Introduction
The Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) is a core component of the security and defence infrastructure of the Russian Federation. The SVR, along with the Main Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation (formerly known as the Main Intelligence Directorate – GRU), is a part of Russia’s unified intelligence body. As well as conventional deterrence activities, Russia’s unified intelligence bodies are known to employ a number of unconventional methods.
This article stands as an introductory brief to a series of articles that will be published on the topic, and concerns the SVR and its chief’s official statements on countries that Russia considers to be in its sphere of influence, among them the Baltic states, the Balkans, and the South Caucasus.
From Dzerzhinsky to Naryshkin
The Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) is a successor to the Soviet Union’s First Chief Directorate of the State Security Committee (KGB). The service underwent multiple reshuffles throughout Soviet rule. It was initially conceived within the All-Russian Extraordinary Commission in Combating Counterrevolution and Sabotage, established in 1917, and was first headed by the Bolshevik revolutionary Felix Dzerzhinsky.
In 1920, Dzerzhinsky created the Foreign Division within the committee, and appointed Yakov Davidov as the first head of the unit. The first major extraterritorial operations planned by the committee and the division targeted the Baltic states, with a particular focus on Estonia, where Dzerzhinsky believed the counterrevolutionaries had set up a powerful network.
An ethnic Armenian born in the modern-day Azerbaijani Nakhchevan, Davidov’s real last name was Davtyan. He was executed by the Soviet security services in 1938. It is important to note that all but one of the chiefs of the Foreign Division who led the unit from 1920 to 1938 were convicted of treason and executed by the Soviet government in the late 30s or soon thereafter.
The Foreign Division underwent numerous reorganisations, ultimately becoming the First Chief Directorate in the 1950s. It kept this designation until the dissolution of the Soviet Union, and was among the Soviet Union’s most crucial instruments during the Cold War. In 1991, the service was transformed into the Foreign Intelligence Service, first within the Russian SFSR, and then into the Foreign Intelligence Service of the Russian Federation.
The last chief of the Soviet foreign intelligence and the first director of the Foreign Intelligence of the Russian Federation was Evgeniy Primakov. He is considered to be the founding father of modern Russian foreign intelligence.
Evgeniy Primakov
Primakov was born in 1929 in Kyiv, Ukrainian SSR. There is no public data available about his father, who was allegedly repressed and possibly executed by the Soviet government. His mother was Anna Kirschenblatt, a doctor whose family lived in Tbilisi, Georgian SSR. Primakov spent most of his childhood in Tbilisi, and finished middle school there before moving to Moscow. His wife was an ethnic Georgian, the step-daughter of an ethnic-Georgian NKVD (The People’s Commissariat for Internal Affairs), General Gvishiani.
After graduating in Moscow, Primakov worked for the Soviet state newspaper Pravda (Truth), and spent the 1960s travelling and working in the Middle East, Central Asia, and Africa. He became acquainted with many leaders of the Arab states, among them Saddam Hussein. In the 1970s and 80s, Primakov headed the Institute of World Economy and International Relations. In the late 1980s, he was put in charge of the foreign intelligence of the Soviet Union.
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Primakov became the first chief of Russia’s SVR, and served there from 1991 to 1996. He was promoted to Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation in 1996, and became the country’s Prime-Minister in 1998. Between 2001 and 2011, he served as head of The Chamber of Commerce and Industry of the Russian Federation.
Primakov was a devout supporter and one of the initiators of the concept of global multipolarity, a concept known in Russia as the “Primakov Doctrine.” On June 23, 2026, in his address to the International Scientific Forum “Primakov Readings,” Vladimir Putin said: “The Western countries advocate for a certain world based on rules. However, it is not difficult to understand that there are clear neocolonial ambitions, disrespect of the sovereignty of independent states, and a desire and pursuit to interfere in their internal affairs so as to compel them to change their internal-political priorities.” This event was organised by IMEMO, the Institute of World Economy and International Relations, which had previously been headed by Evgeniy Primakov himself.
