Post-Soviet Conflicts Watch monitors ongoing conflicts and post-conflict developments throughout the post-Soviet region. The publication analyses key events and trends in Georgia’s Russian-occupied Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali region (so-called South Ossetia), as well as in Transnistria, Gagauzia, and other areas. It also covers the Armenian-Azerbaijani peace process following on from the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War.
Note: This review does not cover developments related to Russia’s ongoing military aggression against Ukraine.
Armenia and Azerbaijan
Azerbaijani Exports to Armenia
According to the State Customs Committee of Azerbaijan, goods worth USD 17.129 million were exported from Azerbaijan to Armenia during the first six months of 2026. Azerbaijani exports consist primarily of fuel products. Azerbaijani media claim the first half of 2026 also saw the export of 1.4 tonnes of plastic construction components, valued at approximately USD 5,900. Armenian media reported that Armenia, in turn, exported goods worth USD 960 to Azerbaijan, consisting of greenhouse flowers.
On 21 October 2025, Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev, during a joint press conference with Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, announced that Azerbaijan had lifted all restrictions on the transit of cargo to Armenia that had been imposed following the end of the First Nagorno-Karabakh War. The first transit shipment was of Kazakh wheat. Subsequently, Armenia also began receiving petroleum products from Azerbaijan on a regular basis. The first shipment of Azerbaijani fuel arrived in Armenia on 19 December 2025.
Following President Aliyev’s announcement, the transportation of fuel and other transit cargoes towards Armenia commenced. In July 2026, the following shipments were transported: 3 July: 976 tonnes of wheat (14 railway wagons); 6 July: 30 railway wagons of propane; 10 July: 470 tonnes of propane (14 wagons) and 339 tonnes of fertiliser (5 wagons); and, on 13 July, 490 tonnes of wheat (7 wagons).
As of 13 July, the total volume of cargo transported from Russia to Armenia via Azerbaijan amounted to 36,000 tonnes of wheat; 8,000 tonnes of fertiliser; 1,136 tonnes of propane; 133 tonnes of aluminium; 414 tonnes of anthracite; and 68 tonnes of buckwheat.
Fuel continues to constitute the main Azerbaijani export to Armenia. As of 13 July, Azerbaijan had exported 14,000 tonnes of diesel fuel, and 5,000 tonnes of AI-92 and AI-95 petrol.
According to President Ilham Aliyev, at a time when many countries around the world are experiencing fuel shortages, Armenia has a reliable source of supply in Azerbaijan.
The opening and rapid operationalisation of transport routes is expected to have a clearly positive impact on the peace process and contribute to overcoming Armenia’s isolation. Although the full operation of these transport corridors will require time and the implementation of several infrastructure projects, the statements made by government representatives of both countries and the increasing frequency of bilateral meetings indicate that the process has gained momentum and that both sides are prepared to develop new transport routes. This is expected to contribute to the reconfiguration of regional transport corridors and the emergence of a new geopolitical reality in the South Caucasus.
TRIPP Developments
Brief Overview of TRIPP
On 8 August 2025, at the initiative of U.S. President Donald Trump, a peace summit was held in Washington with the participation of the leaders of Azerbaijan and Armenia. During the summit, both trilateral and bilateral agreements were signed. The summit also announced a transport corridor project entitled the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP).
On 13 January 2026, following a meeting in Washington between U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio and Armenian Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan, the Framework Agreement for the Implementation of the Trump Route was published. On 4 June, Foreign Minister Mirzoyan announced that the framework agreement on the TRIPP project between Armenia and the United States had been signed a few days earlier by himself and U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio.
At this stage, preparatory activities for the implementation of TRIPP are underway, although concrete infrastructure works have not yet commenced.
The Ratification Process
On 16 July 2026, the Government of Armenia approved a draft law initiating the ratification of the Framework Agreement on Strategic Cooperation between the Republic of Armenia and the United States concerning the TRIPP project. This decision marks the beginning of the ratification process. Before parliamentary approval, the agreement will be submitted to the Constitutional Court.
