Post-Soviet Conflicts Watch monitors ongoing conflicts and post-conflict developments throughout the post-Soviet region. The publication analyses key events and trends in Georgia’s Russian-occupied regions of Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali region (so-called South Ossetia), as well as in Transnistria, Gagauzia, and other areas. It also covers the Armenian-Azerbaijani peace process following on from the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War.
Note: This review does not cover developments related to Russia’s ongoing military aggression against Ukraine.
Armenia and Azerbaijan
Significant Meeting in Dilijan
On 14 June 2026, Hikmet Hajiyev, Assistant to the President of Azerbaijan and Head of the Foreign Policy Affairs Department of the Presidential Administration, met with Armen Grigoryan, Secretary of the Security Council of Armenia, in the Armenian town of Dilijan. Hajiyev travelled to Armenia by land, completing all border-crossing procedures in accordance with the established regulations.
Hikmet Hajiyev is one of the most influential figures within the Azerbaijani government. This marked his first official visit to Armenia. Following the meeting, both sides released identical statements indicating that they had discussed the bilateral peace agenda and exchanged views on strengthening confidence-building measures between the civil societies of the two countries.
The meeting took place in one of Armenia’s best-known resort towns, Dilijan. Afterwards, Hajiyev and Grigoryan took a walk through the town together, footage of which was widely circulated on social media. The next meeting is expected to take place in Azerbaijan.
The meeting followed Armenia’s parliamentary elections, in which Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s party secured victory but failed to obtain a constitutional majority. This may complicate the adoption of the constitutional amendments required for the conclusion of a final peace agreement.
On 17 June, Prime Minister Pashinyan commented on the Dilijan meeting, stating that the purpose of direct contacts between Armenian and Azerbaijani representatives is to restore momentum to the peace process and demonstrate both sides’ continued commitment to the peace agenda.
Since the Washington Agreement of 8 August 2025, contacts between Armenia and Azerbaijan have intensified considerably. Meetings have involved not only government officials, but also representatives of civil society and the research community. Hajiyev’s visit represents the second visit by a senior Azerbaijani official to Armenia since the Washington Agreement. Shortly before his visit, Armenian Deputy Prime Minister Mher Grigoryan met with Azerbaijani Deputy Prime Minister Shahin Mustafayev, who co-chair the bilateral commission on border delimitation.
Armenia’s Strategic Road Corridors and EU Support
The European Union has said it will assist Armenia in preparing strategic road infrastructure projects leading to the borders with Azerbaijan and Türkiye.
On 23 June 2026, the European Commission, the European Investment Bank (EIB), and Armenia’s Ministry of Territorial Administration and Infrastructure signed a Letter of Intent in Brussels. The document was concluded within the framework of the Eastern Partnership Investment in Connectivity (EPIC) initiative.
Under the agreement, the European Union will provide technical assistance and advisory support for preparing construction projects of strategic importance. The planned infrastructure includes the 212-kilometre Akhurik–Kayan corridor and the 258-kilometre Margara–Kayan corridor, extending from the Turkish border to the Azerbaijani border. These routes are intended to connect Armenia’s national road network with future border crossing points.
Following Armenia’s defeat in the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War, Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan has pursued a policy of reducing Armenia’s dependence on Russia while strengthening ties with Western partners. The European Union’s growing engagement in Armenia is reflected in its increasing involvement in strategic infrastructure projects of this nature.
TRIPP Development Company
On 3 June 2026, the U.S. Embassy in Armenia announced that the Board of Directors of the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (DFC) had approved several new strategic investments, including the establishment of the TRIPP Development Company.
The company will operate as a joint Armenian–American enterprise, and is expected to facilitate the implementation of major infrastructure projects, including railways, highways, pipelines, fibre-optic networks, and other strategic infrastructure systems.
On 4 June, Armenian Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan confirmed that the framework agreement on the TRIPP project between Armenia and the United States had been signed remotely by Mirzoyan and U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio, completing the signature process. The document is now ready for ratification.