Sergey Naryshkin
In 2016, President Putin, appointed Sergey Naryshkin as the chief of Russia’s Foreign Intelligence Service. According to his official biography, Sergey Naryshkin was born on October 27, 1954, in Leningrad (now St. Petersburg). His early career spanned academic administration at the Leningrad Polytechnic Institute, a diplomatic assignment as an expert in the economic counselor’s office at the Soviet Embassy in Belgium, and various economic and investment leadership roles within the St. Petersburg municipal administration, Promstroybank, and the local government, throughout the 1990s.
In 2004, Naryshkin transitioned to Russia’s federal leadership, becoming Deputy Chairman of the Government of the Russian Federation. He was appointed Chief of the Presidential Administration in 2008, and later served as the Chairman of the State Duma from 2011 until 2016. On September 22, 2016, President Putin appointed him Director of the Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR). Notably, Naryshkin also serves as the chairman of both the Russian Historical Society and the board of trustees for the Modern History Foundation.
Legal Framework of Russian Foreign Intelligence
According to Russian legislation, the Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) is a unified entity of specially formed foreign intelligence bodies. It constitutes a part of the state security forces of the Russian Federation, whose duty is to protect Russia from external threats within the framework established by law.
The intelligence bodies include the Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) itself and the foreign intelligence body within the Ministry of Defence (the GRU) of the Russian Federation. Collectively, Russian foreign intelligence is led by the President of Russia, who defines the directions of work and appoints the head of the service.
The Russian law on foreign intelligence defines intelligence activity as the collection and processing of information vital to the interests of the Russian Federation, concerning the real and potential “capabilities, actions, plans, and intentions” of foreign states, organisations, and individuals, and within this scope, cooperation with other relevant Russian authorities.
The service uses overt and covert methods (Russian: гласные и негласные методы) to achieve the following goals:
- Providing the President, the State Duma, and the Government of the Russian Federation with the intelligence necessary for decision-making;
- Creating conditions for the successful implementation of the Russian Federation’s policy in the field of security;
- Contributing to Russia’s economic development, scientific and technological progress, and the military sphere.
According to the same law, overt methods include the use of information systems, video and audio recordings, photography, information from technical communication channels, and other methods and means. The law classifies covert methods under the category of state secrets.
Based on the service’s goals, the federal law ensures the confidentiality and cover (undercover status) of relations with foreign intelligence officers, as well as secrecy regarding their subsequent activities. According to the law, the service: “…for the purposes of conspiracy, ensures the use of documents, encrypted (cover) identities of employees, their institutional affiliation (place(s) of employment), organisations, institutions, and vehicles.”
According to the law, for the purpose of performing official duties without disclosing their real activities or identities, employees of the Russian foreign intelligence bodies are appointed to parallel positions, such as executive branch bodies (ministries, public agencies/entities, etc.), other state institutions (including state-owned companies), and structures and organisations not directly related to the executive branch.
What the Open-Source Data Shows
The current director of the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service, Sergey Naryshkin, appointed to this position by Vladimir Putin in 2016, publicly indicates that he simultaneously holds two other positions. Specifically, he is the chairman of the Russian Historical Society organisation and the chairman of the board of trustees of the Modern History Foundation. The Russian Historical Society, in its current form, as established in 2012, cooperates with dozens of organisations internationally.
Among the founders and members of the Russian Historical Society are organisations such as the Russkiy Mir Foundation, the Imperial Orthodox Palestine Society (Evgeniy Primakov’s grandson, Evgeniy Primakov [junior] is a member of the supervisory board of the organisation), the international media organisation Russia Today (Sputnik is a subsidiary of this state media organisation), universities such as the Moscow State Institute of International Relations – MGIMO, Moscow State University – MSU, and over 150 Russian state funded educational facilities, museums, and media organisations.
In turn, Russkiy Mir cooperates with the Gorchakov Foundation, which, for example, is represented in Georgia and many other countries under the title ‘the Primakov Foundation,’ carrying the name of the first head of Russia’s Foreign Intelligence Service – Evgeniy Primakov.