According to Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan, two additional documents must be completed before the establishment of TRIPP can be finalised: a shareholders’ agreement, and the adoption of the charter of the TRIPP Development Company. The company will be authorised to establish special-purpose entities responsible for implementing individual infrastructure projects.
Another Visit by AECOM to Armenia
In July, representatives of the American engineering and consulting company AECOM visited Armenia to continue surveying the territory required for the implementation of TRIPP. AECOM representatives first visited Armenia on 5 February 2026. These visits are supported by the U.S. Department of State’s Global Infrastructure and Investment Partnership Fund. The engineering team is conducting technical and economic assessments and preparing proposals for the development of railway and other transport infrastructure.
TRIPP Investment Fund
The U.S. Department of State appointed Russian-born American businessman Konstantin Sokolov as Chairman of the newly established USD 200 million TRIPP+ Investment Fund.
The objective of TRIPP+ is to support the transit corridor administered by the United States not only within Armenia but also across the wider region. The fund is authorized to provide loans, equity investments, and grants to promote the strategic development of the private sector in the South Caucasus and Central Asia. According to Armenian Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan, TRIPP+ is not an alternative to the TRIPP project, but rather an instrument designed to support its implementation.
Sokolov was one of the 36 private donors who contributed to the financing of President Donald Trump’s White House Banquet Hall project. He also has business interests in Armenia, where, together with another foreign investor, he owns one of the country’s three mobile telecommunications operators, Viva Armenia.
Baku’s Assessment
On 9 July 2026, Azerbaijani Foreign Minister Jeyhun Bayramov stated that new information regarding TRIPP is expected to emerge in the near future: “At the initial stage, negotiations are taking place between the United States and Armenia,” he said. “However, both the entry and exit sections of the route are located on the territory of Azerbaijan. Therefore, our American colleagues keep us informed about the project. At this stage, the necessary documentation is being prepared.”
Although Azerbaijan is not directly involved in implementing TRIPP, the project’s objective is to establish a transport connection between Azerbaijan and Türkiye via Armenia.
Iran’s Interests
On 9 July 2026, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan stated that TRIPP directly serves Iran’s interests.
“The project is of global significance, and its value and role will continue to increase over time,” he said. “Armenia will continue cooperation with Iran, Russia, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Türkiye, the European Union, the Central Asian countries, China, and other partners.”
Pashinyan expressed hope that construction activities would begin in the autumn, and noted that implementation of the project will establish a railway connection from the Persian Gulf to the Black Sea, significantly expanding the trade and economic opportunities of both Armenia and Iran. Taking these factors into account, he argued that the project directly corresponds to Iran’s interests.
Earlier, on 8 July, Iran’s Ambassador to Armenia, Khalil Shirgolami, had stated that the Armenian Government had assured Tehran that implementation of the project would neither create challenges nor pose security risks for Iran. According to the Ambassador, risk management and the prevention of possible challenges associated with the project should remain the central issue in Armenia–Iran relations.
Iran’s position remains important for the implementation of TRIPP, as the project is planned to run along Armenia’s border with Iran. At the same time, the involvement of the United States is regarded by Tehran as a matter of national security. Consequently, one of Armenia’s principal challenges is to convince Iran that both the implementation of the project and U.S. participation in it will not pose a threat to Iranian security.
When Will the Peace Agreement Be Ready?
On 9 July 2026, Azerbaijani Foreign Minister Jeyhun Bayramov stated that Azerbaijan had completed the preparatory work necessary for concluding a peace agreement with Armenia. According to Bayramov, “The two countries are also continuing the process of delimiting the state border. Delimitation has already been completed along a 13-kilometre section of the border. By mutual agreement, the process will continue from north to south. The issue of the enclave villages will also be addressed within this framework.”
The statement indicates that the peace process is progressing simultaneously along both the political and technical tracks, with border delimitation remaining one of its principal components.
