Post-Soviet Conflicts Watch monitors ongoing conflicts and post-conflict developments throughout the post-Soviet region. The publication analyses key events and trends in Georgia’s Russian-occupied Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali region (so-called South Ossetia), as well as in Transnistria, Gagauzia, and other areas. It also covers the Armenian-Azerbaijani peace process following on from the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War.

Note: This review does not cover developments related to Russia’s ongoing military aggression against Ukraine.

Armenia and Azerbaijan

TRIPP Updates

Brief Overview of TRIPP

On 8 August 2025, at the initiative of U.S. President Donald Trump, a peace summit was held in Washington with the participation of the leaders of Azerbaijan and Armenia, during which both trilateral and bilateral agreements were signed. At the same summit, a transport corridor project called the “Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity” (TRIPP) was announced.

On 13 January 2026, following a meeting in Washington between U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio and Armenian Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan, the “Framework Agreement for the Implementation of the Trump Route” was published.

On 26 May 2026, the “Framework Agreement on Strategic Cooperation between the Republic of Armenia and the United States regarding the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP)” was signed.

On 1 June 2026, the TRIPP framework agreement between Armenia and the United States was signed by U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio, and on 4 June, by Armenian Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan. The signing was carried out remotely.

At this stage, preparatory work related to TRIPP is underway. No specific infrastructure construction activities have yet commenced. According to statements by various officials, the launch of concrete project activities is planned for early 2027.

Statements and Key Developments Related to TRIPP

In October 2026, numerous statements concerning TRIPP were made in various formats. Meetings related to the project became more frequent, as did visits to potential project implementation sites.

  • According to Narek Mkrtchyan, Armenia’s Ambassador to the United States, the project may move into its practical implementation phase in early 2027. He stated that the project is progressing according to a predetermined schedule and that an American company is expected to complete its research work within the next 2–3 months.
  • On 5 October, Armenian Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan met with Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian. Mirzoyan informed the Iranian President about the progress of TRIPP’s implementation.
  • On 6 October, Azerbaijani Foreign Minister Jeyhun Bayramov received Arie Lightstone, Senior Advisor to the Chief U.S. Special Representative for Peace Missions. During the meeting, it was emphasised that TRIPP would make a significant contribution to the development of transport and economic connectivity in the region, ensure uninterrupted links between Azerbaijan and its Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic, and create broader regional transit opportunities.
  • On 8 October, during the 8th Consultative Meeting of the Leaders of the Central Asian States and Azerbaijan, President of Kazakhstan Kassym-Jomart Tokayev stated that: “The large-scale modernisation of Kazakhstan’s transport infrastructure will strengthen the strategic role of the entire region. Particular importance is attached to the development of the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route… I believe it would be possible, at the expert level, to discuss integrating the Middle Corridor with the TRIPP transport initiative, which would further expand existing potential and serve the long-term interests of our states.”
  • On 8 October, a technical meeting was held in the Armenian city of Goris between representatives of the relevant agencies of Azerbaijan and Armenia. The meeting focused on issues related to the construction of electricity transmission lines within the framework of TRIPP.
  • At the business forum Armenia–United Kingdom 2026, held for the first time in Yerevan, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan stated: “The Republic of Armenia and our region are undergoing a transformation process linked to the peace established between Armenia and Azerbaijan and the ensuing developments. We are currently working every day to commence the practical implementation of TRIPP. This project will undoubtedly become a cornerstone in transforming not only the economic environment of the Republic of Armenia, but of the entire region.” The Prime Minister also noted that, in parallel with the development of TRIPP, the opening of the Armenia-Türkiye border and the restoration of Armenia-Azerbaijan and Armenia-Türkiye railway connections are expected in the near future.
  • According to Armenian Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan, it is a realistic possibility that certain works will begin by the end of 2026, with the main construction phase likely to start in early 2027. Mirzoyan stated that the project would not only connect Azerbaijan with Nakhchivan, but would also provide Armenia with rail links towards China, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan. In his assessment, the project is mutually beneficial, and Armenia is already taking advantage of opportunities for cargo transit through Azerbaijani territory. Mirzoyan further stated that the transportation of weapons, ammunition, and certain categories of dangerous cargo will be prohibited within the framework of TRIPP. All cargo will be subject to declaration, scanning, and customs control. Special permits will be required for some categories of cargo.
  • Armenian Deputy Prime Minister Mher Grigoryan, the Minister of Infrastructure, and other officials, visited the Syunik region. The purpose of the visit was to discuss issues related to the commencement of TRIPP infrastructure design activities. According to Grigoryan, territory clearing, technical assessments, and other preparatory works are currently underway. He stated that it is already possible to launch design activities in three areas: Railway infrastructure; highway infrastructure; and energy infrastructure. The railway route has been agreed upon, and design work is expected to begin shortly, while alternatives for the highway route are still under discussion, with the aim to ensure that the transit corridor remains regionally competitive.

