Post-Soviet Conflicts Watch monitors ongoing conflicts and post-conflict developments throughout the post-Soviet region. The publication analyses key events and trends in Georgia’s Russian-occupied Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali region (so-called South Ossetia), as well as in Transnistria, Gagauzia, and other areas. It also covers the Armenian-Azerbaijani peace process following on from the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War.
Note: This review does not cover developments related to Russia’s ongoing military aggression against Ukraine.
Armenia and Azerbaijan
One Year Since the Signing of the Washington Declaration: Assessing the Results
On 8 August 2026, one year passed since the Washington Peace Summit. On the occasion, U.S. President Donald Trump held telephone conversations with the leaders of Azerbaijan and Armenia. During his conversation with Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev, Trump discussed the importance of TRIPP in the context of regional connectivity, while, in his conversation with Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, the parties reaffirmed their readiness to begin construction under the TRIPP framework in the near future. Aliyev and Pashinyan also spoke by telephone on the same day.
To mark the anniversary of the peace summit, the three parties issued a joint statement summarising the achievements of the past year:
- Maintaining stability along the Armenia-Azerbaijan border;
- Moving TRIPP from the conceptual phase to the implementation phase through the establishment of the TRIPP Development Company, the launch of engineering works in Armenia, and the near completion of road and railway construction by Azerbaijan up to the Armenian border;Allocation by the United States of a USD 201 million grant to the Trans-Caspian Fund (The U.S. government has decided to increase financing for TRIPP+ from USD 201 million to USD 402 million.);
- The signing of strategic partnership agreements between the United States and Armenia and Azerbaijan;
- Removal by Azerbaijan of all transit restrictions for Armenia. During the year, Armenia received 60,000 tonnes of goods via transit through Azerbaijan, and imported 20,000 tonnes of petroleum products from Azerbaijan;
- The signing of an agreement between the telecommunications operators of the two countries on internet interconnectivity;
- Dissolution of the OSCE Minsk Group;
- Invitation of Armenia and Azerbaijan to the “Peace Council” initiative related to the reconstruction of the Gaza Strip.
A trilateral meeting was also held in Washington on 10 August. Participants included Armenian Deputy Foreign Minister Vahan Kostanyan, Azerbaijani Deputy Foreign Minister Elnur Mammadov, and U.S. Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Allison Hooker.
The Washington Declaration provided a positive impetus to the peace process. Although the legal process of concluding a peace agreement has not yet been completed, cooperation between Armenia and Azerbaijan is gradually expanding.
De Facto Peace
On 4 August 2026, Azerbaijani Foreign Minister Jeyhun Bayramov noted that a de facto peace had been established between Azerbaijan and Armenia, and that this represented a significant achievement in the normalisation process.
According to Bayramov, in addition to the dissolution of the OSCE Minsk Group, important confidence-building measures have been undertaken. Azerbaijan has unilaterally lifted restrictions, facilitated cargo transportation to and from Armenia, and supplied Armenia with petroleum products.
Bayramov stated that a formal peace agreement could be signed after Armenia removes from its constitution a provision that indirectly implies territorial claims against Azerbaijan. This may prove to be the greatest challenge for Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, whose party does not hold a constitutional majority in the newly elected parliament, making constitutional amendments impossible without support from other political forces.
TRIPP Developments
A Brief Overview of TRIPP
On 8 August 2025, at the initiative of U.S. President Donald Trump, a peace summit was held in Washington with the participation of the leaders of Azerbaijan and Armenia. Both trilateral and bilateral agreements were signed during the summit.
The summit also introduced a transportation corridor project known as the “Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity” (TRIPP).
On 13 January 2026, following a meeting in Washington between U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio and Armenian Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan, the Framework Agreement for the Implementation of the Trump Route was published.
On 4 June, Armenian Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan announced that Armenia and the United States had signed the framework agreement on the TRIPP project. The agreement had been signed several days earlier by Mirzoyan and U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio.
