Post-Soviet Conflicts Watch reviews ongoing conflicts and post-conflict developments across the post-Soviet region. The publication analyzes key events in the Russian-occupied areas of Georgia, including Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali region, as well as in Transnistria, Gagauzia, and other relevant areas. It also covers progress in the Armenian-Azerbaijani peace negotiations following on from the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War.
Note: This review does not cover issues related to Russia’s military aggression against Ukraine.
Armenia and Azerbaijan
Another batch of Azerbaijani fuel for Armenia
Armenia has received a second batch of fuel from Azerbaijan. On January 9, 2,698 tons of cargo in 48 railway wagons departed from Azerbaijan’s Baladzhar station for Armenia, including 1,742 tons of AI-95 gasoline and 956 tons of diesel fuel. On January 11, an additional 18 wagons carrying 979 tons of AI-92 gasoline were sent to Armenia.
The petroleum products were supplied commercially via transit through Georgia. The director of Mega Trade stated that Georgia imposed a fee for the second transit, whereas the first was free. He noted that this fee does not significantly affect the final fuel price.
On January 8, 2026, Armenia’s Minister of Economy, Gevorg Papoyan, announced that the second shipment of Azerbaijani fuel would be imported by the same companies as before: Mega-Trade, owned by MP Khachatur Sukiasyan, and Sisha World, reportedly owned by businessman Samvel Aleksanyan. Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan stated that only Armenian companies that did not politicize the issue were employed in the first shipment.
On January 10, Armenia announced it would receive 1,000 tons of sugar from Russia by rail, transiting through Azerbaijan. On January 19, Lilit Shaboyan, press secretary for Armenia’s Ministry of Economy, stated that Armenia would soon begin importing Russian liquefied gas via the Sargsyan gas pipeline. On January 26, Economy Minister Gevorg Papoyan announced additional plans to transport liquefied gas and bitumen. Armenia currently imports liquefied gas from Russia and Iran, but local conditions complicate imports from Iran. Transit through Georgia is also disrupted at the Georgian-Russian border crossing at Zemo Lars due to limited checkpoint capacity and adverse weather.
In December 2025, Armenia received its first rail shipment of fuel from Azerbaijan’s State Oil Company (SOCAR) since the First Nagorno-Karabakh War. Having transited through Georgia, on December 19, 22 tank wagons delivered 1,210 tons of AI-95 gasoline to Armenia. Currently, about 60 percent of Armenia’s fuel imports come from Russia, and annual demand is approximately 480,000 tons. While the volume of Azerbaijani fuel remains limited, this development is symbolically significant, and indicates major changes in Armenian-Azerbaijani relations.
The fuel transit was preceded by Baku’s decision to lift the ban on cargo transit from Azerbaijan to Armenia. Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev announced the decision at a joint press conference with Kazakhstan’s President on October 21, 2025. The first transit cargo under this arrangement, bound for Armenia, was wheat from Kazakhstan.
In 2025, Azerbaijan exported USD 788.8 thousand in transit cargo to Armenia.
Currently, only Armenia is accepting cargo from Azerbaijan, following the Washington agreement signed on August 8, 2025. Initiated by U.S. President Donald Trump, the peace summit in Washington included the leaders of Armenia and Azerbaijan, and resulted in both trilateral and bilateral agreements. The summit also introduced the transport corridor project, “Trump’s Route for International Peace and Prosperity” (TRIPP).
The rapid opening of transport routes will support the peace process and help Armenia address its isolation. While full implementation depends on completing key infrastructure projects, statements from both governments and frequent bilateral meetings show that progress is underway and that both parties are committed to developing new routes. These efforts are likely to reshape regional transport networks and create a new geopolitical landscape.
The Rubio-Mirzoyan Meeting and a New Agreement
On January 13, 2026, after a meeting in Washington between U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio and Armenian Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan, the “Framework Agreement on the Implementation of the Trump Route” was published. This six-page document (available on the Armenian Ministry of Foreign Affairs website), builds on the agreement reached on August 8, 2025.
The introduction to the document states that the project aims to connect Azerbaijan proper with the Nakhichevan Autonomous Republic, and establish a vital link along the Trans-Caspian Trade Route, commonly known as the Middle Corridor.
The document outlines new details about Yerevan’s non-binding commitments to implement the Trump Initiative for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP).
A TRIPP Development Company (TDC) will be established, with Armenia transferring 74 percent of shares to the United States and retaining 26 percent. TDC will develop TRIPP, and is expected to have the right to administer the project for an initial 49-year term. The agreement may be extended for an additional 50 years, during which the Armenian government would contribute more capital and increase its stake to 49 percent.