Ratification of the TRIPP Agreement

The National Assembly of Armenia ratified the Framework Agreement on Strategic Cooperation between Armenia and the United States concerning TRIPP. The document was supported by 63 deputies. 32 voted against it, primarily representing the pro-Russian opposition.

According to a statement by Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan, several important documents still need to be approved before project implementation can proceed. These include the Shareholders’ Agreement and the Charter of the TRIPP Development Company.

Mirzoyan explained that the company will be established jointly by the Government of Armenia and TRIPP Development Company USA, which will be wholly owned and controlled by the United States Government.

Planned Ownership Structure:

  • Armenia will hold 26% of the company.
  • TRIPP Development Company USA will hold 74% of the company.

This ownership arrangement will remain in force for 49 years, corresponding to the period envisaged for the construction and operation of the infrastructure. After the expiration of the 49-year term, the parties will have the option to extend their cooperation for an additional 50 years.

Should the cooperation be extended, Armenia’s share will automatically increase to 49%, without requiring any additional investment. The share of TRIPP Development Company USA will be 51%.

Azerbaijani Exports to Armenia

On 21 October 2025, Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev stated, during a joint press conference with Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, that Azerbaijan had lifted all restrictions on cargo transit to Armenia that had been imposed following the end of the First Nagorno-Karabakh War. The first transit shipment consisted of Kazakh wheat. Subsequently, Armenia also began receiving petroleum products from Azerbaijan on a regular basis. Armenia received the first batch of Azerbaijani fuel on 19 December 2025. Following Aliyev’s announcement, the transportation of fuel and other transit cargoes towards Armenia commenced.

Unlike previous months, no detailed information was published in October 2026 regarding exports to Armenia from Azerbaijan or from Russia via Azerbaijan in transit. Only general financial data are currently available in this regard.

During the period January-September 2026, exports from Azerbaijan to Armenia amounted to USD 23,450 million. For comparison, during the first six months of 2026, the figure stood at USD 17.8 million. The principal export commodities are fuel products (gasoline and diesel), as well as smaller quantities of plastic construction materials.

At present, exports from Armenia to Azerbaijan remain negligible. In 2026, Armenian exports to Azerbaijan totaled USD 96,500. Almost the entire volume of these exports was shipped in September. According to Armenian Minister of Economy Gevorg Papoyan, Armenian exports consisted primarily of aluminum foil (quantity unspecified). Small volumes of greenhouse-grown flowers were also exported.

The opening of transport routes and their rapid operationalisation will undoubtedly have a positive impact on the peace process and will help Armenia overcome its isolation. Although the full activation of transport routes will require time and the implementation of certain infrastructure projects, statements by government officials from both countries, and the increasing frequency of bilateral meetings, clearly indicate that the process has begun and that both sides are prepared to develop new transport corridors. This is expected to contribute to a reconfiguration of regional transport routes and facilitate the emergence of a new geopolitical reality in the region.

The Mine Issue

On 8 October 2026, a mine exploded in the area of Daghmashanli village, located in the Jabrayil District. Local resident Orkhan Gahramanov stepped on an anti-personnel mine and sustained injuries of varying severity.

On 5 October 2026, a photo exhibition dedicated to the threat posed by landmines was opened near the United Nations Office in Geneva. As part of the event, the initiative “A Mine-Free World” was presented, aiming to have this issue recognised as the 18th Sustainable Development Goal of the United Nations.