European Union Support
According to European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, the European Union will allocate EUR 200 million in grant funding under the Global Gateway initiative to support the development of transport, energy and digital connectivity in the South Caucasus. She stated that the programme is expected to mobilise approximately EUR 2 billion in public and private investment, including financing for projects such as the restoration of the railway connection with Nakhchivan and the further development of the Port of Baku.
President von der Leyen also announced a EUR 20 million programme dedicated to peacebuilding in the South Caucasus. The funding will support improvements in living conditions and healthcare in border communities, mine-clearance activities, and investments in agriculture, water resource management, and support for small and medium-sized enterprises.
Restoration of Railway Infrastructure
On 2 July 2026, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan announced that Armenia had already begun preparatory work for the restoration of two railway sections: Gyumri–Akhurik, a 12.4 km section located near the Turkish border, and Gyumri–Yeraskh, a 1.6 km section located near the border with the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic.
Prime Minister Pashinyan has stated that the country’s railway infrastructure belongs to the Republic of Armenia and should be managed by the Armenian state. Negotiations on this issue are currently underway with the Russian side, as Armenia’s railway network has been operated since 2008 by the South Caucasus Railway, a subsidiary of Russian Railways (RZD), under a 30-year concession agreement.
The future management of Armenia’s railway system has become another point of disagreement between Armenia and Russia. The Armenian Government has expressed its preference for transferring railway management to a country maintaining friendly relations with both parties, with Kazakhstan, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates mentioned as possible alternatives. Prime Minister Pashinyan also suggested the possibility of requesting USD 2 billion annually from Russia for the continued use of the railway infrastructure. In response, the Russian side has warned that, should the concession agreement be terminated, it would seek compensation for its investments.
Armenia’s Country Code in the Turkish Customs System
The Ministry of Trade of Türkiye has introduced technical modifications to the national customs system as part of the ongoing process of normalising relations with Armenia, Turkish media claims. Under the new rules, customs declarations relating to imports, exports and transit operations involving Armenia through third countries may now use Armenia’s official customs country code, “077.”
The amendments also allow cargo transported from Türkiye through third countries to Armenia to identify the country of destination or origin as “Armenia/Türkiye.” Although direct trade and border crossings between the two countries remain suspended, these technical changes demonstrate that both sides continue to advance gradually towards the normalisation of bilateral relations.
Armenian Freestyle Wrestlers in Baku
The Armenian national freestyle wrestling team travelled to Baku to participate in the World Under-17 Wrestling Championships, held from 27 July to 2 August 2026. Against the backdrop of the ongoing peace process, this marks the first occasion on which athletes from one country have participated in a sporting event hosted by the other.
Transnistria
How Many Residents Hold Moldovan Citizenship?
The Bureau for Reintegration of Moldova reported that the separatist region of Transnistria has a population of approximately 455,000, of whom around 360,000 now hold Moldovan citizenship. During the first half of 2026, more than 7,000 residents of Transnistria applied for Moldovan identity cards or passports.
It is noteworthy that Moldovan citizens residing in Transnistria received 76.3 million Moldovan lei (approximately USD 4.34 million) from the state social insurance budget during the first half of 2026, representing a significant increase compared with the same period in 2025. While approximately 2,700 residents of Transnistria received various forms of social assistance in 2025, the number exceeded 8,000 during the corresponding period of 2026.
Possession of a Moldovan passport enables residents of Transnistria to travel within the Schengen Area without a visa. Consequently, increasing numbers of residents of the separatist region have sought to obtain Moldovan citizenship documents in order to benefit from these opportunities.
According to the latest available data, approximately 4,000 pupils and university students from Transnistria are enrolled in Moldova’s general education, vocational and higher education institutions. Against the backdrop of the region’s continuing economic difficulties, employment migration from Transnistria to Chișinău has also been increasing.