On 18 June, Prime Minister Pashinyan announced that Armenia and the United States are prepared to move to the implementation phase of the TRIPP project in the near future. He noted that the United States has already made a preliminary decision to finance the project, and a dedicated investment fund has been established to support regional infrastructure initiatives, including TRIPP.
The TRIPP initiative was first announced during the Washington Peace Summit on 8 August 2025, convened at the initiative of U.S. President Donald Trump with the participation of the leaders of Armenia and Azerbaijan. During the summit, both trilateral and bilateral agreements were signed, and the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP) transport corridor was officially introduced.
On 13 January 2026, following a meeting in Washington between Secretary of State Marco Rubio and Armenian Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan, the parties published the Framework Agreement on the Implementation of the Trump Route.
At present, preparatory work on the TRIPP initiative is underway. Construction of specific infrastructure projects has not yet begun.
Azerbaijani Exports and Transit Through Armenia: June Developments
On 21 October 2025, Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev, during a joint press conference with Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, announced that Azerbaijan had lifted all restrictions on cargo transit to Armenia that had been imposed following the First Nagorno-Karabakh War. The first transit shipment consisted of Kazakh wheat. Subsequently, Armenia also began receiving regular imports of petroleum products from Azerbaijan. The first shipment arrived on 19 December 2025 and consisted of 1,220 tonnes of AI-95 gasoline, produced by the State Oil Company of the Azerbaijan Republic (SOCAR) and transported in 22 railway tank wagons.
Since then, both fuel exports and transit cargo movements through Azerbaijan toward Armenia have expanded steadily.
Throughout June 2026, the following Russian transit cargoes were transported to Armenia via Azerbaijan:
- 4 June: 210 tonnes of wheat (3 rail wagons), 140 tonnes of barley (2 wagons), and 69 tonnes of fertiliser (1 wagon);
- 9 June: 828 tonnes of fertiliser (12 wagons) and 414 tonnes of anthracite (6 wagons);
- 15 June: 490 tonnes of wheat (7 wagons);
- 20 June: 490 tonnes of wheat (7 wagons);
- 23 June: 408 tonnes of fertiliser (6 wagons);
- 28 June: 770 tons of wheat (11 wagons).
According to June data, Russia exported to Armenia via Azerbaijan a total of 34,000 tonnes of wheat, 8,000 tonnes of fertiliser, 414 tonnes of anthracite, 133 tonnes of aluminium, and 68 tonnes of buckwheat.
Fuel remains Azerbaijan’s principal export commodity to Armenia. Fuel shipments during June included:
- 4 June: 2,475 tonnes of diesel fuel (42 wagons);
- 11 June: 984 tonnes of diesel fuel (17 wagons);
- 21 June: 1,000 tonnes of diesel fuel;
- 26 June: 971 tonnes of AI-92 gasoline (18 wagons) and 467 tonnes of diesel fuel (8 wagons).
To date, Azerbaijan has exported more than 14,000 tonnes of diesel fuel and over 4,000 tons of AI-92 and AI-95 gasoline to Armenia.
The opening and rapid operationalisation of transport routes is expected to have a clearly positive impact on the peace process by helping Armenia overcome its long-standing regional isolation. Although the full activation of these transport corridors will require additional time and the completion of several infrastructure projects, the frequent bilateral meetings and public statements made by government representatives demonstrate that the process has gained momentum and that both governments are committed to developing new transport links. These developments are likely to contribute to the restructuring of regional transport networks and the emergence of a new geopolitical reality in the South Caucasus.
Agreement on Internet Traffic Transit
On 22 June 2026, Azerbaijan’s AzerTelecom and Armenia’s Telecom Armenia signed a bilateral commercial agreement on the transit and exchange of international internet traffic through the territories of both countries.
According to AzerTelecom, the company will utilise its infrastructure to provide international internet transit services to Armenia, while Telecom Armenia will similarly use its own network to deliver international internet traffic.
AzerTelecom is Azerbaijan’s leading telecommunications operator and is implementing the Digital Silk Way project, which aims to establish a new digital corridor linking Europe and Asia.
Since the end of the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War, cooperation between Armenia and Azerbaijan has gradually expanded within the framework of the peace process. Beyond fuel exports and the transit of Russian and Kazakh cargo through Azerbaijan, the two countries are now beginning to cooperate in new areas of economic activity. These developments are expected to contribute positively to the consolidation of the peace process.