Preparatory work on TRIPP is already underway, although infrastructure construction has not yet begun. According to information published by the Russian propaganda outlet Sputnik Armenia on 19 August 2026, citing the office of Armenian Deputy Prime Minister Mher Grigoryan: “At this stage, research, calculations, and feasibility studies are underway, including those concerning the railway line. The exact parameters of the route, project cost, and technical characteristics of the infrastructure will become known after these works are completed.”
Doubled Funding for “TRIPP+”
The U.S. government has decided to increase financing for TRIPP+ from USD 201 million to USD 402 million.
The information was reflected in the official U.S. government expenditure database, USAspending.gov. According to the published data, the Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs of the U.S. Department of State allocated USD 201 million to the TRIPP+ Fund on 30 January 2026 for expenditure until 31 December 2036. On 16 July, the grant conditions were amended and the amount was doubled, without changing the implementation period.
TRIPP+ (the Trans-Caspian Investment Fund) was established in Washington on 26 January 2026, two weeks after the meeting between the U.S. and Armenian foreign ministers on 13 January.
Rubio on the Trans-Caspian Investment Fund
On 8 August 2026, U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio announced that the Trans-Caspian Investment Fund had begun operations.
According to Rubio, the fund, managed by a newly elected board of directors and financed by the U.S. government, will stimulate private-sector investment along the Trans-Caspian trade route in the South Caucasus and Central Asia.
Rubio emphasized that TRIPP is not merely an infrastructure project, but an important link in the Trans-Caspian trade corridor and a driver of commercial opportunities for the United States and other countries.
Meetings with Arab Ambassadors
On 11 August 2026, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan met with ambassadors of Arab countries accredited to Armenia. The parties discussed TRIPP, among other issues. The purpose of such meetings is to increase the interest of other regional actors in TRIPP, as broadening the circle of stakeholders interested in the project will increase the chances of its successful implementation.
Meetings with U.S. Representatives
On 18 August 2026, U.S. Congressman Abraham Hamadeh met Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan in Yerevan. The implementation of TRIPP was among the issues discussed during the meeting. On 19 August, Hamadeh met Armenia’s newly appointed Secretary of the Security Council, former parliamentary speaker Alen Simonyan, to discuss TRIPP. For Simonyan, this was his first meeting of such rank in his new position.
Hamadeh also met with Armenia’s newly elected parliamentary speaker Ruben Rubinyan and Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan. The increasing frequency of visits by U.S. officials to Armenia, and their meetings with Armenian government representatives, demonstrate Washington’s growing interest in Armenia.
On 5 August, Mirzoyan also discussed matters related to TRIPP implementation with Aryeh Lightstone, Senior Advisor to the U.S. Special Representative for Peace Missions.
Where Will TRIPP Pass through?
On 24 August 2026, during a speech before the newly elected parliament, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan addressed the route of the TRIPP railway line and its economic and regional significance.
TRIPP is to run along Armenia’s southern border, near the banks of the Aras River, following the route connecting the village of Nrnadzor and the town of Agarak. Both settlements are located in Armenia’s Syunik Province. The distance between the settlements is approximately 31 km via the E002 highway.
The route closely follows the Soviet-era railway line that once connected mainland Azerbaijan with the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic. The railway was completely destroyed during the First Karabakh War.
During the Soviet period, after passing through Nakhchivan, the railway re-entered Armenian territory near Yerask in the Ararat Province and continued to Akhurik in the Shirak Province before connecting to Turkey. Pashinyan noted that some investors are attempting to bypass this route and create a direct railway connection from Nakhchivan to Turkey, which would deprive Armenia of potential transit revenues.
According to Pashinyan, the main challenge is that Armenia’s railway infrastructure is currently under Russian management, creating potential risks in the context of Russia’s confrontation with the West. Consequently, Pashinyan is seeking to transfer the management of the railway to a company from a third country, an initiative that faces considerable resistance from Russia.
Aliyev and Pashinyan Discuss TRIPP
On 31 August 2026, Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev and Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan held a bilateral meeting in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, on the sidelines of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation Summit. According to available information, the importance of TRIPP was among the topics discussed.