Exports to the European Union
The Bureau for Reintegration of Moldova noted that 77% of Transnistria’s exports are destined for the European Union, with Romania, Italy, and Slovakia serving as the region’s principal export markets. Meanwhile, imports from the European Union account for 41.5% of total imports into the separatist region. Transnistria primarily imports goods from Ukraine, EU Member States, and China.
As Transnistria is a landlocked and internationally unrecognised territory without direct access either to Russia or the sea, exports produced in the region must comply with Moldovan legislation in order to reach international markets.
The region’s economic integration with the European Union requires local companies to comply with the legal framework, customs procedures, documentation requirements and technical standards applicable throughout the Republic of Moldova. According to the Moldovan authorities, the increasing orientation of Transnistrian businesses towards Western markets contributes to the region’s gradual reintegration into Moldova’s economic space.
European Union Representative Visits Tiraspol
On 2 July 2026, the European Union Special Representative for the Transnistrian Settlement Process, Audrone Perkauskiene, visited Moldova. She first met Prime Minister Alexandru Munteanu in Chișinău, before holding talks in Tiraspol with the separatist leader Vadim Krasnoselsky.
During the meeting in Tiraspol, the EU representative emphasised the importance of maintaining a constructive and pragmatic dialogue between Chișinău and Tiraspol. Krasnoselsky, in turn, called upon the European Union to maintain a neutral position throughout the negotiation process.
Release of Detainees
Two individuals, Yevgeny Panchokha and Emiliana Cheban, were released from detention in Transnistria after serving prison sentences on charges of “state treason.” They had originally been sentenced to 13 and 12 years’ imprisonment, respectively. Panchokha, arrested in 2018, spent eight years in detention, while Cheban served four years. Cheban was detained in 2022 after refusing to sign a ten-year military contract and for attempting to relocate to the right bank of the Dniester River.
Cheban possesses no valid identity documents and does not hold the citizenship of any state. Panchokha is a Moldovan citizen who worked in the passenger and freight transport sector before his arrest. Throughout his imprisonment, concerns regarding the deterioration of his health were repeatedly raised.
According to the Bureau for Reintegration of Moldova, both cases had remained under its close observation for several years, and Moldovan representatives consistently raised the issue during meetings with the authorities in Tiraspol. The Bureau emphasised that these are not isolated incidents and that the separatist authorities continue to hold other individuals in unlawful detention. Charges of “state treason” are frequently used against opponents of the de facto regime.
State of Emergency
On 20 July 2026, the de facto president of Transnistria extended the state of emergency for an additional month. The decision was justified by the continuing economic crisis, which has been accompanied by declining industrial production.
Under the state of emergency, the authorities are authorised to regulate energy consumption, control the transportation and distribution of natural gas, and restrict exports of energy resources from the region. The state of emergency was first introduced on 11 December 2024. The current energy crisis began in January 2025, after Ukraine discontinued the transit of Russian natural gas, prompting Gazprom to halt gas supplies to Transnistria. Since then, the emergency measures have been extended repeatedly.
Following the termination of gas transit through Ukraine, Tiraspol, Chișinău, and Brussels agreed on the “Hungarian gas supply scheme” for Transnistria. Under this arrangement, natural gas is purchased on the European market and transported to the Moldovan border by the Hungarian company MET Gas and Energy Marketing AG, while Moldovagaz is responsible for delivery into Transnistria. Payment is made by a Dubai-registered company using Russian credit facilities. Compared with previous years, the volume of gas supplied to the region has declined substantially. Since November 2025, daily gas deliveries have been reduced by approximately half.
Gagauzia
When Will the Elections Be Held?
Deputies of the People’s Assembly of Gagauzia have scheduled elections to the autonomous region’s legislature for 15 November. However, several legal issues concerning the electoral process remain unresolved. The mandates of the current deputies expired on 12 November 2025, after which the elections were postponed twice because the autonomy had failed to establish an electoral administration in accordance with legal requirements.
