On June 2, 2026, Alan Gagloev, the de facto president of Georgia’s occupied Tskhinvali region, also known as “the Republic of South Ossetia,” signed a decree “On the Approval of the Military Doctrine of the Republic of South Ossetia.”
Several Russian media outlets reported that the de facto republic has a “new” military doctrine, however, this appears to be the first complete document summarising and defining priority directions in the military and security domains of Georgia’s breakaway region.
This article overviews and analyses the recently-adopted “military doctrine.” It includes a comparison with the Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation, and an investigation of the messages and the phrases used in the text.
Structure of the “South Ossetian Military Doctrine”
The “Military Doctrine” of “South Ossetia” comprises 48 points spread across four sections: General Provisions, Military Dangers and Threats, Military Policy, and Military Economic Support of Defence.
The first section sets out and defines terms and general provisions. The second section addresses the primary threats perceived by the “Republic of South Ossetia.” The third section focuses on the government’s views and priorities in military policy, and the fourth section sets the Russian Federation as the primary supplier of arms, as well as the guarantor of a unified Russo-Ossetian defence domain.
The “South Ossetian Military Doctrine” covers 48 points, while the Russian has 58, however, the latter addresses broader issues Russia considers relevant to its security domain that are completely irrelevant to “South Ossetia.” Those paragraphs which are identical merely replace the term “Russian Federation” with “South Ossetia,” while the points that closely resemble the Russian provisions but contain differences, feature, for example, NATO being the main adversary for Russia, and Georgia being the main threat for “South Ossetia.”
The majority of the “South Ossetian Military Doctrine” is a direct copy of the Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation. Specifically, 28 out of 48 points are direct copies of the provisions of the Russian document; 13 points have matching wording and phrasing, with only a narrower scope compared to the Russian version; and the remaining seven points are tailored to “South Ossetian” views, with the majority of these concentrated in the third section of the “doctrine,” which addresses the primary military threats.
The “South Ossetian Military Doctrine”
Section 1 – Key Terms and Definitions
There are several terms and definitions that need to be taken into consideration in the context of the “South Ossetian Military Doctrine,” each of which have been directly copied from the Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation:
- Local War – A war whose pursued military-political goals are limited. The military activities are carried out within the borders of opposing states and concern solely the interests of the states involved (territorial, economic, political, etc.).
- Regional War – A war involving more than two states of the same region, which is waged by national or coalition armed forces, and where the parties pursue important military-political goals.
- Armed Conflict – An armed clash of a limited scale between states (an international armed conflict) or between opposing parties, which is limited to the territory of only one state (an internal armed conflict).
- Military Security of the “Republic of South Ossetia” – A state of protection of the vital interests of the individual, society, and the state against external and internal military threats associated with the use of military force or the threat of its use.
Section 2 – Addressing “Dangers and Threats”
The second section of the document addresses the military dangers and threats allegedly facing the so-called “Republic of South Ossetia.” Though the majority of the provisions are identical to those of the Russian doctrine, there are a number of lines that have been drafted to fit the rhetoric and priorities of Russia in this occupied region of Georgia. For instance, point 11 of the “doctrine” defines the Primary External Military Dangers for the “republic,” according to which:
- Georgia continuously seeks to apply hybrid concepts aimed at asserting control over the territory of “South Ossetia” and at obstructing integrational processes of “South Ossetia” with the Russian Federation.
- Georgian special services and their partners conduct active intelligence operations to obtain information and to damage “South Ossetia’s” security.
- Systemic counteractivities from Georgia obstruct the integration of Leningori, and Sinaguri and Karzmani of the Java district into “South Ossetia’s” social-political and social-economic spheres. To note, Leningori is the renamed settlement of Akhalgori, occupied by Russia following the 2008 Russo-Georgian War. Akhalgori was invaded and occupied by the Russian army four days after the ceasefire announcement.
- Georgia’s military potential is increasing and military cooperation with NATO is deepening. Regular military training and drills are carried out on the Georgian territory involving NATO forces, including in proximity to the so-called “state border” of “South Ossetia.”
- There stands a possibility that Georgia will join NATO.
- Weapons and military equipment are being deployed that are able to interface/integrate with elements of NATO’s strategic missile defence.
- There is a possibility that “radical pro-Western and revanchist forces are planning a renewal of military activities in the ‘South Ossetian’ direction with an aim to restore the territorial unity of Georgia and provide support to Ukraine.” This includes opening a second front against the Russian Federation.
- There have been attempts by Georgian and Western representatives through foreign non-governmental and non-profit organisations to foster anti-Russian and pro-Western sentiment among the population of the Republic of “South Ossetia,” as well as to affect public opinion regarding the alleged need to establish a dialogue with Georgia without the latter recognising the state sovereignty of the “Republic of South Ossetia.” Propaganda activities targeting the population, primarily its youth, aim at undermining historical, spiritual, and patriotic traditions in the area of defending the Fatherland.
