Post-Soviet Conflicts Watch examines ongoing conflicts and post-conflict developments in the post-Soviet space. This document analyzes key events and trends in the Russian-occupied regions of Georgia, including Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali region, as well as the breakaway region of Transnistria and other areas. It also addresses the Armenian-Azerbaijani peace negotiations following the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War.
Note: This review does not cover issues related to Russia’s military aggression in Ukraine.
Armenia and Azerbaijan
Azerbaijani Fuel Supplies for Armenia
For the first time since the end of the First Nagorno-Karabakh War, Armenia has received fuel produced by the Azerbaijani State Oil Company (SOCAR) via rail transit through Georgia. On December 19, 2025, 22 tank cars carrying a total of 1,210 tons of AI-95 gasoline arrived in Armenia. This delivery was made possible following an intergovernmental agreement signed on November 28, in Gabala, by Azerbaijani Deputy Prime Minister Shahin Mustafayev and his Armenian counterpart, Mher Grigoryan. Currently, 60% of Armenia’s fuel imports come from Russia, and the country’s total annual fuel demand is approximately 480,000 tons. The 1,200 tons supplied by Azerbaijan account for only about 0.25% of this demand. Despite the modest volume, the delivery is highly symbolic, and marks a significant shift in Armenian–Azerbaijani relations.
The sale of Azerbaijani fuel in Armenia commenced on December 23 at Ran Oil gas stations. Media reports indicate that these stations are operated by Megatrade, a company owned by the family of Khachatur Sukiasyan, a member of the ruling Civil Contract party. Two private Armenian companies acquired the fuel through an international intermediary.
The fuel transit was preceded by Baku’s decision to lift the ban on cargo transit from Azerbaijan to Armenia. The fuel was transported to Armenia via the Azerbaijani railway line from the Baku freight station to Boyuk-Kesik, from where it entered Armenia through Georgia. Initially, media reports in both Azerbaijan and Armenia claimed that the Georgian side was demanding an unreasonably high transit tariff. However, the Georgian government later decided to transport the first batch of fuel at no cost. According to media reports, Georgia set a tariff of USD 92 per ton for the transit of Azerbaijani oil and oil products to Armenia over a 111-kilometer section, equivalent to USD 0.82 per ton per kilometer. By comparison, Azerbaijan charges USD 17 per ton for transporting similar cargo over a 680-kilometer stretch, or approximately USD 0.02 per ton per kilometer. Following the resolution of the issue, the foreign ministers of Azerbaijan and Georgia held a telephone conversation on December 29. Armenia’s Minister of Economy, Gevorg Papoyan, characterized the initial tariff proposed by the Georgian side as “relatively high and uncompetitive.”
Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan welcomed the delivery of Azerbaijani fuel, and addressed the tariff concerns, noting that unresolved tariffs with Georgian Railways may prompt businesses to seek alternative routes.
Beyond Azerbaijani fuel imports, Armenia is exploring the import of additional cargo. On December 15, Minister Papoyan, announced that a new shipment of wheat would arrive in Armenia by rail through Azerbaijan and Georgia. However, he did not disclose the supplier or volume. Notably, Armenia had already imported Kazakh wheat via Azerbaijan in November.
Amid the restoration of Armenian-Azerbaijani economic ties, there have also been reports about reviving old railway lines. For instance, after Tbilisi initially proposed high tariffs, Azerbaijani media indicated that Baku is considering reinstating the railway route to the Armenian border. Armenian media noted that preparatory work has commenced on Turkish territory at the Alican checkpoint, which borders Armenia.
Furthermore, Azerbaijan Railways Deputy Chairman Arif Agayev announced that design work for the restoration and modernization of railway infrastructure in Nakhchivan has been completed. Construction is already underway in the Ordubad district, near the Salamelik station on the border with Armenia. The project envisions a 188-kilometer railway line that meets modern standards, with an annual throughput capacity of 15 million tons.