Missing Persons
As of 30 June 2026, 4,010 Azerbaijani citizens remain officially listed as missing following the First Nagorno-Karabakh War. Since the conclusion of the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War, search operations conducted in the liberated territories have resulted in the exhumation of 893 human remains.
According to Hikmet Hajiyev: “Resolving the issue of missing persons is not merely a humanitarian matter: it is also a matter of justice, human dignity, reconciliation, and lasting peace.”
According to Azerbaijani data, 4,004 individuals disappeared during the First Nagorno-Karabakh War, while six persons went missing during the 2020 war. Of the 4,010 missing persons, 3,228 were military personnel and 782 were civilians. Among the civilians were 71 minors, 288 women, and 319 elderly persons.
Landmine Contamination
Landmine contamination remains one of the most serious challenges in the territories returned to Azerbaijan following the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War. It continues to impede both the return of internally displaced persons and the region’s economic recovery.
Between 10 November 2020 and 9 June 2026, Azerbaijan recorded 264 landmine-related incidents, resulting in 427 casualties, including 73 fatalities and 354 injuries. Among those affected were 231 civilians and 196 military personnel.
Since 1991, more than 3,500 people have been killed by landmines in Azerbaijan.
According to the Azerbaijan Mine Action Agency (ANAMA), 7,788.8 hectares of territory have been cleared of landmines and unexploded ordnance.
Since Azerbaijan restored full control over Nagorno-Karabakh in 2023, demining operations have accelerated considerably. Nevertheless, the process remains dangerous and has already claimed numerous lives. Landmine clearance continues to be one of the principal prerequisites for the safe return of displaced Azerbaijani citizens and for the region’s long-term reconstruction and infrastructure development.
Transnistria
Joint Declaration by the Separatist Authorities
On 11 June 2026, the de facto foreign ministers of the separatist Transnistrian Republic and Georgia’s Russian-occupied regions of Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali region signed a Joint Declaration calling on the international community to recognise their “sovereignty and independence.”
The three parties also agreed to strengthen cooperation among themselves and with the Russian Federation. The meeting was held via videoconference.
Russia serves as the principal security guarantor and financial sponsor of all three separatist entities. Consequently, the declaration is largely symbolic in nature and should primarily be viewed as part of the separatist regions’ broader propaganda efforts.
“Russian House” Opens in Tiraspol
Moldovan Parliament Speaker Igor Grosu described Russia’s decision to establish a Russian House in Tiraspol, the capital of the separatist Transnistrian region, as a provocation.
Moscow made the decision after a similar Russian cultural center in Chișinău was closed.
According to Vitaly Ignatiev, the de facto foreign minister of Transnistria, the new center will help counter what he described as “destructive attempts to restrict Russia’s presence in the region.”
The Russian Center for Science and Culture had operated in Chișinău since 2009, based on a bilateral agreement signed in 1998. In 2025, Moldova formally denounced the agreement following repeated violations of its airspace by Russian unmanned aerial vehicles.
Russia operates similar Russian Houses in numerous countries around the world as instruments of the Kremlin’s soft power. Following the August 2008 Russia–Georgia War, comparable centers were also established in Sokhumi and Tskhinvali.
Moldova’s Possible Unification with Romania, and Zakharova’s Statement
On 10 June 2026, Russian Foreign Ministry spokesperson Maria Zakharova stated that “if Moldova becomes part of Romania, it will cease to exist.” According to Zakharova, neither Gagauzia nor Transnistria sees its future within either Romania or the European Union.
In response, Moldovan Parliament Speaker Igor Grosu argued that: “Russia will bring nothing but harm to Gagauzia and Transnistria, and will not help them, contrary to what some people in these regions believe.”
The issue of Moldova’s potential unification with Romania has become increasingly prominent in recent months, and has been actively exploited by Russian propaganda.