The Imperial Orthodox Palestine Society also has representations in several countries, including Georgia, Hungary, and Serbia. The Russian universities that are founding members have signed formal memoranda of cooperation with numerous universities in the EU and US, including double degrees, representative offices, etc.
The Chamber of Commerce and Industry of the Russian Federation, which was transformed and reformed by the founding father of Russian foreign intelligence, Evgeniy Primakov, is represented in over 40 countries around the world. The organisation, with the motto “For the benefit of business! For the benefit of Russia!” aims to strengthen positions for Russian companies and fortify trade relations between Russia and other states, ultimately increasing the share of Russian interests in their economies. The organisation has formal agreements with over 2000 foreign business associations and is a co-founder of over 70 business councils.
The organisation is represented in Georgia through the Russo-Georgian Business Council, headed by ethnic Russian Yuri Balashov, who also represents the Russian Chamber of Commerce in Monaco. The council has organised multiple events both in Georgia and Russia.
The members and affiliates of the council, some of whom are leaders of pro-Russian political parties in Georgia, have publicly expressed their support of the Georgievsky Treaty II (a treaty through which Russia annexed the Kingdom of Georgia in the early 18th century) and of the political neutrality of Georgia, and have been active in disseminating pro-Russian and anti-Western disinformation.
Why do Museums, Media Outlets, and Universities Matter?
On January 18, 2020, during his meeting with WW2 veterans and “patriotic unions,” President Putin stated: “We will create a centre of archival documents, photo and video materials, and we will shut the mouths of those who are trying to falsify history…” He then added: “We will shut this filthy mouth that certain figures abroad open to achieve their short-term political goals, and we will do so using truthful, documented information.”
By the time Putin delivered this speech, the SVR’s chief Naryshkin had already refurbished the website of the intelligence service. The publications thereafter became more systematic, methodical, and structured. Prior to this, the SVR’s statements were scattered throughout the Russian-language media; however, by 2020, the service had already finished the transitioning process.
Naryshkin brought the “right knowledge of history” to a wider audience. The SVR began declassifying archives more often, and publishing articles on famous Soviet spies, with a focus on their exceptional biographies and heroic deeds. Aside from prominent Soviet intelligence operatives, the SVR began publishing its versions of episodes from recent history. Naryshkin, who frequently holds meetings with various academic and other communities in Russia and abroad, has been incorporating these “retold stories” into his speeches.
This “declassified” intelligence is then adopted and utilised by schools, museums, universities, media, and other organisations as the “correct, right, and true knowledge” after undergoing review by central government censorship. This information is the default knowledge upon which the Russian-language media operating around the world is building its narratives.
SVR Statements: A Key Operational Instrument
Public statements issued by the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service count among the overt operational methods defined by federal law. The service makes direct statements only in special cases. The service divides its releases intended for the media into three main categories: ‘The Foreign Intelligence Service of Russia is Authorised to Declare,’ ‘Publications in the Media,’ and ‘Telegrams.’ The majority of the publications from the ‘SVR is Authorised to Declare’ category begin with the phrase: “Based on the information received by the SVR.”
Telegrams mainly include official congratulations, honors, and condolences from the head of the service. Publications aggregate the service’s statements that have been published by various media outlets. Statements from the first category mentioned above have been published on the service’s current website since 2020, and concern events of particular importance to Russia taking place outside its borders. In this way, the service highlights spheres of interest that are particularly relevant to Russia.
These publications are then regularly supplied to dozens of predominantly Russian-language media outlets that purposefully generate information flows inside and outside Russia.
