Post-Soviet Conflicts Watch monitors ongoing conflicts and post-conflict developments throughout the post-Soviet region. The publication analyses key events and trends in Georgia’s Russian-occupied Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali region (so-called South Ossetia), as well as in Transnistria, Gagauzia, and other areas. It also covers the Armenian-Azerbaijani peace process following on from the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War.

Note: This review does not cover developments related to Russia’s ongoing military aggression against Ukraine.

Armenia and Azerbaijan

TRIPP Updates

A Brief Overview of TRIPP

On 8 August 2025, at the initiative of U.S. President Donald Trump, a peace summit involving the leaders of Azerbaijan and Armenia was held in Washington. Both trilateral and bilateral agreements were signed. During the summit, the transport corridor project titled “Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity” (TRIPP) was announced.

On 13 January 2026, following a meeting in Washington between U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio and Armenian Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan, the Framework Agreement on the Implementation of TRIPP was published.

On 26 May 2026, the Framework Agreement between the Republic of Armenia and the United States of America on Strategic Cooperation concerning TRIPP was signed.

Pursuant to the implementation of the understanding reached in Yerevan on May 26, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Armenia Ararat Mirzoyan and U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio signed the Agreement remotely. The Agreement was signed by the U.S. Secretary of State in Washington on June 1, and by the Foreign Minister of Armenia in Yerevan on June 4.

Preparatory work on TRIPP is currently underway. No specific infrastructure works have yet commenced. Russian propaganda outlet Sputnik Armenia, on 19 August 2026, citing information from the office of Armenian Deputy Prime Minister Mher Grigoryan, announced that “studies, calculations, and assessments are currently being conducted, including with regard to the railway line. The exact parameters of the route, the cost of the project, and the technical characteristics of the infrastructure will become known upon completion of these works.”

Constitutional Court Decision

The Constitutional Court of Armenia ruled that the agreement related to TRIPP is consistent with the Constitution. The review procedure began on 15 September and continued for several days. The Court’s decision cleared the way for parliamentary ratification of the agreement.

Statements on TRIPP

In September 2026, numerous statements regarding TRIPP were made in various formats. In most cases, the project was discussed in the context of the Middle Corridor, the development of economic ties between East and West, and regional peace.

  • According to Armenian Ambassador to the United States Narek Mkrtchyan, the construction of TRIPP may begin in early 2027. He stated that the project is not directed against Russia or any other country.
  • Iranian Ambassador to Armenia Khalil Shirgholami, speaking at the APRI Forum 2026, stated that Iran would support TRIPP only if Armenia’s territorial integrity and sovereignty are not undermined and no U.S. military forces are deployed in the region.
  • U.S. President Donald Trump stated that TRIPP would create significant economic opportunities for Armenia, the United States, and the entire region, while strengthening peace in the South Caucasus.
  • An event titled Prosperity Through Peace: Investing in the Trans-Caspian Trade Route and TRIPP was held in New York at the initiative of the U.S. Government. Participants included Azerbaijani Foreign Minister Jeyhun Bayramov, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs Brendan Hanrahan, and U.S. Special Envoy for Peace Missions Steve Witkoff.
  • Several statements concerning TRIPP were made at the 7th Annual Caspian Business Forum, organised by the Caspian Policy Centre (CPC) in New York:
    • Erzhan Kazykhan, representative of the President of Kazakhstan in negotiations with the United States, stated that TRIPP would provide Kazakhstan with additional trade opportunities, strengthen the role of the Middle Corridor, and more effectively connect Central Asia with European markets.
    • U.S. Congressman from Arizona Abraham Hamadeh stated that TRIPP would strengthen U.S. supply chains, expand trade, improve access to energy resources and critical minerals, and promote peace in the South Caucasus.
    • Turkish Deputy Foreign Minister Berris Ekinci stated that TRIPP should not be viewed as an independent or competing corridor: its role is to complement and strengthen existing regional transport networks, particularly Türkiye’s infrastructure.
    • Azerbaijani Deputy Foreign Minister Yalchin Rafiyev noted that TRIPP would promote economic cooperation and regional peace by creating shared interests and new trade opportunities.
    • U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Peter Andreoli described TRIPP as a new model of U.S. engagement in developing regional connectivity, and noted that the project could become an important component of the Middle Corridor.
  • At the annual Concordia Summit in New York, held on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan stated that TRIPP would open a “new era” for Armenia, foster economic development, and facilitate implementation of his Crossroads of Peace initiative.
  • At the Azerbaijan International Investment Forum, during a panel session titled Middle Corridor: Unlocking the Potential of Trade, Industry and Connectivity, Azerbaijani Deputy Foreign Minister Elnur Mammadov stated that engineering works under TRIPP had already begun in Armenia, and that the project would become a strategic economic platform for the South Caucasus.
  • Speaking at the 25th Annual Meeting of Foreign Ministers of Landlocked Developing Countries, held on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly, Azerbaijani Foreign Minister Jeyhun Bayramov stated that TRIPP would expand regional and global transit networks. He also noted that implementation of the project would not be possible without Azerbaijan’s participation.