At present, only Armenia is receiving cargo from Azerbaijan, not yet vice-versa; a development made possible by the Washington agreement of August 8, 2025. The opening and swift implementation of transport routes is poised to positively influence the peace process and help Armenia break free from isolation. While the full realization of these routes will require time and further infrastructure projects, frequent bilateral meetings and official statements from both governments clearly signal that the process is underway, and that both sides are ready to advance new routes. This momentum will ultimately reshape regional transport corridors and foster a new geopolitical landscape.
Notably, on December 22, 2025, Lasha Abashidze, Director General of Georgian Railways, announced that the Baku-Tbilisi-Kars project is essentially complete, with commissioning underway. “The Baku-Tbilisi-Kars railway is already fully operational. This project, developed by Azerbaijan and Georgia, will be exclusively operated by Georgian Railways. The railway is particularly significant, as it connects us directly with Turkey, boosts our country’s connectivity, and offers opportunities to attract additional cargo flows,” Abashidze stated.
Yet, construction of the Baku-Tbilisi-Kars railway has spanned several years, and full commissioning is still pending. Georgia’s tariff policies and infrastructure limitations could accelerate the pursuit of alternative routes through Azerbaijan and Armenia, potentially diminishing Georgia’s role as a regional transit hub.
Bilateral Meetings
Since the Washington agreement on August 8, 2025, meetings between Armenian and Azerbaijani officials at multiple levels have become more frequent, accompanied by a greater U.S. role in ongoing negotiations.
On December 22, 2025, the U.S.-Azerbaijan Chamber of Commerce (USACC) hosted a closed roundtable to discuss President Trump’s itinerary. Ambassadors from Azerbaijan and Armenia attended, as did representatives from Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan.
On December 8, 2025, the Azerbaijani Ambassador to Georgia, Faig Guliyev, met with the Deputy Chief of the U.S. Diplomatic Mission, Alan Purcell.
On November 17, 2025, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan met with Alison Hooker, the U.S. Deputy Secretary of State for Political Affairs. After she visited Yerevan, Hooker continued to Baku, where she met with Azerbaijani Foreign Minister Jeyhun Bayramov and Hikmet Hajiyev, Head of the Foreign Policy Department of the Azerbaijani Presidential Administration.
Beyond government-level meetings, two roundtables have already taken place under the “Bridge of Peace” initiative, bringing together representatives of Armenian and Azerbaijani civil society. The first was held in Yerevan on October 21-22, 2025, followed by a second in Baku on November 21-22, 2025.
These meetings facilitate strengthening bilateral relations, restoring transport links, and alleviating Armenia’s isolation.
Border Clash on the Tajikistan-Afghanistan Border
The Border Guards of the State Committee for National Security of Tajikistan reported that two of their personnel were killed in an armed clash with militants on the Tajik-Afghan border on December 24, 2025. According to officials, the militants crossed into Tajikistan from Afghanistan and engaged in armed resistance; all three militants were killed by return fire. In response, the Tajik authorities demanded an official apology from Afghanistan’s ruling Taliban movement, and called for enhanced border security measures.
Deadly clashes also took place along the border on November 26 and 30, resulting in the deaths of five Chinese nationals working on infrastructure projects.
The border between Tajikistan and Afghanistan extends for up to 1,400 kilometers, tracing river lines and remaining a persistent security concern. Ethnic Tajiks reside on both sides of the border. From Tajikistan’s perspective, instability in Afghanistan poses a significant threat due to active paramilitary groups and ongoing drug trafficking. Armed groups frequently cause clashes in the border zone.
Given its limited resources, Tajikistan is seeking support from the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), led by Russia, which recognized the Taliban movement as Afghanistan’s legitimate government in 2025.
Transnistria
Results of the “Parliamentary Elections”
On November 30, 2025, parliamentary elections widely regarded as illegitimate were conducted in the self-proclaimed Transnistrian Republic. A total of 80,143 individuals participated in voting for “deputy” candidates across 33 single-member districts, with a reported turnout of 26.01%.