On 9 March, Moldova’s Ministry of Justice referred the issue to the Constitutional Court. On 9 July, the Court ruled it unconstitutional for the People’s Assembly to establish a regional electoral body or to participate in the appointment of heads of the police, information and security services, and the regional justice administration.
Following the Court’s decision, on 10 July, the People’s Assembly adopted a declaration calling on the Moldovan authorities to abandon unilateral revisions of the legal foundations of Gagauzia’s autonomy and to return to a constructive dialogue. According to its deputies, the Constitutional Court’s ruling significantly reduces the autonomy’s competences. They further argued that Moldova’s European integration process should strengthen rather than weaken Gagauzia’s special autonomous status. Concerns have been expressed within the region that current government policies could eventually leave Gagauzia with little more than its historical name.
In an effort to ease tensions between the central government and the autonomous region, deputies of the People’s Assembly met Moldovan President Maia Sandu on 20 July. During the meeting, the parties agreed that Parliament would promptly introduce amendments to the Electoral Code. The following day, President Sandu also met with the mayors of Gagauzia’s municipalities.
Following these consultations, on 30 July, the Moldovan Parliament approved, in the first reading, amendments to the Electoral Code, establishing new electoral rules for Gagauzia. Under the proposed legislation, the majoritarian electoral system will eventually be replaced by a proportional system. However, the elections scheduled for 15 November will be conducted under the existing majoritarian system.
Gagauzia, located in southern Moldova, has enjoyed autonomous status since 1994. The Gagauz are a Turkic-speaking Orthodox Christian people, although Russian remains the principal language of everyday communication. The majority of the population traditionally supports pro-Russian political parties and candidates in Moldovan parliamentary and presidential elections. One of Chișinău’s longstanding objectives has been to align Gagauzia’s electoral system with the proportional system used throughout the rest of the country.
Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali Region (South Ossetia)
Nauru Withdraws Recognition of the Occupied Regions
On 29 July 2026, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia announced that Nauru (which officially changed its name to Naoero following constitutional amendments adopted in May 2026) had severed diplomatic relations with Georgia’s Russian-occupied Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali region (South Ossetia). The Ministry welcomed the decision adopted by the Cabinet of the Republic of Naoero on 21 July 2026 to terminate diplomatic relations with the so-called Republic of South Ossetia (also known as the State of Alania) and the so-called Republic of Abkhazia. According to the Ministry, the decision once again reaffirms that respect for international law constitutes the foundation of healthy international relations. Georgia also expressed its readiness to establish diplomatic relations with Naoero and to promote bilateral cooperation based on common interests.
On 30 July, the Government of Naoero confirmed, through its official Facebook page, that it had formally withdrawn its recognition of Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali Region as independent states, and had terminated diplomatic relations with both entities.
On 29 July, the de facto Ministry of Foreign Affairs of occupied Abkhazia responded by stating that Naoero’s decision had been made under external pressure. According to the statement, “The Ministry regrets the Republic of Nauru’s decision to sever diplomatic relations with the Republic of Abkhazia, a decision adopted under unprecedented and systematic external influence… An entire arsenal of unacceptable coercive methods was employed against Nauru, from unprecedented political blackmail and diplomatic pressure to open financial and economic reprisals and punitive sanctions.”
A similar statement was issued on 31 July by the de facto Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the occupied Tskhinvali region. It argued that the decision was not the result of bilateral relations, but rather of prolonged pressure exerted on the Government of Naoero. According to the statement, Georgia, with the support of Western partners, “continues to employ political and economic instruments in an effort to isolate South Ossetia internationally.”
Naoero is a small independent island state in the Pacific Ocean that remains under significant strategic, financial and security influence from Australia. Many of the country’s security arrangements are coordinated with Canberra. In September 2024, Australia concluded a security agreement with Naoero (then Nauru) under which the island state received USD 60.6 million in budgetary assistance over five years. The agreement requires Naoero to consult Australia before concluding agreements related to ports, air bases, banking or security cooperation. Australia also provides banking services to Naoero. The wider objective of the agreement is to limit the expansion of China’s influence in the Pacific region.