Railway Construction towards the Armenian Border
On 4 August 2026, Azerbaijani Foreign Minister Jeyhun Bayramov announced that the railway line and highway leading to the Armenian border are expected to be completed by 2027.
Construction is already underway on the first seven kilometers of railway from the Armenia-Azerbaijan border towards Ordubad in the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic. The total railway length within the republic is 194 km. After reconstruction is completed, the railway will be capable of transporting up to 15 million tonnes of cargo annually.
The reconstructed railway lines from Ordubad, and the Horadiz-Agbend railway from mainland Azerbaijan, will be connected through Armenian territory, referred to by Azerbaijan as the “Zangezur Corridor.” This will provide Azerbaijan with direct rail connections to Armenia, Nakhchivan, and Turkey. In the longer term, the railway could play an important role in facilitating economic relations between East and West.
The Armenian side seeks to ensure that, after crossing Nakhchivan, the railway passes through Armenian territory using the historical Soviet-era route, before reaching Turkey, thereby increasing Armenia’s transit role. Azerbaijan, on the other hand, is attempting to establish a direct railway connection between Nakhchivan and Turkey and reduce dependence on Armenian railway infrastructure managed by Russia.
Azerbaijani Electricity for Armenia?
On 11 August 2026, during a visit to the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic, Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev gave an interview to Azerbaijani television in which he discussed potential energy shortages in Armenia following the eventual closure of the Metsamor Nuclear Power Plant.
Aliyev stated that Baku is prepared to provide Armenia with additional sources of electricity. According to him, Azerbaijani specialists have already conducted surveys within Armenia and identified locations suitable for the installation of electricity transmission towers.
The Metsamor Nuclear Power Plant is aging, and Azerbaijan and Turkey have long advocated its closure. As the Armenia-Azerbaijan peace process progresses, opportunities for cooperation are emerging in an increasing number of sectors.
Azerbaijani Exports to Armenia
According to the Azerbaijani Customs Committee, exports from Azerbaijan to Armenia amounted to USD 17,372 million during the first seven months of 2026, exports which primarily consisted of fuel products. In turn, Armenian exports to Azerbaijan totaled just USD 960, and consisted of greenhouse flowers.
On 21 October 2025, Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev announced during a joint press conference with Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev that Azerbaijan had lifted all the restrictions on transit shipments to Armenia that were imposed after the First Nagorno-Karabakh War. The first transit cargo consisted of Kazakh wheat. Subsequently, Armenia began receiving petroleum products regularly from Azerbaijan. The first shipment of Azerbaijani fuel arrived in Armenia on 19 December 2025.
Following Aliyev’s announcement, the transportation of fuel and other transit cargoes to Armenia commenced.
In August 2026, the following shipments were sent from Russia to Armenia via transit through Azerbaijan: 6 August: 979 tonnes of wheat (14 railcars); 8 August: 1,049 tonnes of wheat (15 railcars) and 700 tonnes of coal (10 railcars); 13 August: 1,400 tonnes of wheat (20 railcars); 15 August: 560 tonnes of wheat (8 railcars); 19 August: 1,820 tonnes of wheat (26 railcars); 20 August: 2,725 tonnes of wheat (39 railcars); 21 August: 1,108 tonnes of wheat (11 railcars) and 273 tonnes of barley (4 railcars); 22 August: 630 tonnes of wheat (9 railcars) and 36 tonnes of propane (1 railcar); 24 August: 242 tonnes of propane (7 railcars); 25 August: 976 tonnes of wheat (14 railcars) and 65 tonnes of timber (1 railcar); 28 August: 420 tonnes of wheat (6 railcars) and 280 tonnes of barley (4 railcars).
As of 28 August 2026, 55,000 tonnes of wheat, 9,000 tonnes of fertilizer, 1,414 tonnes of propane, 133 tonnes of aluminum, 414 tonnes of anthracite, 68 tonnes of buckwheat, 334 tonnes of timber, and 1,114 tonnes of coal had been shipped from Russia to Armenia through Azerbaijan.