Developments Along the TRIPP Route

On 2 September 2026, Armenian and U.S. officials conducted a joint visit to Armenia’s Syunik region to review the planned TRIPP route and ongoing preparations.

The Armenian delegation included representatives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Trade of Armenia (the ministry’s name having been changed to include “international trade”), while the U.S. delegation included U.S. Chargé d’Affaires in Armenia David Allen and Senior Adviser for Policy Planning at the U.S. Department of State John Asconas.

According to Allen, TRIPP has already moved from the conceptual stage to the implementation phase, and engineering and technical railway surveys related to the route have begun in Armenia. Construction work on the future route itself has not yet begun.

Azerbaijani Exports to Armenia

On 21 October 2025, Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev, speaking at a joint press conference with Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, announced that Azerbaijan had lifted all restrictions on cargo transit to Armenia that had been imposed following the end of the First Nagorno-Karabakh War.

The first transit cargo was Kazakh wheat. Subsequently, Armenia also began regularly receiving petroleum products from Azerbaijan. Armenia received its first batch of Azerbaijani fuel on 19 December 2025.

Following Aliyev’s announcement, transportation of fuel and other transit cargoes commenced towards Armenia.

In September 2026, the following shipments were recorded:

From Russia to Armenia via Azerbaijan: 3 September: 989 tonnes of diesel fuel (17 tank wagons); 5 September: 355 tonnes of wheat (5 wagons), 180 tonnes of fertiliser (2 wagons), 138 tonnes of timber (2 wagons); 10 September: 1,400 tonnes of barley (20 wagons) and 1,469 tonnes of wheat (21 wagons).

As of 10 September, total transit shipments from Russia to Armenia via Azerbaijan amounted to: 55,000 tonnes of wheat; 9,000 tonnes of fertiliser; 1,414 tonnes of propane; 133 tonnes of aluminium; 414 tonnes of anthracite; 68 tonnes of buckwheat; 334 tonnes of timber; and 1,114 tonnes of coal.

Exports from Azerbaijan to Armenia have primarily consisted of fuel: as of 10 September, 15,000 tonnes of diesel fuel and 5,000 tonnes of AI-92 and AI-95 gasoline have been imported to Armenia.

During the first six months of 2026, Armenia imported fuel (gasoline and diesel) worth USD 17.8 million from Azerbaijan, along with plastic construction materials worth USD 109,000. Total Armenian imports of petroleum products during the first half of 2026 amounted to USD 299 million, giving Azerbaijan a 6% share of total imports. Over the same period, Russia’s share dropped sharply from 46% to 19%, with Armenia paying USD 58 million for Russian fuel.

Exports from Armenia to Azerbaijan remain insignificant. As of September 2026, Armenia had reportedly exported $960 worth of flowers to Azerbaijan, while aluminium foil had also begun to be exported, although its value was not disclosed.

The opening and rapid activation of transport routes is expected to have a clearly positive impact on the peace process and help Armenia to overcome its isolation. Although full operation of all routes will require time and additional infrastructure projects, statements by government officials and increasingly frequent bilateral meetings indicate that the process has gained momentum and that both sides are prepared to develop new transport corridors, contributing to the reconfiguration of regional transport networks and the emergence of a new geopolitical reality.

Ministers’ Meeting

On 24 September 2026, Azerbaijani Foreign Minister Jeyhun Bayramov and Armenian Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Trade Ararat Mirzoyan met in New York on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly.

Such bilateral meetings have become increasingly frequent, particularly between the heads of foreign ministries, who have greater opportunities to meet in various formats, facilitating the timely resolution of bilateral issues.

Armenian Intelligence Chief in Baku

On 22 September 2026, Head of Armenia’s Foreign Intelligence Service Kristine Grigoryan visited Baku to participate in the 4th Baku Security Forum.

Grigoryan arrived in the morning and returned to Yerevan later the same day. No information about additional meetings has been disclosed, but such a visit by a senior security official generally contributes to the development of bilateral relations and confidence-building.

Railway Line Between Meghri and Yeraskh

Speaking at the UN General Assembly, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan stated that the railway sections between Meghri and Yeraskh would be restored in the near future as part of the TRIPP project.

He highlighted that this would reconnect Armenia with Azerbaijan by rail for the first time since the 1990s and, through Azerbaijan, with Russia, Central Asia, and China.