Furthermore, the United States retains authority to approve or deny any modifications to the company’s shareholders and ultimate beneficiaries, including share sales, donations, reorganizations, or other legal actions.
Yerevan and Washington have agreed to collaborate on the TDC’s corporate structure. The framework includes the following provisions:
- The governments of the United States and Armenia will jointly participate in key decisions concerning the operation of the multimodal transit route;
- The United States will receive financial returns proportional to its initial contribution, along with additional economic benefits, such as opportunities for U.S. companies.
The company will construct the rail and road infrastructure that constitutes TRIPP, and will form subsidiaries to oversee additional project components.
Under the agreement, Armenia commits to:
- fully support the TRIPP Development Company;
- coordinate effectively among its government agencies;
- issue permits promptly;
- maintain ongoing communication with U.S. partners;
- set clear procedures for the movement of people, vehicles, and goods, including between Azerbaijan and Nakhichevan, in line with Armenian law and international agreements.
The document stresses that the project’s success relies on lasting peace between Armenia and Azerbaijan, fully normalized Armenian-Turkish relations, active U.S. engagement, strong regional cooperation, and effective Armenian institutions.
Following the Rubio-Mirzoyan meeting, Armenian and Azerbaijani officials issued several key statements.
- Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan declared, “A new era is coming, and new work is needed so as to be more effective and purposeful.” He noted that the U.S. has already allocated $140 million for the project’s preparatory phase.
- Vice Speaker of Parliament Ruben Rubinyan stated that third-party involvement in the TRIPP project, such as that of Russia and Turkey, is not under discussion at this time.
- Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan emphasized that “Armenia is emerging from a blockade and becoming a key hub on major international logistics routes.”
- Azerbaijan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs described the U.S.-Armenia agreement as a key step toward implementing the Washington Agreement.
The Davos Forum and Presidents’ Statements
On January 20, 2026, at the Davos Economic Forum, the presidents of Armenia and Azerbaijan discussed expanding bilateral transport links. They addressed plans for direct cargo movement from Turkey to Azerbaijan’s Nakhichevan Autonomous Republic and Armenia, and between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Armenian President Vahagn Khachaturian expressed hope that, in the future, cargo currently routed through Georgia would be shipped directly between Armenia and Azerbaijan.
Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev announced that Azerbaijan has removed all restrictions on the transportation of goods to Armenia, including shipments from Kazakhstan and Russia. He also reported that Armenia has requested transit access to Russia, highlighting that Azerbaijan has unilaterally opened transport corridors. “Yes, transportation currently goes through Georgia, but one day it will go through Armenia. One day, Armenian cargo will go directly through Azerbaijan, and that day is not far off,” Aliyev said.
He further noted that the TRIPP initiative and a U.S.-backed connectivity project will establish a new transport corridor from Asia, across the Caspian Sea, through Azerbaijan, Armenia, Nakhichevan, Turkey, and into Europe, supplementing existing routes through Georgia. “The more routes there are, the better it is for consumers, suppliers, and transit countries,” Aliyev concluded.
Optimism about developing transport links has grown since U.S. President Donald Trump announced on January 23 that Vice President J.D. Vance will visit Azerbaijan and Armenia in February to discuss the TRIPP project.
Various Statements and Practical Steps Taken by the Parties
Within the framework of the peace process, both sides have issued statements and undertaken actions that contribute to the development of bilateral relations:
- End of the war: In a January 5, 2026 interview with Azerbaijani television, President Ilham Aliyev confirmed that the war with Armenia ended politically in 2025. He stated, “The past year can truly be considered historic, because in 2025, the war between Azerbaijan and Armenia ended in political terms, and we have been living in peace for several months now.”
- Border demarcation: Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan emphasized that demarcating the Armenia-Azerbaijan border is essential for implementing the transport corridor project. He noted that, at a minimum, border sections relevant to communications must be defined to enable the TRIPP project to go ahead.
- Release of Armenian prisoners: On January 14, 2026, Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan announced that Azerbaijan had released four Armenian citizens to Armenia. Three had been captured during the 44-day war in 2020, and one in 2023. Several dozen ethnic Armenians remain in Azerbaijani prisons, including 16 former de facto leaders of Nagorno-Karabakh. In a 2025 meeting in Washington, Pashinyan asked US President Donald Trump to help secure the release of 23 prisoners; Trump reportedly agreed to raise the issue with Ilham Aliyev. None of the four released individuals was a former leader of Nagorno-Karabakh. According to the available data, 19 Armenian prisoners of war remain in Azerbaijan. In return, Armenia transferred two Syrian mercenaries captured during the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War in 2020 to Syria via Turkey.