Meanwhile, Azerbaijan exported 15,000 tonnes of diesel fuel, and 5,000 tonnes of AI-92 and AI-95 gasoline to Armenia throughout the month.
At the time of writing, there have been no substantial Armenian exports to Azerbaijan, although, on 13 August, Prime Minister Pashinyan announced that exports from Armenia would begin in the near future.
The opening and rapid activation of transportation routes will have a positive impact on the peace process and help Armenia overcome its isolation. Although the full operation of these routes will require time and additional infrastructure, statements by officials and the increasing frequency of bilateral meetings indicate that the process has moved forward and both sides are committed to developing new transportation links. This could contribute to a broader reconfiguration of regional transport routes and the emergence of a new geopolitical reality.
Checkpoint at the Armenia-Azerbaijan Border
On 30 August 2026, Armenian Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan and heads of Armenia’s diplomatic missions abroad visited the Margara Border Crossing Point (BCP) on the Armenia-Turkey border. According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the checkpoint is ready for operation.
Armenia and Turkey have not maintained diplomatic relations since 1991, while the border between the two countries has been closed since 1993, at Ankara’s initiative. In December 2021, special representatives were appointed to facilitate the normalisation process: on the Armenian side, Ruben Rubinyan, Vice Speaker of the National Assembly (later elected Speaker in the newly elected parliament), and on the Turkish side, Serdar Kılıç, former Ambassador of Turkey to the United States.
Since 1 January 2023, direct cargo air transportation between the two countries has been permitted. Subsequently, throughout 2024-2026, the sides agreed to accelerate the opening of the land border for citizens of third countries and holders of diplomatic passports. On 11 March 2026, Turkish Airlines launched direct flights on the Istanbul-Yerevan-Istanbul route.
On 28 April, a working group meeting was held in Kars regarding the restoration of the Gyumri-Kars railway. On 4 May, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan announced that a protocol had been signed on the reconstruction of the medieval Ani border bridge, and on 23 May he announced plans to open the Akhalkalaki (Georgia)-Kars (Turkey) railway in order to facilitate the transportation of goods between Armenia and the European Union.
At present, there is no land connection between Turkey and Armenia. Transport links are limited to air connections and routes passing through third countries.
Restoration of the Historic Ani Bridge
On 4 August 2026, the second meeting of the Armenia-Turkey Joint Working Group on the restoration of the historic Ani Bridge was held in Yerevan. The protocol on the bridge restoration was signed on 4 May 2026.
The bridge is located in the Armenia-Turkey border area and is historically linked to Ani, the medieval capital of Armenia. The joint restoration of the bridge is significant for bilateral dialogue, but does not imply the immediate opening of the border or the restoration of diplomatic relations.
Minefields
On 14 August 2026, a 73-year-old man was injured after stepping on a landmine in Azerbaijan’s Kalbajar District. As a result of the explosion, his leg had to be amputated.
Since the end of the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War, the issue of landmines has remained one of the most acute challenges affecting the return of Azerbaijani internally displaced persons and the development of infrastructure in the region. Movement within Nagorno-Karabakh without the permission of the Azerbaijani authorities is prohibited.
Since 2023, when Azerbaijan re-established full control over Nagorno-Karabakh, extensive demining operations have been underway. However, the process has already resulted in numerous casualties. Since 1991, more than 3,500 people have been killed there as a result of landmine explosions.
The Azerbaijani government publishes weekly updates on its demining activities.
Court of Appeals Ruling against Former Nagorno-Karabakh Leaders
On 6 August 2026, the Baku Court of Appeals upheld the verdict delivered on 5 February against the military-political leadership of the self-proclaimed Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh and several other ethnic Armenians.
On 5 February 2026, a court in Baku sentenced the following individuals to life imprisonment: Former de facto President Arayik Harutyunyan (2020-2023); former commanders of the so-called “Defence Army” Levon Mnatsakanyan (2015-2018) and David Manukyan; former de facto Speaker of Parliament David Ishkhanyan (2023); and former de facto Foreign Minister David Babayan (2021-2023).