Naoero’s foreign policy decisions can be interpreted through the concept of “sovereignty arbitrage,” whereby a small state derives economic and political benefits from its sovereign status. Naoero represents a notable example of how microstates can leverage sovereignty by offering services such as citizenship programmes, financial services, diplomatic recognition or infrastructure cooperation. Larger states may find it advantageous to utilise such “services” for strategic purposes.
For example, on 15 January 2024, Naoero (then Nauru) ended twenty-two years of diplomatic relations with Taiwan and established diplomatic relations with the People’s Republic of China, a decision followed by Chinese financial assistance. In July 2026, Naoero announced the opening of an embassy in Jerusalem, a politically sensitive move given the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, but one that is expected to be accompanied by Israeli financial support.
Naoero recognised the independence of Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali region in 2009. Following its recent decision to withdraw that recognition, today only four UN member states continue to recognise the occupied regions: Russia, Syria, Venezuela and Nicaragua. Questions had previously arisen regarding the positions of Vanuatu and Tuvalu, but it was ultimately confirmed in 2013 and 2014, respectively, that neither country recognised the independence of Georgia’s occupied territories.
The 67th Round of the Geneva International Discussions
The 67th round of the Geneva International Discussions was held on 30 June–1 July 2026. According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia, the Georgian delegation expressed deep concern regarding the so-called agreement on enhanced allied cooperation signed on 9 May 2026 between Russia and the occupation regime in the Tskhinvali region, as well as its rapid implementation. The Georgian side reiterated the necessity of Russia’s full compliance with its obligations under the 12 August 2008 ceasefire agreement, mediated by the European Union, and emphasised the importance of ensuring the safe and dignified return of internally displaced persons and refugees to their homes. The delegation also emphasised the need to restore, without preconditions, the Incident Prevention and Response Mechanism (IPRM) in Gali and to resume regular meetings in both Gali and Ergneti, in accordance with its founding principles.
The Co-Chairs of the Geneva Discussions stated in their press communiqué that the participants had reaffirmed their continued commitment to the peaceful resolution of all outstanding issues through sustained dialogue.
The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs once again called for practical measures to guarantee the long-term security of occupied Abkhazia and “South Ossetia,” including the conclusion of a legally binding agreement on the non-use of force between Georgia and the two occupied regions. According to Moscow, such an agreement would not only provide a tangible incentive for the negotiation process, but would also contribute significantly to regional stability.
The de facto Ministry of Foreign Affairs of occupied Abkhazia likewise reiterated its demand for a legally binding non-use of force agreement and for the delimitation and demarcation of the so-called state border (occupation line). It also expressed its readiness to resume meetings within the Gali IPRM format, which, according to the de facto authorities, have remained suspended due to disagreements over technical issues.
The de facto Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the occupied Tskhinvali region again raised the issue of ethnic Ossetians born in the Truso Valley, Kazbegi Municipality, claiming that they are unable to visit their native villages.
During this round, Russia and the representatives of the occupied regions once again proposed relocating the Geneva International Discussions from Switzerland to another venue. Since 2022, they have argued that Switzerland no longer represents a neutral host and have also referred to logistical difficulties in travelling to Geneva. The next round of the Geneva International Discussions is scheduled for November 2026.
Where Was the Surface-to-Air Missile Launched From?
On 16 July 2026, the German magazine Der Spiegel reported on a previously undisclosed security incident that occurred prior to the NATO Summit in Ankara (held on 7–8 July, 2026). According to the report, an uncontrolled Russian surface-to-air missile triggered an air defence alert across Türkiye. At approximately 07:00 on 7 July, a nationwide Air Raid Warning Red was declared, and the Patriot missile defence battery of the German Bundeswehr stationed in Malatya Province was placed on full alert. Approximately 150 German military personnel had been deployed there under NATO command from June to September 2026.
