The Russian Geostrategy Monitor is a monthly brief that tracks Russian geostrategy worldwide employing the framework set in The Structure of Modern Russia’s Foreign Strategy. Russian geostrategic activities are also tracked on the regularly updated interactive Russian Geostrategy Map.

Issue 43 covers the Russian geostrategy for the month of July 2026. The numbering and contents of the Outcomes, Goals and Objectives follows The Structure of Modern Russia’s Foreign Strategy framework.

Objective 2: Strengthening the Western political forces considered by Moscow to be inimical to the Western-led international order, and the Kremlin’s relationships with such forces

  • On 26 July, DW reported that a Kremlin-linked bot network had been running a disinformation campaign in Germany since late June 2026, spreading at least 135 fake videos and 18 doctored images impersonating major German outlets — targeting all parties represented in the Bundestag except the pro-Russian AfD and BSW, ahead of September 2026 regional elections.

Objective 3: Enhancing internal political instability and polarization within Western states

  • On 13 July, the European Union and Britain sanctioned Russian military intelligence officers, hackers, and others involved in a 15-year cyber campaign targeting governments and critical infrastructure in at least ten European countries.
  • On 16 July, Polish prosecutors charged a Ukrainian recruited by Russian intelligence with 47 acts of sabotage between November 2024 and August 2025, aimed at inciting ethnic tensions between Poland and Ukraine.
  • On 22 July, Latvia reported a doubling of migrant crossing attempts from Belarus, saying this was being orchestrated by Russia and Belarus to destabilize NATO’s eastern flank.

Objective 9: Achieving de-sovereignization of Ukraine

  • In the Russo-Ukrainian War, in July 2026, Russians continued to attack towards Kramatorsk and Slovyansk, while Ukrainians advanced on the southern front in the area east of Zaporizhzhia.

Objective 16: Entrenching Russian influence in sub-Saharan Africa

  • An article published by Riddle on 8 July reported on Russia’s propaganda and political subversion as its main instrument of influence in sub-Saharan Africa, with Russian intelligence agencies coordinating a network across the continent. It includes Moscow’s propaganda outlets RT and Sputnik having content-sharing agreements with African media outlets, the expanded Russia House network, Moscow Patriarchate parishes, paid local journalists and influencers, social media manipulation campaigns, and a network of sympathetic politicians in African countries.
  • On 2 July, Russian sources reported active operations being conducted by Russian troops, together with the Malian regime forces, against the rebels in “over a dozen areas” of Mali.
  • On 18 July, Tuareg and Islamist rebels ambushed a military convoy in northern Mali, reportedly inflicting large casualties on both the Malian regime’s and Russian Africa Corps fighters.
  • Africa Intelligence reported on 6 July that Russia’s Africa Corps had been developing its presence in Congo and Togo for at least the past two years.
  • As reported on 23 July, Russia’s Africa Corps had secured its first military shipment to Mali via Togo’s port of Lomé, with a convoy including a number of armored vehicles, two anti-aircraft guns, and around 20 trucks and motorcycles crossing the Mali-Burkina Faso border heading to Bamako.

Objective 20: Alignment with China

  • In an article dedicated to Russia’s relations with China, published on 16 July, the Russian foreign minister Lavrov highlighted the common features of the two powers’ “foreign policy philosophy,” such as striving for a “more just multipolar world order.” Lavrov also stressed that Russia together with China rejected “the confrontational Indo-Pacific project that is being pushed by the West.”
  • From 6 to 13 July, Russia and China conducted joint naval drills in the waters and airspace off Qingdao. Russia reportedly participated with a cruiser, a corvette, and a submarine from its Pacific Fleet.
  • During the period of 13-29 July, a joint Chinese-Russian naval task force patrolled in the areas of the Miyako, Vries, and La Perouse Straits, conducting exercises in the western Pacific, Sea of Okhotsk, and Sea of Japan.

Objective 27: Alignment with North Korea

  • In a 20 July meeting, the foreign minister of North Korea and the Russian foreign minister Lavrov agreed that “the main reason of degradation of the situation in Northeast Asia and the world as a whole is irresponsible behavior of the USA and its allies,” and that the “all-encompassing deepening of relations between Russia and the DPRK” was helpful for international security as well as “formation of a new fair multipolar world order.”