Due to their age, former de facto presidents Arkadi Ghukasyan (1997-2007) and Bako Sahakyan (2007-2020) were sentenced to 20 years’ imprisonment.
On 17 February, former de facto State Minister Ruben Vardanyan was also sentenced to 20 years’ imprisonment.
In total, 15 individuals were tried.
The exact number of ethnic Armenian prisoners of war and civilian detainees held in Azerbaijan remains unclear. Baku claims that it is holding 30 detainees, while Armenian sources claim that the number exceeds 80 individuals.
Moldova
Russian Drones in Moldova
On 17 August 2026, an explosion was recorded following the crash of an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) in the village of Talmaza, Ștefan Vodă District, Moldova. The crash caused a fire in nearby vegetation.
According to the Moldovan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the incident constituted a serious violation of the country’s sovereignty and posed a direct threat to its citizens.
On 18 August, Moldova’s Minister of Defense stated that since the beginning of the war, Moldovan airspace had been violated approximately 60 times, for which the Russian authorities bear responsibility.
Moldova is one of the weakest countries in Europe militarily and remains vulnerable to Russian drone incursions. Another such incident occurred on 27 August, when Russian drones violated Moldovan airspace several times shortly before celebrations marking the 35th anniversary of Moldova’s independence. One of the drones reportedly crashed in the Bessarabia region.
Tskhinvali’s “Ambassador” in Tiraspol
The appearance in Moldova of Vitaly Yankovsky, the so-called ambassador of Georgia’s occupied Tskhinvali region, sparked controversy in the country.
Yankovsky had been declared persona non grata and was banned from entering Moldova for five years in February 2026. Deputy Prime Minister for Reintegration Valeriu Chiveri stated that he did not know how Yankovsky had managed to enter Tiraspol. According to him, the incident represented a provocative gesture towards the Moldovan authorities.
Foreign Minister Mihai Popșoi stated that the matter did not fall within the competence of his ministry, but rather concerned border control and national security authorities.
On 4 August, a media outlet reported that Yankovsky had been present in Tiraspol since late July, and had participated in various public events.
According to Moldova’s Border Police, Yankovsky had not legally crossed the state border in 2026. On 12 August, the Moldovan Ministry of Internal Affairs stated that he had either used forged documents, or had crossed the border illegally.
As of 26 August, Yankovsky was reportedly still in Transnistria. He met with Transnistria’s de facto leader Vadim Krasnoselsky on the occasion of the anniversary of Russia’s recognition of the so-called Republic of South Ossetia. On the same occasion, he also met Alexander Vataman, the so-called ambassador of occupied Abkhazia.
The occupied Tskhinvali region and the separatist Transnistrian republic have recognised each other since 2006. Relations between the two entities remain largely symbolic, and are primarily used for propaganda purposes.
Russian Citizenship for Transnistrian Residents
According to Vadim Krasnoselsky, the de facto leader of Transnistria, approximately half of the region’s population holds Russian citizenship.
He stated that following Russian President Vladimir Putin’s decision to simplify citizenship procedures, around 60,000 individuals submitted applications for Russian passports. Of the region’s estimated 500,000 residents (the exact population remains disputed, with Moldovan authorities citing approximately 455,000 residents), around 220,000 already possess Russian citizenship.
Under a decree signed by President Vladimir Putin on 15 May 2026, residents of Transnistria are now eligible to receive Russian citizenship under a simplified procedure. Applicants are exempt from examinations on the Russian language and Russian history.
The decree states that the decision was adopted: “For the protection of human and civil rights and freedoms, guided by universally recognised principles and norms of international law.”
Applicants are also exempt from the standard requirement of residing in Russia for five years.
According to Moldovan authorities, the expansion of Russian citizenship in Transnistria may be linked to efforts to recruit additional personnel for Russia’s war effort in Ukraine.
Granting Russian citizenship has long been one of Moscow’s methods of exerting political influence throughout the post-Soviet space. Russia previously distributed passports to residents of Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali region, a policy that Moscow later used to justify its military aggression against Georgia in August 2008.