Transnistria
According to Moldova’s Public Services Agency, residents of Transnistria submitted 50% more applications for Moldovan citizenship between September and December 2025 than in the same period in 2024. Over 2,000 applications were filed during these four months, compared to 1,394 in 2024.
This increase is attributed to recent legislative changes. On December 25, 2025, a new citizenship law took effect in Moldova, significantly tightening citizenship requirements. Applicants must now demonstrate knowledge of the Romanian language and the Constitution of Moldova.
Many Transnistria residents have sought Moldovan citizenship in recent years, as a Moldovan passport allows visa-free travel within the Schengen area.
Gagauzia
On January 12, 2025, the People’s Assembly of Gagauzia, Moldova, approved the budget for regional elections and confirmed the composition of the electoral body. The first round was set for March 22. However, on January 21, it was announced that the elections could not proceed as scheduled. The Assembly’s mandate expired in November 2025, but a new election date could not be set because the central electoral body had been dismissed.
On August 5, 2025, the pro-Russian Bashkan (leader) of the autonomous region, Evgenia Gutsuli, was sentenced to 7.5 years in prison. If the appeals court does not overturn the conviction, early elections for the region’s leader will also be necessary.
Gagauzia is an autonomous region primarily inhabited by ethnic Turks, most of whom are Russian-speaking and pro-Russian. The governing pro-Western Party of Action and Solidarity, with minimal backing in the area, generally refrains from participating in local elections.
Central Asia
Armed clashes have increased in frequency along the Tajik-Afghan border in recent months. The most recent incident occurred on January 18, 2026. The Tajik Border Service reported that four members of a terrorist organization crossed from Afghanistan into Tajikistan, disregarded border guard orders, and were subsequently killed during an armed confrontation.
Several incidents occurred in 2025. On December 24, an armed clash on the Tajik-Afghan border left two border guards and three militants dead. Violent confrontations were also seen on November 26 and 30, resulting in the deaths of five Chinese nationals who were working on infrastructure and mining projects.
The Tajikistan-Afghanistan border stretches for nearly 1,400 kilometers, following rivers for much of its length, and remaining highly insecure. Afghanistan’s internal situation poses a significant threat to Tajikistan, driven by paramilitary groups and rampant drug trafficking. Armed groups frequently instigate clashes in the border zone. With limited resources, Tajikistan seeks support from the Collective Security Treaty Organization, led by Russia, which recognized the Taliban as Afghanistan’s legitimate government in 2025.
Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali Region
Maduro’s Detention and the Response in the Occupied Regions
Following the arrest of Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro during a U.S. military operation on January 3, 2025, statements were issued in Georgia’s Russian-occupied regions. Venezuela is one of only five UN member states that recognize the independence of Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali region. After reactions from Sokhumi and Tskhinvali, the Georgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs released a statement on January 4 addressing Venezuela’s recognition of the occupied regions: “Considering that the Venezuelan authorities recognized the occupied regions of Georgia, Abkhazia and the so-called South Ossetia as independent states, in gross violation of international law, we express hope that recent events will lead to the withdrawal of this illegal decision in accordance with the national interests of Georgia and the principles of international law.”
On January 5, the de facto Foreign Ministry of the occupied Tskhinvali region declared that “recognition or non-recognition is the sovereign right of every country, and the decision of the Venezuelan leadership is not open for discussion or assessment by any third party.” Odyssey Bigvava, the de facto Deputy Foreign Minister of occupied Abkhazia, issued a similar statement.
The occupied regions demonstrated their support for Venezuela through a series of gestures. On January 15, Zaur Gvajava, the so-called ambassador of occupied Abkhazia to Venezuela, attended a special session dedicated to the interim Venezuelan president Delcy Rodriguez Gomez’s annual report. Similarly, Venezuela’s backing was highlighted by a visit from Narim Kozaev, the “ambassador” of the occupied Tskhinvali region to Venezuela, to the Venezuelan embassy in Moscow on January 19. During this visit, Kozaev expressed solidarity with Venezuela’s ambassador to Russia, Rafael Salazar, and paid tribute to those who lost their lives in the US military operation.
