The Russian Geostrategy Monitor is a monthly brief that tracks Russian geostrategy worldwide employing the framework set in The Structure of Modern Russia’s Foreign Strategy. Russian geostrategic activities are also tracked on the regularly updated interactive Russian Geostrategy Map.

Issue 42 covers the Russian geostrategy for the month of June 2026. The numbering and contents of the Outcomes, Goals and Objectives follows The Structure of Modern Russia’s Foreign Strategy framework.

Objective 3: Enhancing internal political instability and polarization within Western states

  • A BBC investigation published on 15 June identified a Russian diplomat, Evgeny Lyukshin, as the likely handler behind arson attacks on the British Prime Minister Starmer’s properties, as well as a fake far-right group called Direct Action used to stir societal division in the UK.

Objective 7: Achieving instability in the Western Balkans

  • At a meeting with Bosnia’s Republika Srpska political leader Dodik on 5 June, the Russian foreign minister Lavrov claimed a systematic assault on the Dayton Accords was underway by the Bosnian authorities and the West, calling it “extremely dangerous.”

Objective 8: Undermining US Foreign Policy in the Western Hemisphere

  • On 10 June, Russia’s foreign ministry declared full solidarity with the Cuban regime, condemning US “intimidation” and unilateral restrictive measures against Cuba, and describing the American blockade as a method of the US administration to establish control over Cuba in line with attempts to revive the “Monroe Doctrine.”

Objective 9: Achieving de-sovereignization of Ukraine

  • In the Russo-Ukrainian War, in June 2026, Russians pushed forward in Kostyantynivka with heavy fighting continuing within the city, while Ukrainians were attacking on the front south of Zaporizhzhia.

Objective 16: Entrenching Russian influence in sub-Saharan Africa

  • Unofficial Russian sources reported on 6 June that the port of Conakry in Guinea was being used as a transit route for weapons and equipment flowing to Russia’s African Corps in Mali.

Objective 28: Achieving decisive influence over Armenia

  • The New York Times reported on 5 June that Kremlin-linked groups were flooding Armenian social media with disinformation ahead of the 7 June parliamentary election, spreading fabricated narratives against Armenian Prime Minister Pashinyan across platforms via bot networks, fake news sites, and doctored celebrity videos, in “an unusually intense barrage of overt and covert influence operations.”
  • International election monitors stated that Russia had exercisedunprecedented pressure” on Armenia‘s 7 June parliamentary election using public threats and trade measures, with the head of the European Parliament observer delegation condemning “blatant interference in the domestic affairs of a sovereign state.”