“Post-Soviet Conflicts Watch” offers a comprehensive analysis of ongoing conflicts and post-conflict developments across the post-Soviet space. This report presents an overview of significant events and trends in the Russian-occupied regions of Georgia, Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali region, as well as the breakaway region of Transnistria, the autonomous entity of Gagauzia, and other areas within the post-Soviet space. In addition, the review addresses issues pertaining to the Armenian-Azerbaijani peace negotiation process following the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War.
Note: The review does not cover issues related to Russia’s military aggression in Ukraine.
Armenia and Azerbaijan
Fourth Civil Sector Meeting
From April 10 to 12, 2026, as part of the “Bridge of Peace” initiative, a bilateral roundtable took place in Gabala, Azerbaijan, bringing together civil society representatives from both Armenia and Azerbaijan. Notably, the Armenian delegation entered Azerbaijan via the newly delimited and demarcated land border.
The roundtable gathered 20 experts from Armenia and Azerbaijan, along with civil society and media representatives. This event marked the fourth such meeting in the ongoing dialogue series: the first took place in Yerevan (October 2025), the second in Baku (December 2025), and the third in Tsaghkadzor, Armenia (February 2026).
The initiative is designed to promote dialogue and facilitate direct contact between civil society representatives from both countries. It operates on two fronts: one engages Azerbaijani and Armenian communities in mutual exchange, while the other develops and implements collaborative projects. The overarching goal is to prepare both societies for lasting peace. This dialogue forms part of the bilateral peace agenda endorsed at the trilateral summit of Azerbaijan, Armenia and the United States, held in Washington on August 8, 2025.
Civil society representatives addressed the full spectrum of issues on the official bilateral negotiation agenda, ranging from the signing of a peace agreement to the removal of restrictions on regional transport links. Over the two-day meeting, four discussion sessions were held: two focused on geopolitical and political matters, and two explored future civil society initiatives.
At the concluding press conference, Armenian coordinator Areg Kochinyan, President of the Council of Armenia, emphasized that the initiative had enabled tangible progress toward normalisation between Azerbaijan and Armenia, while Azerbaijani coordinator Farkhad Mammadov, Director of the South Caucasus Research Centre, highlighted the creation of a new format for Azerbaijani–Armenian relations. Both parties noted the symbolic importance of accessing the last two meetings via the land border.
The participants were received by Hikmet Hajiyev, Head of the Foreign Policy Department of the Azerbaijani Presidential Administration and Assistant to the President followed by a discussion that lasted two hours.
In addition to high-level political talks, the convening of such gatherings is crucial for the peace process, as it engages the public in implementing the peace agenda, and encourages improved relations between the two countries.
More Transit Cargo for Armenia
On April 11, 2026, Azerbaijan dispatched another shipment of diesel fuel to Armenia: 15 wagons carrying 887 tonnes. Subsequent deliveries included 22 wagons on April 14, and 22 wagons (974 tonnes) on April 21. Diesel fuel currently reaches Armenia via Georgia from the Bilajaristation, a key railway hub in Baku. To date, Azerbaijan has exported 7,610 tonnes of diesel fuel, 979 tonnes of AI-92 gasoline, and 2,955 tonnes of AI-95 gasoline to Armenia.
On October 21, 2025, President Ilham Aliyev announced at a joint press conference with Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev that Azerbaijan had lifted all restrictions on goods transit through Armenia imposed after the First Nagorno-Karabakh War. The first transit cargo sent to Armenia was Kazakh wheat, followed by regular imports of oil products from Azerbaijan.
Regular shipments of wheat, fertilizers, and other goods now reach Armenia via Azerbaijan. For instance, on April 24, five wagons with 350 tonnes of wheat departed from Russia to Armenia.
The State Revenue Committee of Armenia and the Ministry of Economy released import statistics for goods from Russia and Kazakhstan via Azerbaijan between November 2025 and April 15, 2026. Data for imports from Azerbaijan through Georgia were also published.
In total, Armenia imported 26,295 tonnes of goods from Russia and Kazakhstan and 9,337 tonnes of fuel from Azerbaijan. The first rail shipment of goods through Azerbaijan took place on November 6, 2025.