According to NATO radar systems, the missile was detected travelling at high speed towards Turkish airspace from the territory of Georgia. Initially believed to be a ballistic missile, it ultimately fell into the Black Sea. Subsequent investigations indicated that the missile had been launched from Russia’s 7th Military Base, located in the Russian-occupied region of Abkhazia. The incident illustrates the extent to which the Russia–Ukraine war has increased the risk of military spillover into the wider Black Sea region, potentially exposing neighbouring states to unintended, or deliberate, security incidents.
Cyberattack
On 20 July 2026, it was announced that in early July, a large-scale cyberattack had targeted governmental and tourism-related online resources in occupied Abkhazia. In a statement issued by the de facto Government Communications Agency, the move was claimed as the largest cyberattack in the history of the occupied region.
According to the Agency, the primary objective of the attackers was to disrupt the operation of official digital services and damage the international image of the occupied region. The attack targeted the websites of de facto ministries and governmental institutions, official information resources, tourism portals, online booking platforms and the websites of major resort complexes. The attackers reportedly employed distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks, while in several cases attempts were also made to carry out website defacement.
The principal target was the National Hosting Centre, which hosts most of the official digital infrastructure of the de facto authorities. While core governmental information systems reportedly remained operational, the tourism sector suffered temporary disruptions when several online reservation services became unavailable. At the time of publication, the perpetrators of the cyberattack had yet to be identified.
African Delegation Visits Sokhumi
On 6 July 2026, a delegation from the city of Suhum, Ghana, visited occupied Sokhumi, arriving via Russia through Sokhumi Airport. The delegation, led by King Barima Amoako Darko, the ruler of Suhum, participated in events marking Sokhumi City Day.
During the visit, the king and head of the de facto Sokhumi administration Timur Agrba signed a twinning agreement between Sokhumi and Suhum. The delegation also met the de facto Minister of Foreign Affairs, Oleg Bartsits, with discussions focusing primarily on cooperation between young people, including potential student exchange programmes.
Suhum Municipality is one of the 33 districts of Ghana’s Eastern Region. It covers approximately 400 square kilometres, and its administrative centre is the town of Suhum, with a population of approximately 123,000.
Africa has long represented a priority direction of Abkhazia’s de facto diplomacy. With Russian support, the de facto authorities have sought to establish political contacts across the continent, with the objective of securing additional international recognition. The year 2025 marked an important stage in this effort. On 20 October 2025, the de facto Foreign Minister met Isaac Kumesina, the so-called Ambassador-at-Large, who primarily operates in Ghana. Kumesina is a businessman with commercial interests in several sectors, who has been tasked with promoting the interests of the occupied region throughout Africa. The July 2026 visit from Ghana was most likely facilitated through these established networks.
This was not the only African visit during 2026. On 5 April, Oleg Bartsits met representatives claiming to represent the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Somalia, Adana Muna Abdi and Ismail Hassan Nuur, who participated in the so-called International Economic Forum “Abkhazia – Investments in the Future.”
Meeting with Putin, and Marat Kambolov’s Election Campaign
On 13 July 2026, Marat Kambolov, Acting de facto President of the occupied Tskhinvali region, met Russian President Vladimir Putin at the Kremlin. Although Kambolov was already widely regarded as Moscow’s preferred candidate, the meeting was interpreted as a clear demonstration of the Kremlin’s political support, and as a signal to voters regarding Russia’s preferred outcome in the forthcoming de facto presidential election.
According to official information, the meeting addressed issues relating to the region’s financing, the establishment of modern youth facilities, the development of transport infrastructure, cooperation with Russian regions, and the further expansion of gas infrastructure.
Earlier, on 22 June, the then de facto President Alan Gagloev met President Putin at the Kremlin. The following day, Gagloev announced his resignation and was subsequently appointed as an adviser to the Russian President. Following his departure, Marat Kambolov assumed the duties of Acting de facto President pending the early presidential election.
The early de facto presidential election is scheduled to take place on 18 September 2026.