The Russian Geostrategy Monitor is a monthly brief that tracks Russian geostrategy worldwide employing the framework set in The Structure of Modern Russia’s Foreign Strategy. Russian geostrategic activities are also tracked on the regularly updated interactive Russian Geostrategy Map. You can see older issues of the Monitor here.
Issue 25 covers the Russian geostrategy for the month of November 2025. The numbering and contents of the Outcomes, Goals and Objectives follows The Structure of Modern Russia’s Foreign Strategy framework.
Objective 3: Enhancing internal political instability and polarization within Western states
- On 23 November, Sweden’s chief of defense staff said that Russia was combining “sabotage, special operations, even attacks against individuals” with attacks on critical infrastructure and “exploiting vulnerabilities in the information environment” in order to “split us up” and “break up cohesion” in the Western societies, adding that Russia was “controlling trafficking routes for migrants and drugs” in Africa which “transports very quickly . . . to the whole of Europe and NATO territory.”
Objective 7: Achieving instability in the Western Balkans
- On 27 November, the Russian foreign ministry spokesperson made a statement about a documentary film festival in Bosnia’s Serbian administrative entity (Republika Srpska) held on 17 November, praising a Russian film shown there “reflecting the commonality of tragic destinies of the residents of Donbas and Republika Srpska.” The Russian ambassador to Bosnia and speaker of the Republika Srpska legislature had participated in the opening ceremony of the festival.
Objective 8: Undermining US Foreign Policy in the Western Hemisphere
- On 1 November, Moscow denounced “excessive military force” by the United States in the Caribbean Sea, and reaffirmed its support for the Maduro regime in Venezuela.
- On 17 November, Intelligence Online reported that Russia had sent “drone experts from the Rubicon special unit” to Venezuela. The Russian instructors “from the elite unit were discreetly flown out to Venezuela in an Il-76 aircraft affiliated with the Russian armed forces,” tasked with training the Maduro regime’s armed forces in the use of “FPV and wire-guided drones.”
- On 27 November, the Russian foreign ministry criticized US President Trump‘s statement in support of a candidate in the presidential election in Honduras, calling it “a gross interference in the electoral process and internal affairs of a sovereign nation,” and expressing a conviction that the people of Honduras would not make a choice “imposed by someone from the outside.”
Objective 9: Achieving de-sovereignization of Ukraine
- In the Russo-Ukrainian War, during November 2025, the Russians advanced on the frontline east of Zaporizhzhia, approaching the town of Hulyaipole. They also advanced within the city of Pokrovsk, and entered towns Novopavlivka and Siversk.
- On 16 November, Russian intelligence assets conducted two acts of sabotage on a railway line in Poland used to supply aid to Ukraine.
Objective 16: Entrenching Russian influence in sub-Saharan Africa
- Russian sources reported in November 2025 that Russia and Equatorial Guinea had agreed to widen their “cooperation in the security sphere,” possibly resulting in an increased number of Russian military specialists in this African country.