During this period, Armenia imported 24,865 tonnes of wheat, 1,362 tonnes of fertilizer, and 68 tonnes of buckwheat from Russia and Kazakhstan. From December 2025 to April 15, 2026, 9,337 tonnes of Azerbaijani fuel arrived in Armenia by rail via Georgia, valued at $7.2 million; comprising 5,398 tonnes of diesel fuel ($4.3 million) and 3,939 tonnes of gasoline ($2.9 million).
The rapid opening of transport routes is poised to positively impact the peace process and help Armenia overcome its isolation. While full implementation requires time and infrastructure development, frequent bilateral meetings and official statements demonstrate both countries’ readiness to advance new regional transport links. These efforts are set to reshape transport routes and create a new geopolitical reality in the region.
Statements on TRIPP
On August 8, 2025, a peace summit initiated by U.S. President Donald Trump took place in Washington, bringing together the leaders of Azerbaijan and Armenia. Both trilateral and bilateral agreements were signed during the summit, which also saw the announcement of the “Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity” (TRIPP) transport corridor project. On January 13, 2026, following a meeting in Washington between U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio and Armenian Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan, the “Framework Agreement for the Implementation of the Trump Route” was released.
Preparatory work for TRIPP is underway. In April, the Armenian authorities issued several statements underscoring their eagerness to begin project implementation promptly, including through the launch of specific infrastructure activities.
Armenian Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan stated that many countries have shown interest in the Armenian-American TRIPP project. He noted that the parties are currently documenting the work and preparing to sign an intergovernmental agreement, with the aim of soon advancing to the construction phase, which will require third-party partners.
Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, speaking in parliament, emphasised that the TRIPP initiative is not stalled, but is instead accelerating. He affirmed that the project remains a top U.S. priority, and noted Azerbaijan’s parallel interest.
Pashinyan also highlighted Kazakhstan’s interest in TRIPP, naming the country a major player in international transport, particularly for cargo flows to and from China. The Armenian government has openly expressed its wish to transfer management of the Armenian railway from Russia to Kazakhstan. It is a move Russia opposes, viewing it as an attempt to diminish its influence over new regional transport routes.
Hikmet Hajiyev, Head of the Foreign Policy Department of the Azerbaijani Presidential Administration, described TRIPP as a strategically vital connectivity corridor. At the Anatolian Diplomatic Forum, he emphasised the fact that Azerbaijan, Armenia, and the United States are working together on the trilateral regional initiative to connect Central Asia, the South Caucasus, and Europe. Hajiyev identified Armenia as both a key transit country and key participant in this network. TRIPP was also discussed with Rebecca Neff, Principal Advisor for the U.S. State Department’s Bureau of Economic, Energy, and Business Affairs, during her visit to Baku.
Restoring the Gyumri-Kars Railway Line
On April 28, 2026, officials from Armenia and Türkiye met in Kars to advance the normalisation of bilateral relations by discussing the restoration of the Gyumri–Kars railway line. The United States and the European Union regarded the meeting as a positive development. Armenia is actively advocating for the swift reopening of the line, hoping to enable a direct transport link between Azerbaijan and Türkiye that passes through Armenian territory.
The normalisation process between Yerevan and Istanbul began in December 2021, shortly after the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War. In 2022, both parties agreed to open their border to third-country nationals and to allow direct cargo air transport, although these measures remain unimplemented.
Agreement on the Principles of Border Delimitation
Notable progress is evident in multiple aspects of Armenian-Azerbaijani relations, particularly regarding the state border agreement. On April 29, 2026, the 13th meeting of the State Border Delimitation Commission convened in Aghveran, Armenia. Participants addressed border security and technical delimitation issues, reaching consensus on the principles of the process.
Transnistria
“1+1” Meeting
On April 16, 2026, the second “1+1” meeting of the year took place at the OSCE Mission Office in Tiraspol, the capital of the breakaway Transnistria region. Deputy Prime Minister for Reintegration Valeriu Chieveri represented Chișinău, while de facto Foreign Minister Vitaly Ignatiev represented Tiraspol. Chieveri proposed signing a declaration to resume negotiations, emphasising respect for Moldova’s territorial integrity. Ignatiev objected, resulting in a dispute. The remainder of the meeting was held behind closed doors. Both parties maintained their positions but agreed to continue discussions.
