Beginning in 2026, the Kremlin’s deployment of “soft power” instruments in allied nations and across the post-Soviet region will be supported by a new entity: The International Foundation of the International Projects of the Presidential Grants Fund, overseen by Sergey Kiriyenko, First Deputy Head of the Presidential Administration of Russia.
The Establishment of a New International Foundation
On December 8, 2025, the President of Russia, Vladimir Putin, established the International Foundation of the International Projects of the Presidential Grants Fund by decree (No. 901). The fund is intended to promote public relations and cooperation between Russia and other countries in humanitarian and related fields. Its responsibilities include developing and implementing programs in areas such as social development, healthcare, culture, art, science, education, the preservation of historical memory, sports, and ecology. The fund will also support, monitor, and evaluate these initiatives abroad.
The new international foundation was established by the Presidential Grants Fund, which became the sole operator of presidential grants on April 3, 2017. The new fund’s stated mission is to support the development of civil society in Russia. In practice, this support primarily benefits organizations aligned with government policies.
Under Vladimir Putin, legislation targeting critical civil society groups has become more restrictive. Measures such as the designation of organizations as “foreign agents,” along with other regulatory barriers, have forced many independent groups to scale back or cease operations in Russia. The allocation of grants is overseen by a Coordination Committee, chaired by Sergey Kiriyenko.
While the Presidential Grants Fund mainly supports pro-government civil society initiatives within Russia, the new international foundation will operate abroad. In partnership with international organizations, it will support joint projects in “friendly” countries, including BRICS members and post-Soviet states. These initiatives aim to promote a “multipolar world,” a key theme in Russian foreign policy.
The Post-Soviet Space: Kiriyenko’s Main Target
The International Foundation of the International Projects of the Presidential Grants Fund will finance projects outside Russia. This dedicated structure is intended to serve two main purposes. First, by functioning as a “fund of funds,” it will consolidate previously fragmented initiatives under a single Russian “soft power” strategy. Second, it will provide a formal mechanism for allocating legally structured funding to projects in foreign countries.
The Presidential Administration adopted a new approach to “soft power” with the creation of the Department for Strategic Partnership and Cooperation on August 29, 2025. In October 2025, Vadim Titov, a protégé of Sergey Kiriyenko, was appointed as its head. Previously, the Department for Interregional and Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries managed “soft power” initiatives in post-Soviet states, but this structure was abolished after the new department was formed. The Cross-Border Cooperation Department, which also focused on post-Soviet affairs, was dissolved. The new department will primarily focus on the post-Soviet region.
In 2026, a key focus of the department and Russia’s broader “soft power” strategy will be Armenia, where parliamentary elections are scheduled for June 7, 2026. Oversight of the Armenian direction lies with Sergey Kiriyenko, who, since May 2025, has been tasked with advancing Russian interests in the country’s parliamentary elections through “soft power” instruments. Kiriyenko assumed responsibility for managing relations with post-Soviet states after Dmitry Kozak stepped down as Deputy Head of the Presidential Administration in September 2025.
Despite significant resource mobilization under Kiriyenko, the Kremlin faced a setback in the September 2025 Moldovan parliamentary elections. The party aligned with pro-Western President Maia Sandu won a majority, limiting pro-Russian influence over Moldova’s foreign policy.
Kiriyenko saw relative success during the 2025 presidential elections in occupied Abkhazia, however, a vote widely regarded as illegitimate by much of the international community. Although Abkhazia’s political elite has generally maintained a pro-Russian orientation, the Kremlin openly backed Badra Gunba. Following extensive involvement by the Kremlin and networks associated with Kiriyenko, Gunba won the second round of the elections.
Armenia presents a more complex challenge. Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan has recently taken a series of foreign policy steps that the Kremlin views as increasingly anti-Russian. In this context, Kiriyenko is expected to seek ways to maximize electoral support for pro-Russian political forces. More realistically, however, the strategy appears aimed at strengthening these actors sufficiently to constrain Pashinyan and increase Kremlin influence over Armenia’s policies. The new international foundation will help create a favorable political environment for the Kremlin by deploying “soft power” tools.
More Coordination and Effectiveness
The establishment of the new international fund marks a potential shift in the Kremlin’s use of “soft power” tools. Although various state institutions and foundations have long been active in this sphere, their overall effectiveness has often been questioned. Within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia, the Department of Multilateral Humanitarian Cooperation and Cultural Relations oversees these efforts. Rossotrudnichestvo, a federal agency under the Ministry, maintains 87 representative offices across 71 countries.
Other key actors include the Russkiy Mir (Russian World) Foundation, chaired by Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, and the Gorchakov Foundation for Public Diplomacy Support. Both organizations promote Russian cultural and diplomatic outreach abroad. In the media domain, the state-funded network Russia Today (RT) is a primary tool for advancing Russia’s “soft power” narrative internationally.
Russian experts note that achieving policy objectives requires better coordination among organizations implementing “soft power,” and more efficient use of resources. The newly created international fund is therefore expected not only to finance projects abroad, but also to coordinate the activities of various organizations operating across the post-Soviet space. In this capacity, it could evolve into a central mechanism for shaping and directing Russia’s “soft power” policy in the region.
The Fund’s Activities in Occupied Abkhazia
Prior to the creation of the International Foundation, the Presidential Grants Fund began financing projects in occupied Abkhazia in 2025. The Fund allocated 77 million rubles to rehabilitate 93 memorials related to World War II and the Abkhazian War of 1992–1993 across 82 villages. Additionally, with the Fund’s support, some 27,000 children in Abkhazia received their first medical examinations, conducted by medical personnel from Russia.
A dedicated competition, “Creators of Abkhazia,” was launched for the region on August 7, 2025. Of 186 submitted projects, 32 were selected for funding, totaling 115 million rubles. The winners were announced on November 18, 2025, by the Expert Council, chaired by the Fund’s General Director, Ilya Chukalin. The Council also included Otar Arshba, a Russian State Duma member and Batumi (the second-largest city of Georgia) school graduate.
Funded initiatives focused on education, culture, healthcare, tourism, and preserving historical memory. Grants were awarded to local non-governmental organizations and initiative groups, with a maximum of 5 million rubles per project. The launch ceremony was attended by the de facto President of Abkhazia, Badra Gunba, and Sergey Kiriyenko, highlighting the initiative’s political significance.
What is expected from Kiriyenko?
The establishment of the International Foundation of the International Projects of the Presidential Grants Fund, tasked with deploying “soft power” tools in the post-Soviet space, suggests the Kremlin’s intent to strengthen coordination and increase effectiveness in this area. The appointment of Sergey Kiriyenko as curator, alongside the creation of a new unit within the Presidential Administration and a dedicated fund for “soft power” initiatives, demonstrates the Kremlin’s confidence in his leadership. These institutional changes indicate that Moscow expects Kiriyenko to play a central role in influencing both political elites and segments of the local population in the post-Soviet region toward positions more favorable to Russian interests.