It is noteworthy that, according to Moldova’s Reintegration Bureau, approximately 360,000 residents of Transnistria also hold Moldovan citizenship. A Moldovan passport allows visa-free travel within the Schengen Area, making Moldovan citizenship particularly attractive for residents of the separatist region.
State of Emergency in Transnistria
On 18 August 2026, Transnistria extended its state of emergency for another month. The authorities cited the need for an “operational response to the situation concerning energy resources.”
According to the de facto government: “Due to reduced natural gas supplies, the economic situation remains difficult. The special legal regime allows expenditures to be prioritised in order to ensure the payment of pensions, salaries, and social benefits.”
In January 2026, following the cessation of gas transit through Ukraine, Tiraspol, Chișinău, and Brussels agreed on the so-called “Hungarian scheme” for supplying natural gas to Transnistria.
Under this arrangement, gas is purchased within the European Union; transportation to Moldova’s border is carried out by the Hungarian company MET Gas and Energy Marketing AG; delivery from the border into Transnistria is handled by Moldovagaz; and payments are made by a Dubai-registered company using Russian credit financing.
Compared to previous years, gas deliveries to the region have declined significantly. Since November 2025, daily gas supplies have been reduced from approximately 2 million cubic metres to 1 million cubic metres per day.
Central Asia
Russia’s ongoing full-scale military aggression against Ukraine continues to have significant repercussions for the countries of Central Asia. In recent months, the increased frequency of Ukrainian drone strikes against Russian cities and infrastructure has created a range of challenges for the region.
Casualties among Central Asian Labour Migrants
On 10 August 2026, a drone attack against the city of Nizhnekamsk in Russia’s Republic of Tatarstan resulted in the deaths of eight citizens of Uzbekistan and one citizen of Tajikistan.
Nizhnekamsk is home to one of Russia’s largest oil refineries, and thousands of labour migrants from Central Asian countries are employed both at the refinery and on related construction projects. As a result, attacks on industrial facilities in Russia increasingly pose direct risks to Central Asian migrant workers.
Economic Losses for Exporters and Traders
Exporters and traders from Central Asia have also suffered financial losses due to attacks on logistics infrastructure within Russia.
Many entrepreneurs from the region use warehouses operated by the Russian e-commerce company Wildberries for storing and distributing goods. Ukrainian drone strikes have destroyed a number of warehouses across Russia, including facilities where merchants from Central Asian countries had stored their products, resulting in substantial financial losses.
Impact on Kazakhstan’s Energy Exports
Kazakhstan’s energy exports have also been affected by Ukrainian drone strikes targeting Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC) infrastructure.
Approximately 80 percent of Kazakhstan’s oil exports are transported through the CPC pipeline. The damage caused by attacks on the consortium’s facilities was significant enough that Washington reportedly urged Ukraine to halt attacks against tankers and infrastructure involved in the export of Kazakh oil.
Western countries and companies also have substantial interests in Kazakhstan’s energy exports, making the uninterrupted operation of CPC infrastructure strategically important beyond the region itself.
The consequences of the war are therefore extending well beyond Russia and Ukraine, affecting Central Asian economies, migrant labour communities, regional trade networks, and critical energy-export infrastructure. These developments demonstrate the interconnected nature of Eurasian economic and logistical systems, and the broader regional impact of the conflict.
Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali Region
Fuel Shortages and Georgian Fuel for the Occupied Region
Ukrainian air strikes on Russian oil-refining facilities have resulted in fuel shortages in Russia, with knock-on effects now being seen in occupied Abkhazia. In recent months, Abkhaz Telegram channels have frequently reported fuel shortages and long queues at gas stations. August was particularly notable in this regard.
On 12 August 2026, Abkhaz Telegram channels reported that fuel had entered Abkhazia from territory controlled by Georgia’s central government. On the same day, Georgian Prime Minister Irakli Kobakhidze confirmed that occupied Abkhazia had received fuel from territory controlled by Tbilisi, stating that the deliveries had been made by a private company. Following Kobakhidze’s statement, the de facto authorities also confirmed the information.