The first “1+1” meeting of the year took place on February 26, 2026, in Tiraspol, following a lengthy pause since the previous meeting on February 8, 2025.
At the same time, the state of emergency in Transnistria’s economy was extended for 30 days due to ongoing gas supply instability and external economic pressure. Gas shortages have been causing energy disruptions and shutdowns in the region since 2025.
Enhancing Security along the Ukraine-Transnistria Border
Mykhailo Podoliak, adviser to the head of the Ukrainian presidential administration, has stated that Ukraine is intensifying security measures along its border with Transnistria. He identified the presence of Russian military forces in Transnistria as a significant threat, raising concerns that the territory could serve as a platform for attacks on Ukrainian infrastructure and logistics. Podoliak warned that Russia might use Transnistria to conduct simulated strikes against Ukraine’s rear or to target supply routes. In response, Ukraine has implemented various defensive measures, such as mining, reinforcing border units, and establishing additional control zones. Although the border crossings in the separatist region have not functioned for decades, Ukraine maintains constant oversight.
One of Russia’s objectives in its military aggression against Ukraine was to secure control over the land border with Transnistria, an outcome that would have enabled greater leverage over both Ukraine and Moldova. Currently, only a limited Russian military contingent remains in Transnistria, with rotation and logistics hampered by the absence of a direct land route from Russia. Additionally, the Moldovan government in Chișinău has imposed restrictions on airspace use by the Russian forces.
Shoigu’s Threat
In an interview with Komsomolskaya Pravda on April 21, 2026, Russian Security Council Secretary Sergei Shoigu claimed that Chișinău, with the support of the European Union, is attempting to expel the Russian Armed Forces operational group from Transnistria. On April 17, the Moldovan Main Migration Inspectorate designated the group’s leadership as undesirable persons, restricting their movement within Moldova. Shoigu characterised these actions as a deliberate attempt by Moldovan authorities to escalate tensions. He further asserted that Russia would employ all permissible means to protect its citizens in Transnistria, should the need arise.
In response, the Moldovan Reintegration Bureau issued a statement on April 22 rejecting Shoigu’s remarks as unfounded and misleading, emphasising that they do not accurately reflect the situation in Transnistria. The Bureau reiterated Chișinău’s commitment to a peaceful, sustainable resolution based on sovereignty and territorial integrity. Deputy Prime Minister Valeriu Chieveri also underscored the necessity of a peaceful settlement, characterising the presence of Russian troops in Transnistria as illegal. The Foreign Ministry further denied any threats posed to Russian citizens residing in Transnistria.
Central Asia
Kazakhstan’s oil exports declined by 21.5% in the first quarter of 2026, largely due to air strikes targeting the Caspian Pipeline Consortium since last year. This pipeline, which accounts for 80% of Kazakhstan’s oil exports via Russian territory and the port of Novorossiysk, is vital to the Kazakh economy. Throughout Russia’s ongoing military aggression against Ukraine, Ukrainian air forces have repeatedly targeted pipeline infrastructure in Novorossiysk as part of retaliatory measures, resulting in significant operational disruptions.
Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali Region
Russian Initiatives on New Transit Routes and Occupied Regions
Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine has prompted a significant reconfiguration of international transport routes. Facing Western sanctions, Russia is intensifying efforts to establish alternative corridors, including those traversing the Russian-occupied regions of Georgia: Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali region. As a result, new transit initiatives involving these territories have gained increased relevance in recent years.
On April 5, 2026, Alexander Shokhin, head of the Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs of Russia, announced that a new North–South international transport corridor could connect Russia and Türkiye via Georgia. He emphasized the need to explore alternative routes, specifically mentioning connections through North and South Ossetia (the occupied Tskhinvali region) and Abkhazia. Shokhin noted that restoring diplomatic relations with Georgia would be necessary to realise these projects, and acknowledged the complexity of such decisions, although he argued they may be less challenging than resolving Middle East crises.
