The Russian Geostrategy Monitor is a monthly brief that tracks Russian geostrategy worldwide employing the framework set in The Structure of Modern Russia’s Foreign Strategy. Russian geostrategic activities are also tracked on the regularly updated interactive Russian Geostrategy Map.
Issue 39 covers the Russian geostrategy for the month of March 2026. The numbering and contents of the Outcomes, Goals and Objectives follows The Structure of Modern Russia’s Foreign Strategy framework.
Objective 2: Strengthening the Western political forces considered by Moscow to be inimical to the Western-led international order, and the Kremlin’s relationships with such forces
- On 21 March, Washington Post reported that in the run-up to Hungary‘s April 2026 general election officers from Russia’s intelligence service, SVR, troubled by Orban’s decreasing chances to win the election, had proposed a way to “fundamentally alter the entire paradigm of the election campaign” by “the staging of an assassination attempt on Viktor Orban” which SVR thought would “shift the perception of the campaign out of the rational realm of socioeconomic questions into an emotional one, where the key themes will become state security and the stability and defense of the political system.”
Objective 3: Enhancing internal political instability and polarization within Western states
- On 6 March, European officials said that “Russia’s military intelligence service is suspected to be behind a series of parcel fires” that had targeted multiple European states in 2024. The parcels contained explosive devices set off by electronic timers.
Objective 5: Thwarting policies of the US and its allies in the MENA region
- On 6 March, Washington Post reported that Russia was “providing Iran with targeting information to attack American forces in the Middle East” during the US’s and Israel’s war with Iran, giving Tehran “locations of U.S. military assets, including warships and aircraft” in what “does seem like it’s a pretty comprehensive effort.”
- On 11 March, Russia was reported to be “helping Iran with advanced drone tactics from its war in Ukraine to hit US and Gulf nation targets in the Middle East.”
- On 17 March, the Wall Street Journal reported that “Russia has been expanding its intelligence sharing and military cooperation with Iran, providing satellite imagery and improved drone technology to aid Tehran’s targeting of U.S. forces in the region,” including “components of modified Shahed drones, which are meant to improve communication, navigation and targeting.” Russia was reportedly “drawing on its experience using drones in Ukraine, offering tactical guidance on how many drones should be used in operations and what altitudes they should strike from.”
Objective 5: Thwarting policies of the US and its allies in the MENA region and Objective 21: Alignment with Iran
- On 4 March, Russia accused the US of “using an imaginary threat from Iran as a pretext to overthrow its constitutional order,” saying its calls for the Iranian people to seize power were “cynical and inhumane.”
- On 9 March, the Kremlin congratulated Mojtaba Khamenei on his selection as Iran’s new supreme leader, saying: “Now, when Iran is facing armed aggression, your activity in this great post undoubtedly demands much bravery and dedication.”
Objective 8: Undermining US Foreign Policy in the Western Hemisphere
- On 17 March, Moscow expressed support for the Cuban regime in the face of US pressure, saying it would continue “to provide Cuba with the necessary support, including financial support.”
Objective 9: Achieving de-sovereignization of Ukraine
- In the Russo-Ukrainian War, by March 2026, Russians had completed the capture of cities Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad. During March, both sides made a number of advances at different sections of the frontline, particularly in the south.
- On 20 March, Financial Times reported that in early March Russia had offered the US “to stop sharing targeting data with Iran if Washington agreed to end its intelligence partnership with Ukraine.” The US rejected the offer.
Objective 16: Entrenching Russian influence in sub-Saharan Africa
- On 17 March, Russian sources reported the presence of Russian troops in Togo, including the country’s capital Lome.
- Also on 17 March, Africa Intelligence reported that Russia’s Africa Corps was preparing to deploy forces on a permanent basis at the Diéma camp, located 350 kilometers north of the capital of Mali, widening its presence in the country.
- On 4 March, the Russian foreign ministry stated that on 27 February 2026 Russia had delivered a humanitarian aid package to Madagascar, with the country’s leadership participating in the official ceremony dedicated to the Russian cargo’s arrival.