According to the Azerbaijani side, more than 1.5 million mines were laid in the formerly occupied territories.

Main Mine-Related Challenges for Azerbaijan

  1. Human Casualties: Since the 2020 war, the number of mine-related casualties has reached 443.
  2. Delays to the Return of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs): Contaminated areas hinder the safe return of the population.
  3. Economic Losses: The development of agricultural land, transport infrastructure, and investment projects is restricted.
  4. Persistent Security Risk: Local residents, farmers, construction workers, and personnel involved in reconstruction activities remain exposed to danger.

Measures Taken by Azerbaijan to Reduce the Mine Threat

  1. Azerbaijan continues large-scale demining operations through ANAMA (the Azerbaijan National Agency for Mine Action) and other government institutions.
  2. The mine issue is actively raised on international platforms in order to attract international support and funding.
  3. Information campaigns and public events are used to highlight the humanitarian and socio-economic consequences of landmine contamination.

Despite ongoing demining efforts, the scale of mine contamination indicates that this challenge will continue to affect regional security, economic development, and population return processes for many years to come.

Moldova

Transnistria and Integration into the European Union

On 4 October 2026, European Commissioner Valdis Dombrovskis stated that the unresolved Transnistrian conflict would not become an obstacle to Moldova’s accession to the European Union. He noted that the European integration process itself may help facilitate a gradual resolution of the Transnistrian issue, and, as an example, cited Cyprus, which became a member of the European Union despite its territorial disputes.

Brussels has said it believes that closer integration with the European Union will create economic and political leverage that can support the country’s gradual reintegration. Accession negotiations are ongoing, and Moldova has already opened several important negotiation clusters.

Administrative Reform and Transnistria

Moldovan Prime Minister Vasile Tofan explained why the Transnistrian region was not taken into account when drafting Moldova’s new administrative-territorial map. He stated that the government is proceeding from the existing reality, as laws adopted by the constitutional authorities of Moldova are not implemented in Transnistria. At the same time, he noted, Moldova continues to pursue the reintegration of the country. It continues to provide residents of Transnistria with pensions, maternity and childbirth benefits, social assistance payments, and access to Moldova’s healthcare system.

The Moldovan government plans to implement a local government reform under which the number of municipalities will be reduced from nearly 900 to 273.

In addition, three regions will be established in place of the current 32 districts.

Three second-level municipalities will be retained: Chișinău; Bălți; and Taraclia. The Autonomous Territorial Unit of Gagauzia will also be preserved. The new administrative boundaries are expected to enter into force in 2027, following local elections.

Elections in Gagauzia

On 15 November 2026, elections for both the Bashkan (Head of the Region) and the People’s Assembly of Gagauzia (the regional parliament) will be held simultaneously in Moldova’s Autonomous Territorial Unit of Gagauzia. The election campaign officially began on 16 October.

A total of 135 candidates are contesting 35 parliamentary seats across 35 electoral districts. The majority of candidates (93 individuals, approximately 69%) are running as independents, while 42 candidates represent political parties. The most broadly represented political force is the pro-Russian Party of Socialists of the Republic of Moldova (PSRM).

For the elections, 67 polling stations will be opened throughout the Autonomous Territorial Unit, including 12 polling stations in Comrat, the capital of Gagauzia.

Eight candidates are competing for the post of Bashkan, although the main contest is seen as being among leading contenders:

  1. Alexandr Stoianoglo – former Prosecutor General of Moldova and former presidential candidate. He is running as an independent candidate and is regarded as one of the main favourites.
  2. Fyodor Gagauz – candidate of the Party of Socialists of Moldova (PSRM), benefiting from substantial political support within the region.
  3. Sergey Anastasov – incumbent Mayor of Comrat, who advocates restoring dialogue between Chișinău and Comrat.

The elections are expected to play a significant role in determining the future political direction of the autonomous region. One of the central issues of the campaign is Gagauzia’s relationship with Chișinău, as well as the region’s broader foreign-policy orientation. Traditionally, pro-Russian sentiments have remained strong in Gagauzia, despite Moldova’s continuing process of integration with the European Union.

