Introduction

The 2026 fuel crisis in the Russian Federation has also affected Georgia’s Russian-occupied Abkhazia region. However, few reports have emerged regarding fuel shortages in the country’s occupied Tskhinvali region, also known as “South Ossetia.” GFSIS-E has published a study examining the fuel market in Abkhazia, focusing on its structure, supply mechanisms, and dependence on Russia.

This article details the agreement between the de facto authorities in Tskhinvali and Moscow establishing a tax-free regime, followed by an overview of the supply chain through which Russian fuel is delivered to the occupied region. It also analyses the roles of the de facto state-owned fuel company Yugosetnefteprodukt, and Russian giant Rosneft in the region’s fuel market.

Summary

The fuel market in the Russian-occupied Tskhinvali region is relatively small, centralised, monopolised, and vulnerable to disruptions. Over the past 18 years, since the 2008 Russo-Georgian war and Russia’s recognition of “South Ossetia’s” independence, Tskhinvali has experienced repeated fuel shortages and fuel-quality issues that have directly affected local consumers.

Moscow granted the Russian state-owned company Rosneft exclusive rights to supply Russian petroleum products to the occupied region. Rosneft later constructed two filling stations there under a different brand.

Unlike Russian-occupied Abkhazia, the Tskhinvali region has no fuel depots of its own. This was further confirmed by Soslan Dzhigkaev, the current director of the de facto state-owned fuel company Yugosetnefteprodukt (Russian: ГУП Югосетнефтепродукт). The map embedded in this study identifies fuel storage facilities fuel depot locations that appear to exclusively serve the Russian  4th Military Base and the Russian FSB Border Force units deployed in the occupied region.

According to the latest available data, approximately 27,000 vehicles are registered in the Tskhinvali region. However, this figure includes those that have been registered there but are used elsewhere, primarily in Russia. It is also important to note that a significant number of Ossetians from the occupied region reside in Russia.

The agreement establishing a tax free regime

In 2012, the de facto authorities of “South Ossetia” signed a deal with the government of the Russian Federation “on the Trade Regime for Goods.” Under the agreement, the parties agreed to abolish customs duties and other related charges on goods imported from either side.

The document defined Russia as the authority responsible for determining the origin of goods, with the relevant procedures to be executed in accordance with the framework of the Customs Union of the Eurasian Economic Union, originally established in 2010 by Russia, Belarus, and Kyrgyzstan.

The agreement defined two major aspects of the trade deal:

1. A list of the goods which would be exported from Russia to “South Ossetia” without applying export tax in Russia;

2. A list of goods on which “South Ossetia” reserves the right to levy taxes upon import from Russia. The exemption from Russian export duties applied exclusively to gasoline with an octane rating below 95, and diesel fuel.

The list of goods subject to potential taxation by the de facto authorities included products such as water, beer, cottage cheese, wine, ethyl alcohol, and liquors. These measures were intended primarily to “protect” local manufacturers from competition with major Russian manufacturers that could supply similar products to the local market at lower prices.

The tax-free regime on fuel products is subject to strict annual quotas. Article 6 of the agreement stipulates that the authorised agencies of both parties will determine the quotas for the following year on an annual basis. These quotas have remained dynamic and reflect specific demand. If the parties fail to agree on the volumes for the following year, duty-free exports continue at the levels set for the previous year. The initial annual quotas were set at 16,000 tonnes of gasoline and 19,000 tonnes of diesel fuel.

The authorised agencies were identified as the de facto Ministry of Economy of “South Ossetia,” and the ministries of economy and energy of Russia. The parties also established an intergovernmental commission to oversee the implementation of these arrangements.

One of the main justifications for introducing such quotas was the concern that an unrestricted supply of relatively inexpensive, duty-free fuel could incentivise illicit resale within the region, potentially undermining Russia’s financial interests. These restrictions would later prove particularly relevant when the director of the Ossetian “state” fuel company Yugosetnefteprodukt, was arrested on fraud charges.

Article 8 introduced rules governing the use of Russian fuel imported into “South Ossetia” under the duty-free regime, and introduced penalties for violations. Specifically, it prohibited the resale or re-export of Russian fuel to third countries. If the Russian side detected such activities and the local de facto authorities failed to prevent them, Russia reserved the right to reimpose tariffs on the fuel, applying the standard rates charged on exports to other countries.