Pashinyan’s government aims for Armenia not merely to become a transit corridor linking Azerbaijan and Türkiye, but to play a broader role in regional transportation and evolve into a transport hub.

When Will the Armenia-Türkiye Border Open?

On 24 September 2026, Armenian Security Council Secretary Alen Simonyan explained why the Armenia-Türkiye border remains closed: “I associate this primarily with the completion of the ongoing processes between Armenia and Azerbaijan.” According to Simonyan, there are no significant obstacles that should prevent the issue from being resolved or which will cause further delays.

Armenia and Türkiye have had no diplomatic relations since 1991, while the border has remained closed since 1993 at Ankara’s initiative. The main issues have included recognition of the Armenian Genocide in the Ottoman Empire, and the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. In December 2021, special representatives were appointed for normalisation: Ruben Rubinyan, Vice Speaker of the National Assembly of Armenia (elected Speaker in August 2026) and Serdar Kılıç, former Ambassador of Türkiye to the United States.

Since 1 January 2023, direct cargo air transportation has been permitted between the two countries. On 11 March 2026, Turkish Airlines launched direct flights on the Istanbul-Yerevan-Istanbul route. On 28 April, a working-group meeting on restoration of the Gyumri-Kars railway was held in Kars. On 4 May, Pashinyan announced the signing of a protocol regarding reconstruction of the medieval Ani border bridge. On 23 May, he announced the opening of the Akhalkalaki-Kars railway for freight transportation between Armenia and the European Union.

Armenia-Azerbaijan Border Delimitation

On 9 September 2026, Azerbaijani Foreign Minister Jeyhun Bayramov announced that Azerbaijan and Armenia had agreed to conduct border delimitation from north to south. Work will begin at the junction of the Azerbaijani, Armenian, and Georgian borders.

According to Bayramov, the delimitation commission holds regular meetings, and both sides have agreed to begin with the more complex northern section before gradually proceeding southward.

The Mine Issue

On 5 September 2026, Elmdar Sariyev (born in 1972) was injured after his tractor struck a landmine in the Aghdam district. Another explosion occurred on 28 September in the Shusha district, with Bakhtiyar Mirza (born in 1979) injured when his vehicle hit a mine.

According to the Azerbaijan Mine Action Agency:

  • Approximately 300,000 hectares of liberated territory have been cleared.
  • 43,000 mines and more than 24,000 explosive devices have been neutralised.
  • The annual target is to clear 65,000 hectares.
  • Around 50,000 hectares had been cleared as of September 2026.
  • More than 4,500 personnel are involved in humanitarian demining operations.

According to President Ilham Aliyev, since the end of the 2020 war, mine-related incidents have affected 437 people, resulting in 73 fatalities and 364 serious injuries.

Aliyev also stated that more than 3,500 Azerbaijani citizens have been affected by mines since the beginning of the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict.

Baku frequently criticises Yerevan over minefield maps, arguing that the maps provided by Armenia do not always contain accurate information.

Moldova

Russian Drones in Moldova

Since the start of Russia’s full-scale military aggression against Ukraine, Moldova has become vulnerable to Russian military attacks. Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) pose a particular threat, as they occasionally or deliberately violate Moldovan airspace. Such incidents have become more frequent in recent months.

Moldovan President Maia Sandu stated that Russia’s war against Ukraine already poses a direct threat to Moldova’s security. She made this statement while commenting on another Russian drone attack against Ukraine, during which one UAV violated Moldovan airspace.

On the night of 8-9 September 2026, a Russian attack on Ukraine killed two people near the Starokozache border crossing point, located approximately 1 km from the Moldovan border. Another Russian drone entered Moldovan airspace, crossed toward Romania, then returned and crashed in Moldova’s Rîșcani district.

Russian State Duma Elections in Transnistria

The elections to the Russian State Duma were held in Transnistria on 18-20 September 2026. According to the Russian Central Election Commission, 51,092 Russian citizens residing in Transnistria participated in the elections. As expected, the ruling political party, United Russia, received the majority of votes, securing 39,733 votes (77.76%).

On 20 September, 15 polling stations were opened in Transnistria for the elections. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Moldova submitted a protest note to the Russian authorities, stating that only one polling station, located at the Russian Embassy in Chisinau, had been officially approved.

Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali Region

Russian State Duma Elections in the Occupied Regions

On 18-20 September 2026, elections to the 9th State Duma of the Russian Federation were held. Polling stations were opened in Georgia’s occupied regions of Abkhazia and Tskhinvali (“South Ossetia”). Russian presidential and parliamentary elections are routinely organised in the occupied regions, where participation is limited to individuals holding Russian citizenship.