Stylistics and Terminology of the Statements
The service utilises specific, distinct stylistics and wording in its publications. For instance, the Russian media outlets began publishing articles such as that titled: The Foreign Intelligence Service (of Russia) Exposed the Plans of Patriarch Bartholomew. The article concerned the current Ecumenical Patriarch of Constantinople, who, according to the source, was intervening in other countries’ internal affairs. The information originated from the SVR’s official statement and aired shortly before the articles were published. The SVR information was titled: “Варфоломей забылся в своем высокомерии,” a phrase can be translated directly as “Bartholomew was lost in his arrogance,” or “got confused in his pride,” and indirectly as “developed an exaggerated idea of his capabilities” or “overestimated himself.” The title of this publication is stylistically more informal, and such headlines for formal statements are uncharacteristic of Russia’s official public bodies.
However, the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service frequently uses such stylistics for statement headlines, and within texts themselves. In a statement published in January 2026, the service called Patriarch Bartholomew “the devil incarnate” (Russian: дьявол во плоти) and the “Antichrist of Constantinople,” citing his interference in the affairs of the churches of the Baltic states as the reason.
In another case, in 2025, a statement published by the SVR concerning Armenia was titled “поцелуй Еревана” or “A Kiss from Yerevan.” Another article related to France said: “Наполеон, Карл XII, Макрон – траектория падения” (“Napoleon, Charles XII, Macron – Trajectory of a Fall [Decline]”). This, of course, is no accident. It is well known that the Russian authorities, and before that the authorities of the Soviet Union, carefully and meticulously choose their wording and official language in public relations and other fields of activity.
Therefore, when reviewing these statements, particular attention should be paid to the terminology, stylistics, the periods of publication, and the social and political processes taking place around the target audience and countries. It is also noteworthy that the words used by political actors and media outlets in the countries that Russia considers to be in its sphere of influence frequently coincide with the specific terms and phrases originating in the statements of the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service.
Pro-Russian Information Campaigns in States within Russia’s Sphere of Interest
A study published by the German Marshall Fund in 2019 describes the situation in the Balkan countries in terms of pro-Russian and anti-Western campaigns. According to the study, information campaigns became especially active during pre-election periods, with multiple attempts made to create positive backgrounds for pro-Russian political parties and actors.
Alongside the election periods, (dis)information campaigns in those countries included in the study also aimed at strengthening religious (Orthodox Christian) national movements, as well as fueling domestic ethnic separatism. According to the research outcomes, information campaigns were conducted by Russian media outlets operating in local languages, such as Sputnik, and local pro-Russian/anti-Western media outlets.
Furthermore, in 2018, in North Macedonia, anti-Western disinformation entered a particularly active phase in the information domain, calling pro-Western forces within the country “traitors,” while anti-Western forces were declared as “patriots.” The wave of disinformation also fueled ethnic tension between North Macedonians and Albanians.
According to the results of a 2017 poll, Russian President Vladimir Putin was at the time considered the politician with the highest level of trustworthiness among the population of Serbia. During his visit to Belgrade in 2019, Putin said that the West was forcing on the Serbs “an artificial choice” between the West and Russia. Articles by Naryshkin have also been distributed multiple times in the Serbian media. The “forced choice” is also found in statements related to Georgia created by the Foreign Intelligence Service of Russia.
There were also similarities identified in information campaigns conducted in recent years in Georgia and Hungary, where the ex-Prime Minister of Hungary, Viktor Orbán, actively began making anti-Ukrainian and anti-Western statements. One phrase that Orbán and his team members used from the start of the full-scale Russia-Ukraine war drew particular attention: that of Hungary “being dragged into the war” (in Hungarian: belesodródni), suggesting that the West, EU, and the “EU puppet” opposition parties wanted Hungary brought into the war against Russia. According to Orbán, the EU and the West equaled war; he and his party equaled peace.
This matches exactly the narrative presented in Georgia, from 2022 onwards, by the leaders and members of the ruling Georgian Dream party. They have, on numerous occasions, claimed that the West is demanding Georgian Dream involve Georgia in the war against Russia. The wording “being dragged into the war” has been heard repeatedly. In 2023, in an interview published in Russian media, the head of the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service, Naryshkin, also stated that the West wanted to “drag Georgia into the war.” Indeed, in 2022, he claimed that the West was trying to “impose a global war” on the world.