Earlier, on April 1, 2026, Sergey Menyailo, head of the Republic of North Ossetia-Alania, also highlighted the prospects of a North–South transport corridor, identifying South and North Ossetia as key branches. He argued that this route would enhance the region’s transit potential, and could serve as a vital logistics artery for the Caucasus.
Given the persistent congestion on the Georgian Military Road and at the Larsi checkpoint, the sole road connection between Russia and Georgia, Menyailo discussed developing two North–South corridor branches: the Transcaucasian Highway, linking the occupied Tskhinvali region with Russia, and the Ossetian Military Road. He noted that political challenges, particularly Georgia’s stance on the Tskhinvali region, complicate the use of the Transcaucasian Highway for Russian cargo bound for Armenia and Iran. In contrast, the Ossetian Military Road would require restoring only a single section (between Lsiri in North Ossetia and Glola in Georgia’s Oni municipality), a project he described as technically feasible. This route, passing through the low-lying Mamisoni Pass, would offer Russia a shorter connection to Black Sea ports.
Menyailo also described the restoration of the railway as technically challenging but achievable. He noted that the North Caucasus railway is operational between Darg-Kokh and Alagir in North Ossetia, while any extension would hinge on political developments with Georgia. Menyailo identified the optimal solution as the construction of a branch from Alagir to Tskhinvali through “South Ossetia”, which would facilitate direct links to Gori, Tbilisi, and Gyumri (home to a Russian military base) in Armenia. Despite these benefits, Georgia’s current position blocks realisation of the project, although Menyailo observed growing support for Russian-led transport initiatives in the region.
Within Russia, Georgia’s stance on the occupied regions is viewed as the primary barrier to advancing these initiatives. The Georgian government typically refrains from official comment, instead reiterating its demand for the de-occupation of Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali region as a precondition for any such project; a requirement deemed unacceptable in Moscow.
The Fuel Crisis in Russia and the Impact on the Occupied Regions
Russia has implemented a temporary restriction on gasoline exports, citing rising oil prices driven by instability in the Middle East and the need to stabilise the domestic fuel market. These restrictions exclude the occupied regions, which have been allocated quotas under bilateral agreements. Nevertheless, fuel prices in Abkhazia have risen, as explained by the de facto Ministry of Energy: “The increase in fuel prices in Abkhazia is due to a combination of external factors, the state of international energy markets, ongoing developments in the Russian market, and logistical challenges.” Local energy companies Azid and Apsni-Oil attributed the price hikes to higher procurement costs for petroleum products from Russia. To mitigate the surge, de facto authorities have begun utilising previously stockpiled fuel acquired at lower prices.
Since the onset of Russia’s full-scale military aggression in Ukraine, Moscow has repeatedly imposed fuel export restrictions. These measures adversely affect the occupied regions, as both Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali region rely exclusively on Russian fuel supplies.
First Contact with Somalia
According to the de facto Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Minister Oleg Bartsits met on April 5 with Adana Muna Abdi and Ismail Hassan Nuuri, designated as “confidential representatives” of Somalia’s Foreign Minister. The Somali delegation was in Abkhazia to attend the “International Economic Forum” (“Abkhazia – Investments in the Future”). During the meeting, a range of cooperative opportunities were discussed, notably Somalia’s interest in importing drinking water from Abkhazia.
Abkhazia’s efforts to cultivate relations with African countries are challenged by geographical distance and political obstacles. Nevertheless, with Russian backing, Sokhumi has recently intensified its outreach to Africa. For instance, on October 20, 2025, Bartsits met with Isaac Kumesina, the so-called Ambassador-at-Large of the de facto Ministry of Foreign Affairs, who was tasked with promoting Abkhazia’s interests across the continent. Sokhumi’s broader strategy involves expanding international ties and pursuing recognition, with Africa representing a relatively untapped direction.
Diplomatic relations between Somalia and Georgia were established in 2011. In 2012, Somalia supported a UN General Assembly resolution affirming the right of return for refugees and internally displaced persons to Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali region. In recent years, however, Somalia has ceased participating in these votes. The Somali government exercises authority over only part of the country, while separatists control the north. In 2025, Israel became the first country to recognise the independence of the separatist region of Somaliland.