Speaking at the international conference “Building Forward: Small but Resilient LMC 2026” in Estonia on 16 May, Moldovan President Maia Sandu referred to the possibility of reunification with Romania. She emphasised that European integration remains Moldova’s primary strategic objective, while acknowledging that, at some point in the future, the idea of unification with Romania could gain broader public support.
Earlier, during an appearance on the British political podcast ‘The Rest Is Politics’ in January, Sandu stated that if a referendum on reunification were held, she would vote in favour of unification.
According to a public opinion survey conducted by iData in March 2026, 42.3% of respondents supported reunification with Romania, while 47.7% opposed it. At the same time, the survey indicates that public support for reunification has been gradually increasing. In previous years, support typically fluctuated between 30% and 35%, suggesting a noticeable shift in public attitudes.
Abkhazia
A New “Ambassador” to Abkhazia
On 26 June 2026, by presidential decree, Russian President Vladimir Putin appointed Vyacheslav Gladkov, the former Governor of Belgorod Oblast, as Russia’s new “ambassador” to occupied Abkhazia.
Gladkov was dismissed from his position as governor on 13 May 2026, having served in that capacity since 18 November 2020. Belgorod Oblast, which borders Ukraine, has been one of the Russian regions most frequently targeted by Ukrainian military strikes.
Gladkov succeeds Mikhail Shurgalin, who had served as Russia’s “ambassador” to occupied Abkhazia since May 2022.
Following Russia’s recognition of Abkhazia’s so-called independence after the August 2008 Russia–Georgia War, Gladkov became the fourth Russian “ambassador” to the occupied region. Unlike his predecessors, however, he is the first appointee without a diplomatic background.
The previous three ambassadors were career diplomats who had served in the Fourth CIS Department of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the department responsible for relations with the South Caucasus and Georgia’s occupied territories.
Russian media reported that Gladkov’s lack of diplomatic experience contributed to the delay in his appointment. According to these reports, this was also one of the reasons he was assigned to Abkhazia rather than to another diplomatic post, where his administrative experience is expected to serve Moscow’s interests in consolidating Russia’s influence over the occupied region.
Fuel Shortages and Drone Attacks
Ukrainian strikes against Russian oil refineries have resulted in fuel shortages within Russia, with the effects increasingly being felt in occupied Abkhazia.
On 22 June, de facto Prime Minister Vladimir Delba convened an emergency meeting with representatives of the fuel market to address the growing supply challenges. Against the backdrop of logistical disruptions affecting fuel deliveries from Russia, particularly during the peak agricultural season, the supply of fuel for agricultural machinery has become a major concern. Demand has also increased significantly due to the summer tourist season.
To prevent more severe shortages, the state-owned company Abkhaztop distributed approximately 300 tonnes of fuel to local filling stations. According to the de facto authorities, these reserves are expected to cover demand for roughly one month.
Another challenge has been rising fuel prices, driven primarily by price increases in Russia. As Abkhazia is entirely dependent on fuel imports from Russia, temporary restrictions on fuel sales have been introduced at several filling stations to mitigate the shortage.
The war in Ukraine has also affected the region through an increasing number of drone incidents. According to the de facto Ministry of Defence, on 22 June, one downed unmanned aerial vehicle crashed into the Black Sea approximately 300 metres off the Abkhaz coast, near the Russian border.
On the same day, the Abkhazia–Russia border was temporarily closed. Throughout 2026, the use of Abkhazia’s airspace during drone attacks has become increasingly frequent. The principal targets of Ukrainian drones remain the Russian city of Sochi and the surrounding area.
Prison Sentence for “Espionage”
On 17 June 2026, the de facto Supreme Court of occupied Abkhazia sentenced Georgian citizen Shalva Khizanishvili to six years and nine months’ imprisonment after convicting him of espionage and the illegal acquisition, possession, and carrying of firearms, ammunition, and explosive devices.
Khizanishvili was detained on 1 October 2025 in the village of Shashikvara, located in the occupied Gali district, a region predominantly populated by ethnic Georgians.
According to the de facto authorities, Khizanishvili, who works as a schoolteacher, admitted to maintaining contacts with the Georgian intelligence services. They further alleged that he had photographed one of the border posts of Russia’s Federal Security Service (FSB) in Abkhazia and had received financial compensation for doing so.