In 2014, “South Ossetian state unitary enterprise” Yugosetnefteprodukt was formally designated as an exclusive executor of fuel quotas in the occupied Tskhinvali region.

The fuel supply chain from the Russian Federation to “South Ossetia”

Following the 2012 agreement and the 2014 designation of Yugosetnefteproduct as an exclusive importer of petroleum products, the supply chain was established as follows:

  1. The de facto government allocates the funds for fuel from the “state” budget in advance to Yugosetnefteprodukt, which in turn procures the petroleum products from Rosneft.
  2. Rosneft transports petroleum products via rail to Vladikavkaz in North Ossetia.
  3. Yugosetnefteprodukt loads the fuel onto tanker trucks and moves it through the Roki Tunnel into the occupied Tskhinvali region.
  4. Yugosetnefteprodukt covers the needs of de facto state agencies and distributes the volumes to local commercial resellers at fixed prices.
  5. Local private entities are permitted to distribute the fuel purchased from the state monopoly to their retail gas stations throughout the occupied region.
  6. In addition to wholesale operations, Yugosetnefteprodukt runs its own gas station in Tskhinvali.
  7. The private entities are allowed to import petroleum products from Russia through alternative channels.

Then-chief of the de facto government staff, Oleg Gagloev, explained the agreement as follows: “This measure will make it possible to proceed with resolving issues important to the Republic. Firstly, to saturate the domestic market with high-quality fuel at a price not exceeding the average Russian price. Secondly, to proceed with the formation of the Republic’s energy security system in terms of the strategic reserves of petroleum products. Thirdly, to establish civilized rules in the market of petroleum products and stop abuses by speculators.”

Despite its apparent economic rationale, the scheme created significant opportunities for corruption. The Ossetian de facto government effectively monopolised fuel imports by controlling access to the quotas to duty-free fuel. Although private entities were not formally prohibited from importing Russian fuel via alternative channels, it was economically unfeasible to do so, as “cheap” Russian fuel was accessible only through those fixed quotas, allocated exclusively to the “state” company, leaving private companies dependent on considerably more expensive alternatives.

The de facto government’s characterisation of private fuel traders operating in the Tskhinvali region as “speculators,” served to delegitimise their role in the market. Officials accused these businesses of manipulating fuel prices for private gain. A natural part of a competitive market economy, private trading and price-setting are not inherently abusive practices. Yet it is a practice that appears absent in “South Ossetia.”

The state fuel company

The de facto authorities of the Tskhinvali region issued a decree by which Yugosetnefteprodukt was given the exclusive right to handle all fuel imports from Russia, being responsible for the import, storage, and retail distribution of fuel in the Tskhinvali region, and operating a single filling station in Tskhinvali city. The company also provides fuel to the de facto government institutions.

The de facto government regularly issues decrees on setting fixed prices of fuel sold by this company. The latest publicly available document states that, on June 1, 2025, the “government” set the selling price of diesel fuel at 60 Russian roubles for both the de facto authorities and civilian consumers.

Alan Bekoev was the first publicly known director of Yugosetnefteprodukt, although the date of his appointment could not be established from publicly available sources. He was dismissed in 2013 by de facto President of “South Ossetia” Leonid Tibilov (2012 – 2017). The same month, Tibilov appointed Vladimir Tigiev as Bekoev’s successor.

On May 5, 2017, less than two weeks after Tibilov’s “presidential” term ended, Russian media outlet Sputnik reported that law-enforcement bodies in “South Ossetia” had uncovered alleged fraud involving Yugosetnefteprodukt. The de facto State Security Committee, commonly referred to as the KGB, announced that it had uncovered a large-scale scheme involving fuel imports, and had identified several suspects. The investigation followed multiple complaints from local residents who reported that low-quality fuel had damaged their vehicles.

According to the de facto KGB, the fuel delivered to Vladikavkaz in North Ossetia was routinely replaced with diluted, low-quality fuel. The substituted fuel was then loaded into tanker trucks and transferred to “South Ossetia.” The KGB did not disclose what had been done with the original Russian fuel. Despite them mentioning multiple “suspects,” only a single person was arrested: Vladimir Tigiev, the director of Yugosetnefteprodukt, who was initially jailed for two months.