The local de facto parliament, known as the Supreme Council, is composed of 33 “deputies.” In 12 districts, two candidates competed, while in 21, only one stood unopposed. Of the 33 “deputies,” 22 are members or supporters of the “Renewal” party, which is closely linked to Sheriff Holding. The Sheriff has been the dominant force in the region since 1993, exercising de facto control over the separatist entity’s economy and political landscape. All previous de facto leaders of Transnistria have received the Sheriff’s backing.
Revocation of Citizenship
On December 2, 2025, reports emerged that Gennady Chorbu, an opposition activist in Transnistria, had his Russian citizenship revoked. According to a statement from the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB), Chorbu “exercised a destructive ideological influence” on Russian citizens and “contributed to the destabilization of the socio-political situation” during the war in Ukraine. Chorbu has been openly critical of Russia’s actions in Ukraine. In 2021, he was sentenced to three and a half years in prison on charges of “extremism” and “insulting” a local separatist leader.
Russia has implemented the practice of revoking citizenship numerous times in recent years. For instance, in 2025, two residents of occupied Abkhazia were stripped of their Russian citizenship for alleged anti-Russian activities, after voicing opposition to the ratification of an “investment agreement” that granted Russian businessmen preferential operating conditions in Abkhazia. Similarly, in 2024, three de facto members of parliament in the occupied Tskhinvali region lost their Russian citizenship on comparable grounds, having also been accused of anti-Russian activities.
Russian Aid to Pensioners
The self-proclaimed Transnistrian Republic recently received another tranche of humanitarian aid from Russia, enabling the distribution of a New Year’s bonus to pensioners. Each beneficiary, in total 150 thousands pensioners, received 150 Transnistrian rubles (approximately USD 9). Russia also extends similar assistance to pensioners and World War II veterans in the occupied regions of Georgia, where most residents hold Russian citizenship. In these areas, pensioners receive both local and Russian pensions, as well as additional bonuses. Such measures are part of Russia’s broader strategy across the post-Soviet space, particularly in occupied and separatist regions, to maintain influence and ensure the loyalty of pro-Russian populations.
The Curator’s Statement
In a December 30 interview with Russian media, Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail Galuzin asserted that resolving the Transnistrian issue without Russia’s involvement is unacceptable. “Chisinau maintains no dialogue with either Tiraspol or Russia. It appears that certain individuals in Chisinau seek to address the Transnistrian problem without Russia’s participation or consideration of its interests. This is, of course, unacceptable. Russia has always supported resolving the Transnistrian issue based on the principles outlined in the July 1992 agreement,” Galuzin stated.
The Transnistrian conflict is managed through the “5+2” negotiation format, which includes Chisinau and Tiraspol as parties; Russia, Ukraine, and the OSCE as mediators; and the European Union and the United States as observers. However, this format has been suspended since 2022, following Russia’s full-scale military aggression against Ukraine.
On December 3, 2025, Moldova’s Deputy Prime Minister for Reintegration, Valeriu Chiveri, announced that the government, supported by the European Union and the United States, is formulating a reintegration plan for the country. Chiveri did not disclose specific details. Moscow, meanwhile, fears that Moldova’s pro-Western leadership is attempting to sideline Russia in resolving the Transnistrian conflict. Galuzin’s recent remarks can be interpreted as an expression of these concerns.
Galuzin serves as the curator for post-Soviet countries and the Russian-occupied regions of Georgia within the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali Region
Are “Citizens of the Republic of Abkhazia” Serving in the Russian Army?
On December 12, 2025, a coordination meeting took place between the de facto foreign minister of occupied Abkhazia, Oleg Bartsits, and the de facto defense minister, Vladimir Anua. The primary focus was on the status of “citizens of the Republic of Abkhazia” who also hold Russian citizenship and are enrolled at Russian universities, specifically regarding their registration for military service in Russia.