Central Asia

Dependence on Russian Technologies

Drone attacks carried out by Ukraine against the data centers of the Russian company Yandex in Russia disrupted taxi, delivery, and navigation services across Kazakhstan, highlighting the country’s dependence on this Russian technology company. During the service outages, users shifted to inDrive, a competing company based in Almaty. As demand surged, fares increased on some routes. As a result, Kazakhstan’s competition regulator issued an official warning to the company. In response, inDrive reduced its commission rates and implemented measures aimed at lowering service tariffs.

The incident also raised concerns regarding the security of Kazakh citizens’ personal data. According to the authorities, the servers storing personal information are located within Kazakhstan. However, the government acknowledged that certain critical functions, including ride dispatching and route calculation, depend on systems operating outside the country.

Central Asian Citizens in the “Special Military Operation”

Citizens of Central Asian countries account for nearly half of all identified foreign recruits who have joined the Russian Armed Forces since 2022. This is according to new data published by the Ukrainian government.

According to the government initiative “I Want to Live” (Хочу жить), more than 20,000 citizens from the five Central Asian states have been identified. Of these, more than 8,200 are citizens of Uzbekistan, and approximately 5,300 are citizens of Tajikistan. Together, these two groups constitute roughly two-thirds of the total number identified.

The recruitment of foreign citizens and their deployment to participate in combat operations forms part of the Kremlin’s strategy to continuously replenish losses among frontline troops.

Russia’s recruitment efforts are not limited to Central Asia. The African continent has also become a target due to socio-economic conditions that create favourable circumstances for military recruitment. For example, during the period January-September 2026, Russia recruited 699 individuals from Burundi and 530 individuals from Zimbabwe.

These figures illustrate the expanding geographical scope of Russia’s efforts to offset personnel shortages and combat losses associated with the war in Ukraine.

Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali Region

Meeting of Separatist Representatives

Representatives of the occupied Tskhinvali region and Abkhazia discussed prospects for cooperation with the leadership of the Tiraspol City Council in the separatist region of Transnistria, as well as the establishment of “inter-parliamentary” contacts with Tskhinvali and Sokhumi.

The meeting took place on 22 October 2026 and was attended by Vitaly Yankovsky, Head of the Representation of the occupied Tskhinvali region, Alexander Vataman, representative of occupied Abkhazia, and Andrei Volkovich, Chairman of the Tiraspol City Council.

Relations among these separatist entities remain largely formal in nature. Such meetings are primarily intended to demonstrate diplomatic activity; however, due to the parties’ limited resources, they rarely translate into substantive actions.

Abkhaz Students in the Russian Army?

Following the entry into force on 25 April 2025 of the 19 September 2022 Agreement on Dual Citizenship between Russia and occupied Abkhazia, Abkhaz students residing in Russia have found themselves at risk of military conscription.

Russian military commissariats currently require them to register for military service, threatening expulsion from educational institutions in cases of non-compliance.

According to the authorities in Sokhumi, the issue stems from a legal gap in the agreement, which does not provide a special status for students temporarily residing in Russia for educational purposes. The de facto authorities of Abkhazia are attempting to clarify the agreement’s provisions with Moscow.

The de facto Foreign Minister, Oleg Bartsits, stated that the matter was also discussed during his meeting in Moscow with Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov. However, no agreement has yet been reached to grant students an exemption.

The issue has become particularly acute in the context of Russia’s ongoing military aggression against Ukraine, as Moscow seeks to compensate for military losses through active recruitment policies. Using legal and financial incentives, Russia has sought to recruit various categories of individuals, including convicts, foreign nationals, and labour migrants.

Due to shortcomings in the dual citizenship framework, Abkhazians studying at Russian higher education institutions have also become targets of Russian military recruitment efforts. The issue is widely perceived in occupied Abkhazia as a serious social and political concern.

UK Sanctions against De Facto Leaders

On 1 October 2026, the United Kingdom imposed sanctions on six individuals connected to Georgia, including former and newly appointed leaders of the occupied Tskhinvali region and four pro-Kremlin figures, for activities deemed to be “threatening to the sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of Ukraine.”

