenia towards national suicide.” The article had a provocative cover: ‘Artsakh (Karabakh) is Armenia.’
Another article was titled, ‘How the Anglo-Saxons are Driving Armenia towards National Suicide.’ Yet another implied, ‘National Suicide in the Pashinyan Way.’ Days before the June elections in Armenia, a former MP and Pashinyan’s pro-Russian critic, Samvel Farmanyan, stated the following: “This [Pashinyan’s policy] is national suicide, accompanied with songs and dances… On June 7th, we must, at any cost, prevent this national suicide. Nikol [Pashinyan] must go!”
Armenians are “Good at Counting Money”
In its November 2024 publication, the SVR presented the usual Soviet-manufactured narrative. The Soviet Union would regularly produce and spread ethnic chauvinism, assigning certain stereotypes to the ethnicities within the Union. The publication’s claim that Armenians are “good at counting money” directly points towards this Soviet chauvinistic stereotype, according to which Armenians were labelled as witty, money-obsessed, and untrustworthy (Rus: спекулянты). In the same era, a typical Georgian was lazy, drunk, and careless, but good at cooking and dancing, and a typical Ukrainian was untrustworthy and baselessly arrogant, or, as Russians call them as an offensive slur: “Khokhol” (Rus: хохол). However, the SVR claims it is the Americans, not Russians, who view Armenians as such, turning the actual facts upside down.
The Weaponisation of Food
In its latest publications, Russia has claimed that the collective EU has been forcing Armenia to abandon “Russian grain” and replace it with Ukrainian. It accuses the EU of weaponising food for political gain. With the intent of raising political pressure and public dissatisfaction against Pashinyan, Russia has begun gradually banning Armenian products. Armenia has been exporting the majority of its production to Russia for decades. The Russian embargo became ever more severe as the 2026 election approached. Following the pro-Russian candidates’ failure in the elections, Russia imposed even harsher bans on Armenian food. In every single case, Russia’s Service for Veterinary and Phytosanitary Surveillance Service (Rosselkhoznadzor) cited “quality and sanitary” violations.
In fact, Russia has a well-documented history of weaponising food and using it as geopolitical leverage. In 2006, Russia banned the import of Georgian wine and mineral drinks, citing “quality concerns.” This move followed Georgia’s refusal to abandon its Euro-Atlantic integration. Russia only lifted the embargo in early 2013 after Saakashvili’s government was replaced by the anti-Western Georgian Dream party led by oligarch Bidzina Ivanishvili. Russia has banned Moldovan wine and production multiple times since the 2000s, with the harshest embargo imposed in 2013 after Moldova formally declared it was signing an Association Agreement with the EU. Russia deliberately manipulated and hindered Ukrainian imports until 2014, and imposed a full-scale embargo on Ukrainian food products following the annexation of Crimea.