Following the initial response to developments in Venezuela, the issue resurfaced for discussion within the UN framework in Geneva. On January 19, Revaz Lominadze, Georgia’s Permanent Representative to the UN Office and international organizations in Geneva, and Coordinator of the Eastern Europe Group of the UN Human Rights Council, met with Venezuela’s Permanent Representative, Ambassador Alexandre Yanez Deleu. The meeting took place at the request of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela’s Permanent Mission. Alongside discussions about the situation in Venezuela, the Georgian delegation stressed that Venezuela’s recognition of Georgia’s occupied regions, Abkhazia and the so-called South Ossetia, as independent states constitutes a serious violation of the fundamental principles of international law. The Georgian side expressed hope that recent events in Venezuela would prompt a reconsideration and reversal of this unlawful decision, in accordance with Georgia’s national interests and international legal norms.
In the occupied regions, there are concerns that a change in Venezuela’s government or policies could result in the withdrawal of recognition of their independence. Similar anxieties exist with regard to Syria, where the Assad regime was overthrown in December 2024. However, the new Syrian government’s policy has remained unchanged, and no withdrawal of recognition has taken place.
Rail Transportation
Since 2021, rail traffic in the occupied territory of Abkhazia has risen markedly:
- 2025: 1,186,000 tons transported
- 2024: 921,000 tons transported
- 2023: 912,000 tons transported
- 2022: 700,000 tons transported
- 2021: 455,000 tons transported
The surge in cargo shipments is linked to Russia’s efforts, under international sanctions, to develop alternative transport routes, including via the occupied territory of Abkhazia. Cargo is first delivered to the port of Ochamchire, then illegally shipped by sea. In recent years, Russia has made extensive use of both the Abkhazian railway and the port of Ochamchire.
To increase throughput, intensive railway infrastructure rehabilitation has taken place. In December 2025, repairs began on the line from Kelasuri to Ochamchire, with Russian crews participating and materials sourced from Russia. Work is ongoing along the 55 km stretch between Sokhumi and Ochamchire. Additionally, a new 650-meter fifth track was added at Ochamchire station, the main cargo hub. The upgraded railway will accommodate higher cargo volumes, including containers. Completion is scheduled for March 10.
Awaiting the formation of a new “government”
On January 21, 2026, the de facto president of the occupied Tskhinvali region, Alan Gagloev, ordered the dismissal of Konstantin Jusoev from his position as chairman of the “Government of South Ossetia,” citing Jusoev’s personal views. His dismissal prompted the resignation of the entire de facto government. Until a new “cabinet” is formed, “Vice Prime Minister” Dzambolat Tedeev has been appointed acting chairman. Gagloev has indicated that changes will be made in the new “government.”
Following Gagloev’s election as de facto president, Jusoev was appointed “prime minister” on June 20, 2022. Previously, Jusoev worked in construction, with his companies participating in a Russian-funded investment project. His resignation surprised many observers, and several theories have emerged to explain it. One suggests Jusoev was appointed by former Kremlin handlers and managed the budget independently of Gagloev’s allies. Another posits that Gagloev, preparing for the 2027 “elections,” wants a more loyal prime minister in place.
The 130th meeting in Ergneti
On January 29, 2026, the 130th meeting of the Incident Prevention and Response Mechanism (IPRM) took place in Ergneti, marking the first session of the year. Representatives from the State Security Service reiterated their demand for accountability in the murder of Georgian citizen Tamaz Ginturi. (On November 6, 2023, near St. George Church in Lomis, close to the village of Kirbali in Gori Municipality, Russian military personnel fatally shot 58-year-old Ginturi during an attempted detention). Central government officials also raised the issue of individuals held in illegal detention and called for their immediate release.
Egor Kochiev, head of the delegation for the de facto government of the occupied Tskhinvali region, expressed hope that the “illegal Georgian police post” near Chorchana would be removed, stating, “There has been no breakthrough so far, but there is some hope that we will be able to convince the Georgian side and this post will be removed.” Former Georgian Prime Minister Giorgi Gakharia, who has been in custody in absentia in connection with the Chorchana checkpoint case since November 13, 2025, responded to Kochiev’s remarks. On Platform X, Gakharia wrote: “At today’s IPRM meeting, the Tskhinvali occupation regime once again expressed hope that the Chorchana checkpoint – which was established under my leadership to prevent further occupation – will be removed by the Georgian Dream government. The checkpoint, which is located on Georgian territory, was protecting our land from illegal seizure and the creeping occupation of the Georgian population living in the surrounding area. The charges brought against me in the Chorchana case constitute political persecution and a direct attack on the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Georgia, clearly coordinated with Russia and the occupation regime.”