Subsequently, additional details emerged regarding who had delivered the fuel and in what quantity. Giorgi Arveladze, owner of the company Solidus, confirmed to Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty that his company had supplied fuel to occupied Abkhazia.
During a briefing on 18 August, Kobakhidze provided updated figures, stating that by that date, 680 tonnes of fuel had been delivered to occupied Abkhazia. Companies operating in the occupied region also acknowledged purchasing fuel from the Georgian side. According to them, they resorted to obtaining fuel from “alternative sources” as a result of shortages.
No additional information regarding further fuel deliveries from Georgia to the occupied region had emerged by the end of August.
Turkish MPs Call for the De-isolation of Abkhazia
On 5 August 2026, members of several Turkish opposition parties held a joint press conference calling for an end to the “isolation” of occupied Abkhazia. The MPs urged Ankara to recognise travel documents issued by the de facto authorities and to establish direct air and maritime connections with the region.
The press conference was organised within the framework of a campaign launched by the local Abkhaz diaspora in Turkey aimed at ending Abkhazia’s isolation. The appeal was read by Ahmet Şık, a member of the Workers’ Party of Turkey (TİP) and a member of parliament elected from Istanbul. The event also received coverage in Turkish media.
According to a press release issued by the Turkish Grand National Assembly, various representatives of opposition parties attended the conference. Together, these parties hold 206 parliamentary seats, accounting for approximately 34 percent of Turkey’s parliament.
On 4 August, during a meeting of the parliamentary group of the People’s Equality and Democracy Party (DEM Party), co-chair Tuncer Bakırhan expressed support for Turkey’s recognition of Abkhaz “passports” and the restoration of direct maritime links with Abkhazia. Similar statements had also been made by the Labour Party on 4 July.
On 27 July, Selçuk Özdağ, a member of the Turkish parliament, addressed the issues of transportation links with occupied Abkhazia, and recognition of Abkhaz “passports,” during a press conference in parliament. While not opposing Turkey’s official policy, he argued that political recognition and humanitarian issues should be separated. Özdağ serves as deputy chair of the parliamentary group “New Path.”
The de facto Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Abkhazia commented on the initiative on 10 August, stating that: “The launch of such discussions is viewed as an objective process, driven not by temporary political considerations, but by an understanding of the real needs of people who have found themselves in difficult circumstances.”
Abkhaz media noted that this was the first time in the history of the Turkish parliament that deputies from eight different parties had jointly called for an end to Abkhazia’s isolation. The campaign “End the Isolation of Abkhazia” also received support from representatives of the Abkhaz and Circassian diaspora communities.
Turkey officially recognises Georgia’s territorial integrity, and there have been no indications that Turkish authorities intend to revise their position. Neither Ankara nor Tbilisi issued official comments regarding the statements made by opposition lawmakers.
Abkhaz Delegation Visits Syria
On 24 August 2026, a delegation from occupied Abkhazia led by de facto Foreign Minister Oleg Bartsits visited Syria. It was Bartsits’ third visit to the country.
The delegation participated in the 63rd Damascus International Fair, where an Abkhaz pavilion was opened. Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa attended the opening ceremony. The exhibition ran from 26 August to 4 September. Notably, on 28 August, the pavilion was also visited by the Syrian president’s father, Hussein al-Sharaa.
The most significant event of the visit was a meeting on 25 August in Damascus with Patriarch John X of Antioch. According to information published on the Patriarchate’s Facebook page, Bartsits was identified as “the Foreign Minister of Abkhazia.”
Patriarch John X had previously hosted de facto President Aslan Bzhania in 2021. According to the Patriarchate, Bzhania and the Abkhaz delegation also visited the Mariamite Cathedral in Damascus, where the Abkhaz leader lit a candle “for peace and prosperity in both countries.” The Patriarchate’s statement referred to Bzhania as the “President of the Republic of Abkhazia.”
Although Bashar al-Assad’s Syria recognised Abkhazia’s independence in 2018, the Patriarchate of Antioch, like all other Orthodox Churches, officially regards Abkhazia as part of the canonical territory of the Georgian Orthodox Church, specifically the Diocese of Tskhum-Abkhazia.