The meeting explored potential solutions to concerns in Abkhazia that these “citizens” might be drafted to serve in the war against Ukraine, a prospect that has generated mixed reactions within Abkhazia.
On December 13, Jemal Bganba, head of the Strategic Cooperation Department at the de facto Ministry of Foreign Affairs, commented on the issue. He stated that the purpose of the meeting was to identify legal mechanisms to exempt Abkhazian “citizens” from mandatory military registration in Russia, arguing that they are already part of the mobilization reserve of the “Republic of Abkhazia” and, as such, are required to register for military service there.
Currently, only volunteers from occupied Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali region have been involved in Russia’s military aggression against Ukraine. Nonetheless, concerns are mounting among residents that they could soon face compulsory conscription. Open-source data suggests that up to 70 volunteers from Abkhazia have been killed in Russia’s war against Ukraine since February 2022.
Russian Financial Aid
Russia will continue providing financial assistance to the occupied regions of Georgia in 2026. In Abkhazia, Russian aid will account for roughly one-third of the so-called “republican budget,” down from the previous year, when Russian financial assistance totaled 5.3 billion rubles. This reduction is attributed to increased local revenues, stemming from Abkhazia’s economic dependence on and trade relations with Russia. By contrast, the occupied Tskhinvali region remains almost entirely reliant on Russian funding. The region’s so-called “state budget” for 2026 is projected at 8.949 billion rubles, with 6.995 billion rubles coming from Russian financial assistance. The region’s own revenues account for only 1.953 billion rubles. Minimal economic activity in the Tskhinvali region makes it virtually impossible to generate sustainable domestic income.
On December 31, 2025, Teimuraz Mikvabia, the de facto Minister of Economy of occupied Abkhazia, and Sergey Nazarov, Russia’s Deputy Minister of Economic Development, signed an “Agreement on Support for the Implementation of the State Program for the Socio-Economic Development of the Republic of Abkhazia for 2026-2030.” This agreement provides for continued Russian assistance to the occupied region’s socio-economic development, including direct financial support. Funds will be allocated to raising salaries for designated “budgetary” sector employees, constructing infrastructure, and supporting investment initiatives, among other objectives. A similar agreement was signed between Russia and the occupied Tskhinvali region, further underscoring Moscow’s position as the principal provider of financial and economic support to Georgia’s occupied territories.
129th Meeting in Ergneti
On December 22, 2025, the 129th meeting of the Incident Prevention and Response Mechanism (IPRM) convened in Ergneti, marking the seventh session of the year. According to the State Security Service of Georgia (SSS), Georgian representatives reiterated their demand for accountability regarding the killing of Georgian citizen Tamaz Ginturi, who was shot and killed by Russian occupation forces on November 6, 2023. The SSS emphasized that the Georgian side placed particular focus on the plight of individuals held in illegal detention, calling for their immediate release. Additional topics addressed included the ongoing unlawful restrictions on freedom of movement and the continued process of so-called “borderization” along the occupation line.
Egor Kochiev, a representative of the de facto authorities in the occupied Tskhinvali region, stated that the IPRM meetings remain an effective platform for upholding a stable and predictable security environment. Kochiev emphasized that the removal of the Georgian police checkpoint in the village of Chorchana remains the de facto authorities’ primary concern. He characterized the initiation of a criminal case by Georgian authorities against former Minister of Internal Affairs and Prime Minister Giorgi Gakharia as a positive step, whom the de facto side considers responsible for establishing the checkpoint in August 2019. Kochiev further reported that since the last IPRM meeting, only one alleged violation of the so-called “state border” by a Georgian citizen had been recorded. He noted there were no reported violations of “airspace,” while two alleged breaches of the “state border” by observers from the European Union Monitoring Mission (EUMM) had been registered.
The next meeting of the Incident Prevention and Response Mechanism (IPRM) is scheduled for February 4, 2026.