In addition to Khizanishvili, two other Georgian citizens are currently imprisoned in occupied Abkhazia on espionage-related charges.
In recent years, the number of alleged “espionage” cases in occupied Abkhazia has increased noticeably, a trend widely viewed as linked to Russia’s military aggression against Ukraine. In many instances, the alleged espionage activities involve photographing military infrastructure located within Abkhazia, information that, in most cases, can also be obtained through publicly available sources.
Removal from the “Foreign Agent” Register
On 19 June, the Russian Ministry of Justice removed Abkhaz journalist and political analyst Inal Khashig from its register of “foreign agents,” stating that he no longer met the legal criteria for maintaining that designation.
Khashig had originally been designated a foreign agent on 7 March 2025, after Russian authorities accused him of disseminating false information about the Russian government and electoral system, and of maintaining links with foreign political figures.
The editors-in-chief of the Abkhaz publications ‘Nuzhnaya Gazeta,’ Izida Chania, and ‘Aiaaira,’ Nizfa Arshba, remain listed in the register.
The decision to remove Khashig from the register generated considerable speculation, with some observers linking it to his family connections with de facto President Badra Gunba. Commenting on the decision, Khashig stated that he had never requested assistance from any government institution and had no knowledge of why Moscow had changed its position.
He wrote: “I hope that the Kremlin’s decision to review my status represents a political decision intended to ease the tensions that emerged in Russian–Abkhaz relations during the presidency of Aslan Bzhania.”
Khashig also expressed hope that similar decisions would be taken regarding his colleagues.
In recent years, the designation of “foreign agent” has increasingly become an instrument of political pressure, employed by Moscow against individuals who criticise Russia’s policies or the Kremlin-backed political leadership in occupied Abkhazia.
More recently, Russia has also begun using the revocation of Russian citizenship as an additional means of political pressure. Several politicians in both occupied Abkhazia and the occupied Tskhinvali region have been stripped of their Russian citizenship after being accused of engaging in anti-Russian activities.
The Tskhinvali Region
Putin’s New Adviser and the Kremlin’s “Man” in Tskhinvali
On 22 June 2026, Alan Gagloev, the de facto president of Georgia’s Russian-occupied Tskhinvali region, met with Russian President Vladimir Putin at the Kremlin.
One day after the meeting, Gagloev announced his resignation. On the same day, he was appointed as an Adviser to the President of the Russian Federation. Until early de facto “presidential elections” are held, the duties of acting president have been assigned to Marat Kambolov.
A Russian citizen of Ossetian origin, Marat Kambolov was first appointed State Adviser to the President of South Ossetia on 27 May 2026. On 16 June, Gagloev issued a decree appointing him de facto Prime Minister of the occupied region.
According to assessments widely circulated in Russia, the recent leadership changes are less closely associated with preparations for annexation than with Moscow’s efforts to improve governance and ensure more effective management of Russian financial assistance.
For years, Russian officials have expressed dissatisfaction with poor project management and corruption involving programmes financed by the Russian federal budget.
The first official Russian response to Gagloev’s resignation came from Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov, who rejected suggestions that the personnel changes were linked to the prospect of incorporating the occupied Tskhinvali region into the Russian Federation.
When asked whether the leadership changes in South Ossetia could be interpreted as preparation for accession to Russia, Peskov responded succinctly: “No, they cannot.”
The Kremlin’s recent actions nevertheless create the impression that Moscow may be preparing the ground for the eventual annexation of the occupied Tskhinvali region. At present, however, most Russian politicians and experts say they consider such a scenario unlikely in the near term.
The possibility of annexation remains an important instrument of political pressure in Moscow’s relations with Georgia. The Georgian government has pursued a policy of strategic patience towards Russia, and has generally sought to avoid direct political confrontation and strong public criticism of Moscow.
From this perspective, the Kremlin’s recent decisions may also be interpreted as a political signal to Tbilisi: should the government led by the Georgian Dream party adopt a more openly anti-Russian course, Moscow’s next step could be the formal annexation of the occupied Tskhinvali region.