Following these events, neither Russian nor local media in Tskhinvali reported further developments. It wasn’t until two years later, in 2019, that Sputnik Ossetia stated that Vladimir Tigiev had been dismissed from his position by Tibilov’s successor, Anatoliy Bibilov. This raises questions about the timeline of events: Tigiev, who had been accused by the de facto KGB of involvement in fuel-import fraud and reportedly spent two months in pre-trial detention, remained associated with Yugosetnefteprodukt until his dismissal approximately two years later.

The same report stated that Bibilov had appointed Soslan Dzhigkaev as acting director of the de facto state-owned enterprise in autumn 2017. Dzhigkaev has reportedly held the position since then. The discrepancies in the publicly available accounts raise questions about the reliability and completeness of the reporting. They also leave open the possibility that Tigiev’s role in the alleged scheme was more complex than the available reports suggest, although there is insufficient evidence to establish whether he benefited from political protection or other arrangements.

Tigiev’s arrest followed the end of Tibilov’s presidential term. The case was accompanied by another criminal investigation by the “Ossetian KGB,” that reportedly uncovered corruption schemes in the de facto Ministry of Health. The overall picture pointed towards the new “president” pressing on Leonid Tibilov’s networks of de facto government employees.

Russian public business registries show that Tigiev was an active entrepreneur operating in Russia even before his appointment as a director of Yugosetnefteprodukt. There are three legal entities directly tied to him: Salting LTD; VTB LTD; and Strelets+ LTD. These companies indicated the trade of petroleum products and production of pharmaceuticals as their primary spheres of operation.

The registered addresses of these companies, in Vladikavkaz, North Ossetia, were also associated with other businesses that had no direct connection to Tigiev. However, some of their owners and shareholders had previously been his business partners. It is also possible that Tigiev, or the group of people included in this scheme, were selling the original Rosneft fuel in North Ossetia, Russia, instead of sending it to its intended destination.

On Rosneft entering the “South Ossetian” market – twice

The primary provider of petroleum products to the occupied Tskhinvali region is the Russian petroleum giant Rosneft. Rosneft is also the largest importer of fuel to Russian-occupied Abkhazia.

A month after the KGB’s crackdown on the government employees appointed by Leonid Tibilov, in June 2017, the new “president” Anatoly Bibilov met Rosneft’s chief, Igor Sechin, in Sochi, Russia. The parties announced that Rosneft had decided to construct gas stations in the occupied Tskhinvali region. Following the meeting, Bibilov stated: “We expect that, with Rosneft’s arrival in South Ossetia, all issues related to fuel quality and untimely deliveries will be resolved.”

The statement was ambiguous, given that the Russian government had already designated Rosneft as the exclusive supplier of petroleum products to the region. The de facto authorities had also established Yugosetnefteprodukt to administer fuel imports under the preferential quota system. Bibilov’s statement, combined with his KGB’s crackdown on officials from the previous administration, fuels suspicion that a faction of South Ossetian elites has been exploiting the agreement with Russia to benefit from Rosneft’s fuel profits.

This suspicion is further amplified by the fact that the ex-director of Yugosetnefteprodukt only served two months of prison time and, according to Sputnik, continued to hold his position in the company until 2019.

In early 2019, Rosneft proceeded to construct two gas stations in occupied Tskhinvali. Construction of both stations was concluded by the end of that year. However, neither of these gas stations were opened under Rosneft’s brand. Instead, both began operating under the name A-Oil.

Rosneft’s direct commercial presence in the region under a different brand, despite having been the sole fuel supplier to the occupied region for over a decade, raises further questions.

The argument that Rosneft acted cautiously to avoid international sanctions for operating in internationally regognised Georgian territory holds little weight, given that the company has openly operated gas stations in occupied Abkhazia for years. Another possibility is that Moscow and Rosneft lacked confidence in the de facto Ossetian authorities’ management of fuel quota imports. Yet this explanation also falls short, as Moscow could easily have stripped Tskhinvali’s “state” enterprise, Yugosetnefteprodukt, of its exclusivity and assumed direct oversight.

Considering the crackdown on Tibilov-era officials, Rosneft’s expansion under an agreement brokered by Bibilov, and Tskhinvali’s retention of Yugosetnefteprodukt to execute tax-free fuel quotas, it is far more likely that multiple political interest groups are exploiting the local fuel market for illicit gain. Such arrangements could provide members of the de facto political establishment with opportunities to supplement their relatively modest official incomes, reinforcing their dependence on Moscow and ultimately reducing incentives to challenge Russian influence.