The decision to establish meetings in this format was taken during the 6th round of the Geneva International Discussions, held on February 18-19, 2009. The primary objective of the IPRM is to address day-to-day incidents on the ground and ensure a prompt, effective response. The mechanism includes a dedicated hotline to facilitate rapid communication and resolution of specific incidents. IPRM meetings are co-chaired by the Head of the EU Monitoring Mission in Georgia, alongside representatives from the UN and the OSCE.
The Arrest and Deportation of Tamar Mearakishvili
On December 22, 2025, the so-called General Prosecutor’s Office of the occupied region initiated criminal proceedings against a Georgian citizen under Article 276 of the Russian Criminal Code (espionage). Investigators allege that the individual, a Georgian citizen residing in “South Ossetia,” collected and transmitted information on strategically significant sites in the region, which, according to authorities, posed a threat to regional security.
Subsequently, the so-called State Security Committee issued a statement that diverged from the account presented by the “Prosecutor General’s Office.” According to the Committee, acting in cooperation with the de facto Ministry of Internal Affairs, a Georgian citizen residing in Akhalgori was detained on suspicion of transmitting information to foreign media outlets allegedly affiliated with Georgian special services. The statement further alleged that these outlets exploited the individual for propaganda purposes to advance Georgia’s interests and those of its Western partners.
On December 23, it was revealed that the detained individual is Tamar Mearakishvili, a prominent civil activist known for her frequent criticism of the de facto authorities. Originally from Akhalgori, Mearakishvili had recently been residing in Tskhinvali, where she operated a small business. Reports indicate that she was apprehended during a special operation at her rented apartment in Tskhinvali. Mearakishvili has faced systematic violations of her rights for years. Previously, the de facto authorities initiated criminal proceedings against her, which were subsequently dropped. Notably, she lacks an identity document, which has resulted in persistent challenges in her daily life.
Shortly before her arrest, Mearakishvili published a Facebook post addressed to Alan Margiev, chairman of the de facto parliament of the occupied region. She noted that she had been publicly requesting a meeting with him for over a year and had made repeated visits to the de facto parliament, all without success. Mearakishvili stated that she was “forced to go on a hunger strike,” citing “arbitrary actions by the authorities, complete disregard for civil service and labor laws, and violations of her rights” as her reasons.
Mearakishvili was placed in isolation, where she went on a hunger strike, which soon led to a deterioration of her health. She was subsequently taken to hospital.
On December 31, the so-called Prosecutor General’s Office announced that, pursuant to a decision by the Tskhinvali City Court and a resolution from the so-called Prosecutor General of the Republic of South Ossetia, Georgian citizen Tamar Mearakishvili was expelled from South Ossetia. According to the State Security Service of Georgia, the co-chairs of the Geneva International Discussions played an active role in the process, maintaining continuous communication through the “hotline” coordinated by the European Union Monitoring Mission in Georgia (EUMM). Mearakishvili is now in territory under the control of Georgia’s central government.
Mearakishvili’s criticism elicited a strong response from Alan Gagloev, the de facto president of the occupied Tskhinvali region. Addressing journalists on December 25, Gagloev remarked: “The situation involving Tamar Mearakishvili has exceeded acceptable boundaries. No one is entitled to insult officials publicly, use offensive language, or raise such matters in public. Regarding the threat of a one-person picket, we will not permit the disruption of children’s holiday celebrations. If someone wishes to protest, they should go to a neighboring country, to their historical homeland. The republic’s authorities have demonstrated considerable tolerance for an extended period. We have refrained from imposing restrictive measures, despite her high-profile actions and, to be candid, her questionable ties to Georgian organizations. We possess documentary evidence that she receives foreign funding.”
The Ossetian social media community has expressed critical views on Mearakishvili’s expulsion. A commonly held view suggests that the decision was motivated by personal retaliation by Gagloev, who was displeased with Mearakishvili’s criticism and protest activities. Many believe that she was detained on largely fabricated charges by the de facto authorities of the occupied region to “legitimize” her expulsion.