The Russian Geostrategy Monitor is a monthly brief that tracks Russian geostrategy worldwide employing the framework set in The Structure of Modern Russia’s Foreign Strategy. Russian geostrategic activities are also tracked on the regularly updated interactive Russian Geostrategy Map.
Issue 41 covers the Russian geostrategy for the month of May 2026. The numbering and contents of the Outcomes, Goals and Objectives follows The Structure of Modern Russia’s Foreign Strategy framework.
Objective 2: Strengthening the Western political forces considered by Moscow to be inimical to the Western-led international order, and the Kremlin’s relationships with such forces
- On 16 May, the Kremlin envoy Kirill Dmitriev publicly praised the German AfD party as the “hope for Germans“, citing the party’s reported 36 percent poll lead in the state of Mecklenburg-Vorpommern ahead of September 2026 state elections in Berlin, Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, and Saxony.
Objective 5: Thwarting policies of the US and its allies in the MENA region
- On 9 May, The New York Times reported that Russia had been shipping drone components to Iran through the Caspian Sea, helping the Iranian regime rebuild its drone arsenal, while also supplying goods that normally transit the US-blockaded Strait of Hormuz. Four Iranian Caspian ports were reportedly operating around the clock to receive food imports including wheat, corn, animal feed, and sunflower oil rerouted through this corridor.
Objective 8: Undermining US Foreign Policy in the Western Hemisphere
- On 15 May, Russian foreign minister Lavrov held a meeting with the Cuban foreign minister Rodriguez Parrilla, confirming Moscow’s readiness to provide Cuba with “politico-diplomatic and material support” amid US pressure, while backing the Cuban regime’s demand for an immediate end to the US trade and financial blockade.
Objective 9: Achieving de-sovereignization of Ukraine
- In the Russo-Ukrainian War, in May 2026, the Russians advanced within Kostyantynivka city where intense fighting continued. Both sides made minor gains at various sections of the rest of the frontline.
Objective 28: Achieving decisive influence over Armenia
- On 1 May, the Speaker of the Armenian parliament said that Russia was conducting a political operation aiming to change the ruling party in Armenia, attempting to exploit the country’s democracy as a weakness.
- On 12 May, Russian State Duma Speaker Volodin made a menacing parallel between Armenian Prime Minister Pashinyan’s recent steps, including inviting Ukraine’s President Zelensky to a summit in Yerevan, and how things “began in Ukraine,” warning that Russia-Armenia relations would grow more tense as a result.
- On 15 May, Stratfor reported that the pro-Kremlin Matryoshka bot network was publishing hundreds of fake videos targeting Armenian Prime Minister Pashinyan ahead of the 7 June parliamentary election.
- On 19 May, The Insider reported that Russia was deploying FSB, GRU, and SVR officers under diplomatic cover in Yerevan to subvert Armenia’s 7 June parliamentary elections. The Kremlin reportedly was backing pro-Russian opposition candidates in attempt to prevent Pashinyan’s party from winning, and coordinating the operation through a newly created presidential directorate.
- On 27 May, Russia warned Armenia it would suspend or terminate the supply of cheap oil, gas, and rough diamonds if Yerevan continued its EU accession process, with Russian Energy Minister Tsivilev’s letter describing Armenia’s EU policy as incompatible with the bilateral partnership.
- On 28 May, Russia banned Armenian tomatoes, cucumbers, peppers, leafy vegetables, and strawberries, following earlier bans on Armenian flowers, mineral water, and brandy.
- On 29 May, Reuters reported that Russia was running covert influence operations ahead of Armenia’s 7 June election including “an audacious scheme to transport tens of thousands of Russian-Armenians tosway the vote” against Pashinyan.