Among those sanctioned were Alan Gagloev, former de facto leader of the Tskhinvali region, and Marat Kambolov, recently “elected” as the region’s new de facto leader.

According to a statement released by the UK Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office on 1 October: “Today’s package includes seven individuals, including four Georgian citizens, involved in spreading pro-Kremlin disinformation. This includes both legitimising Russia’s occupation of Ukrainian territory and serving in Russian-installed administrations in occupied South Ossetia.”

The British Embassy in Tbilisi stated: “Russia’s aggression against Ukraine is part of a broader pattern of disregard for the sovereignty, territorial integrity and internationally recognised borders of its neighbours. This includes the continuing occupation of the Georgian regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.”

The Embassy further noted: “The United Kingdom condemns Russia’s attempts to consolidate its illegal control over Georgia’s occupied regions, including through the so-called ‘presidential elections’ held in South Ossetia on 18 September and subsequent steps towards de facto annexation.”

It added that: “The United Kingdom firmly supports Georgia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity within its internationally recognised borders and continues to hold Russia accountable for its actions.”

Personnel Changes and Government Reform

In October 2026, the de facto authorities of the occupied Tskhinvali region carried out a large-scale institutional and personnel reorganisation. The reform included: renewal of the de facto government; replacement of key security officials; creation of a new administrative structure; and strengthening the positions of officials advocating for deeper integration with Russia.

These developments followed the “election” of Marat Kambolov as the region’s new de facto president.

Shortly after assuming office, on 9 October, Kambolov approved a new structure for the de facto government. The reform envisages strengthening the economic sector, establishing tourism as a separate ministry, enhancing the agriculture, energy, transport, and industrial policy sectors, and reducing the number of ministries and agencies from 37 to 34.

On 14 October, Kambolov nominated Soslan Margiev for the position of “Prime Minister.” Margiev was born in Tskhinvali in 1982, but his professional career has been largely connected to Russia. He worked for many years within the Russian judicial system, serving as head of the Lobnya City Court of Moscow Oblast between 2016 and 2022. In 2026, he held the position of Deputy Head of the Anti-Corruption Directorate of the Judicial Department under the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation.

On 22 October, the de facto parliament approved Margiev’s nomination, and later that day Kambolov formally appointed him as de facto Prime Minister.

On 19 October, Kambolov made another notable personnel decision by appointing Ekaterina Tolstikova as “facto First Deputy Prime Minister.” Tolstikova was born in Sevastopol in 1981 and has worked for various Russian federal institutions and scientific organisations, including the Russian Ministry of Education and Science (2010–2016) and the Kurchatov Institute (2021–2025). Notably, she worked in both institutions during periods when Kambolov held senior positions there.

Kambolov dismissed Yuri Kadyi as chairman of the so-called State Security Committee and appointed Yevgeny Romanov as his successor.

At this stage, Kambolov appears to have completed the main personnel reshuffle and is expected to continue governing the occupied region with this new team of officials.

World Domino Championship in Abkhazia

On 8 October 2026, the General Assembly of the International Domino Federation unanimously decided to hold the 2027 World Domino Championship in occupied Abkhazia. The 2026 championship was held in Salou, Spain, with approximately 800 athletes participating, including two representatives from Abkhazia.

During the tournament, participants were shown a promotional video about Abkhazia, and a ceremony was held during which Spain transferred the flag of the International Domino Federation to the Abkhazian Domino Federation as host of the next world championship.

The de facto Ministry of Foreign Affairs of occupied Abkhazia welcomed the federation’s decision. According to the ministry, Georgia has repeatedly attempted to politicise the participation of Abkhaz athletes in international sporting events. In the ministry’s view, such actions run counter to the spirit of international sporting cooperation and humanitarian engagement.

Earlier, in September 2026, de facto Foreign Minister Oleg Bartsits met with Manuel Oquendo, President of the International Domino Federation. On 20 October, Bartsits also met with the Abkhaz athletes who had participated in the 2026 championship.

Occupied Abkhazia remains largely unable to participate independently in international sporting competitions, and athletes from the region generally compete under the Russian flag. From Sokhumi’s perspective, participation in such tournaments represents an effort to overcome international isolation.