Despite the change of government in Syria, the issue of withdrawing recognition of Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali region has not appeared on the political agenda. Syria’s new authorities have sought to develop ties with Western countries while maintaining relations with Russia. Although expectations initially existed in Sukhumi that the new Syrian leadership might reconsider relations with Abkhazia, Bartsits’ continued visits indicate that bilateral relations have persisted.
Abkhazia’s 2026–2030 Development Program
On 4 August 2026, Russian President Vladimir Putin ratified an agreement aimed at facilitating implementation of the 2026–2030 State Program for the Socioeconomic Development of Abkhazia.
The agreement was signed in Moscow on 27 December 2025. It seeks to enhance socioeconomic cooperation with occupied Abkhazia, improve living standards, and increase economic and investment activity in the region.
Russian financial assistance is intended to support the region’s education, youth policy initiatives, child welfare programs, and culture and tourism. Funding may also be directed towards salary increases and social benefits for employees of Abkhazia’s de facto emergency services, prosecutor’s office, and security agencies. Under the agreement, the de facto authorities are additionally responsible for providing medicines to Russian citizens permanently residing in Abkhazia.
Since 2008, Russia has regularly supported the occupied regions through direct budgetary assistance and various socioeconomic development projects.
The 18th Anniversary of the August War
The occupied Tskhinvali region marked the 18th anniversary of the 2008 Russia-Georgia War. Most commemorative events took place on 7–8 August.
According to Tskhinvali, events were also held outside the region, including in Moscow, Vladikavkaz, Transnistria, and the Italian cities of Pesaro and Verona, where pro-Russian groups organised various activities.
The de facto Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the occupied Tskhinvali region responded to a statement issued by Georgia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs:
“The Georgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs has once again issued an illogical statement regarding the 18th anniversary of the ‘Russia-Georgia War of 2008,’ calling on Russia to end the ‘illegal occupation of its territories.’ We once again draw the attention of the foreign policy agency of the neighbouring state to the inadmissibility of distorting obvious facts… Recently, Georgia’s political leadership, represented by [Irakli] Kobakhidze, officially acknowledged that former President [Mikheil] Saakashvili was the initiator of the military aggression… It is also clear that responsibility does not rest solely with Saakashvili. As head of state, he acted on behalf of Georgia, issued criminal orders, and pursued anti-Ossetian and anti-Abkhaz policies. Therefore, responsibility for the August 2008 war should be borne by both the state itself and representatives of the Saakashvili regime… For South Ossetia, Russia has been and remains a reliable guarantor of security…”
Russia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs also issued a statement: “Against the backdrop of the international community’s inaction, Russia was compelled to resist the aggressor and conduct an operation to force Georgia into peace. In order to prevent any future attempts by Tbilisi to restore the lost territories by force, Russia’s leadership decided to recognise Abkhazia and South Ossetia as independent states. Subsequently, Moscow has continued to provide large-scale assistance to both republics to strengthen their sovereignty and security and create favourable conditions for their socioeconomic development.”
Moscow further argued that Georgian society is continuing to reassess the events of August 2008, and claimed that there is growing recognition of the Saakashvili government’s responsibility for the outbreak of the armed conflict.
Simplified Crossing of the Occupation Line
The de facto authorities of the occupied Tskhinvali region have decided to change operating schedules at the Odzisi-Mosabruni and Perevi crossing points.
Under the new arrangements:
- The Odzisi-Mosabruni crossing point will operate from Thursday to Sunday;
- The Perevi crossing point will operate on Tuesdays, Thursdays, and Saturdays;
- Operating hours will be from 8:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m.
Procedures for crossing and staying in the occupied region will also be simplified for relatives of residents of the Akhalgori and Java districts.
Previously, the crossing points operated only during the last ten days of each month.
The decision was made by acting de facto president Marat Kambolov following visits to the occupied Akhalgori and Java districts. Kambolov is a candidate in the illegitimate presidential election scheduled for 18 September 2026.