The elections in Russia lasted three days. Voting in the Tskhinvali region also continued for three days, while in Abkhazia it was held only on 20 September. Eligible voters included Russian citizens aged 18 and above who either permanently reside in the occupied regions (individuals holding both the occupied region’s “citizenship” and Russian citizenship) or are temporarily present there (tourists, Russian military personnel, and persons on official assignments).

In Abkhazia, the number of polling stations was increased from the initially planned 35 to 50 due to the presence of Russian tourists in September. Polling stations opened in all districts, including in the city of Gali, where ethnic Georgians reside. It should be noted that only a small proportion of the local Georgian population possesses both so-called Abkhaz and Russian citizenship.

More than 70,000 voters participated in the elections, which is five times the number recorded in 2021, when approximately 14,500 voters took part.

In the Tskhinvali region, 11 polling stations were opened and more than 11,000 voters participated. Russia’s ruling party, United Russia, received 67.6% of the vote. The remaining votes were distributed as follows:

  • Communist Party of the Russian Federation (CPRF) – 10.6%
  • Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR) – 5%
  • New People Party – 3.2%
  • Communists of Russia Party – 2.1%

New “President” of the Occupied Tskhinvali Region

On 18 September 2026, in the early and illegitimate presidential elections held in the Russian-occupied Tskhinvali region, Marat Kambolov won a decisive victory, as was widely expected. Kambolov is the first de facto president of the Tskhinvali region whose life and career have no connection to the region itself. Although ethnically Ossetian, he was born in North Ossetia, and his entire professional career has been linked to Russia.

His “election,” which appeared more like an appointment, indicates the Kremlin’s intention to establish more direct control over the Tskhinvali region and to reduce the role of the local political elite, which Moscow has long accused of weak governance and ineffective use of Russian financial assistance.

From the outset, it was clear that Kambolov would face no serious competition. He received endorsements from former de facto presidents and influential political groups in the occupied region. The political spectrum showed an unusual degree of consensus in supporting Kambolov, suggesting that all political actors understood the Kremlin’s preference regarding who should become the new “president.” None of his opponents were major political figures backed by strong local political or business clans, creating the impression that the remaining candidates participated merely to provide the appearance of competition and democracy in the elections, the outcome of which was already predetermined.

Kambolov effectively began his political campaign at the outset of his political career in the Tskhinvali region. His political ambitions were evident from the beginning, and ultimately culminated in his becoming “president.”

His career in the region began on 27 May 2026, when he was appointed as the State Advisor to the President of South Ossetia. On 16 June, then-leader Gagloev issued a decree appointing him de facto Prime Minister. Shortly afterwards, Gagloev’s resignation was announced, and Kambolov was assigned the duties of acting de facto president until the early “presidential election.”

Kambolov also received open support from the Kremlin. On 13 July 2026, he met with Russian President Vladimir Putin in Moscow.

A total of 32,869 voters participated in the “presidential election,” representing 82.65% of the total electorate. On 19 September, the so-called Central Election Commission of the occupied Tskhinvali region announced the final results:

  • Marat Kambolov – 27,922 votes (84.95%)
  • Murat Valiyev – 1,257 votes (3.82%)
  • Kazbeg Kodoev – 828 votes (2.52%)
  • Zurab Kokoev – 488 votes (1.48%)
  • Votes “Against All” – 1,610 votes (4.90%)

The inauguration of the sixth president of the Tskhinvali region took place on 30 September 2026.

(See more about the illegitimate presidential elections in the Tskhinvali region in this article)

134th Meeting in Ergneti

On 8 September 2026, the 134th meeting within the framework of the Incident Prevention and Response Mechanism (IPRM) was held in Ergneti. The main purpose of the format is to discuss daily incidents on the ground and to provide an operational response. The hotline operates within the frame of the IPRM the main goal of which is to rapidly respond on specific incidents and eliminate them.

During the meeting, Tbilisi once again raised the issues of illegal detentions and the so-called borderisation process, as well as the need to hold accountable those responsible for the killing of Georgian citizen Tamaz Ginturi.

At the same time, representatives of the de facto authorities in Tskhinvali again demanded the removal of the Chorchana/Tsnelisi police checkpoint, and expressed concern regarding the health of Tamaz Goloev, a resident of the Tskhinvali region who is currently imprisoned in Tbilisi-controlled territory on charges of espionage.

According to the Tskhinvali representative, no cases of the Georgian police crossing the so-called state border had been recorded since the previous meeting, aside from one minor incident involving EU monitors.

The representative also stated that, since the previous meeting, two cases of “airspace violation” had been recorded (one involving a drone and another involving an aircraft), along with five instances of Georgian citizens crossing the “border” since 23 July. Three individuals were expelled from the occupied region, while investigations are ongoing in the remaining two cases.

The next meeting in Ergneti is scheduled for 22 October 2026.