- Hostile external forces have been using information and communication technologies for military-political purposes to carry out actions against international law and directed against the sovereignty of the “Republic of South Ossetia.”
Point 12 of the “military doctrine” addresses Primary Internal Military Dangers, which are:
- Activities aimed at the violent change of the constitutional order of “South Ossetia,” the destabilization of the domestic political and social situation in the “country,” and the disruption of the functioning of state authorities, important state and military facilities, and the information infrastructure of “South Ossetia.”
- The activities of destructive groups and individuals, including criminal elements, aimed at undermining the sovereignty and violating the unity and territorial integrity of “South Ossetia.”
- International terrorist activity on the territory of “South Ossetia.”
- Propaganda targeting the population, primarily the country’s youth, aimed at undermining historical, spiritual, and patriotic traditions in the area of defending the “Fatherland.”
- The provocation of inter-ethnic and social tension, and the incitement of ethnic and religious hatred.
- A significant amount of firearms, explosives, and ammunition illegally stored by the population.
Point 13 defines Primary Military Threats:
- A sharp escalation of the military-political situation (interstate relations) and the creation of conditions for the use of military force.
- Obstruction of the operation of the state and military command and control systems of “South Ossetia,” and the disruption of the functioning of potentially hazardous facilities.
- The creation and training of illegal armed formations, and their activities on the territory of “South Ossetia” or on the territories of its allies.
- The demonstration of military force during exercises near the territory of “South Ossetia” or its allies for provocative purposes.
- The intensification of activities by the armed forces of individual states, accompanied by partial or full mobilisation and the transition of the state and military command and control bodies of these states to operating under wartime conditions.
Points 14 and 15 of Section 2 are also direct copies from the Russian Military Doctrine, however, the “South Ossetian” document highlights a number of important statements, according to which modern warfare is characterised by the applying of indirect and asymmetric activities and the use of information warfare, financed and controlled by political powers and civil organisations.
Section 3 – Military Policy
The third section of the “South Ossetian Military Doctrine” addresses the military policy of the “Republic of South Ossetia.” This section is the largest among the four, consisting of 18 points, of which 13 are exact copies of the Russian Military Doctrine provisions. The remaining five have minor differences or specific themes which are approximated to local interests. Among the more important messages are the following:
- The military policy of “South Ossetia” is directed at ensuring the defence and security of “South Ossetia” and its allies.
- “South Ossetia” is to ensure the combat readiness of its “armed forces.”
- Unification of efforts from “state,” society, and individuals towards the elaboration and realisation of activities to raise the efficiency of the military-patriotic upbringing of citizens of “South Ossetia” so as to prepare them for military service.
- Cooperation with the “Republic of Abkhazia” and the Russian Federation to ensure collective defence and security.
- “South Ossetia” considers it lawful to employ the “armed forces,” other troops and bodies to repel aggression against it and/or its allies, and to maintain/restore peace.
- “South Ossetia” ensures its air defence and the security of its vital infrastructure by participating in such actions carried out by the air defence units of the Russian Federation.
- The primary objectives of the “armed forces,” other troops and bodies in wartime are to repel aggression against the “Republic of South Ossetia” and its allies, to inflict defeat upon the forces of the aggressor, and to compel that aggressor to cease hostilities on terms that meet the interests of the “Republic of South Ossetia” and its allies.
- Perfecting the pre-conscription training and military-patriotic education of citizens.
The remainder of the section discusses broad concepts, such as the main tasks of the “Republic’s Armed Forces,” and other authorities relevant to an armed conflict, development of military organisation, buildup and further development of the “armed forces” and law-enforcement agencies, and the mobilisation and conscription process. These paragraphs are also direct copies of Russia’s military doctrine, with the only difference in terminology being “South Ossetia” instead of “the Russian Federation.”
Section 4 – Military-Economic Support of Defence
The fourth section of the “South Ossetian Military Doctrine” offers statements regarding the organisation of logistics of the “armed forces” during a military conflict, where the dominant supplier for “South Ossetia,” according to the document, is the Russian Federation. There are three relevant points in Section 4, the first of which states that the implementation of the tasks for equipping the “armed forces,” other troops and bodies with weaponry, military, and special equipment is envisioned on the basis of the “agreement between the Government of the Republic of South Ossetia and the Government of the Russian Federation on Military-Technical Cooperation of April 8, 2010.”
The second point sets the tasks for military-political cooperation, where, according to the document, the priorities are: strengthening security and stability on a regional level, based on international laws, primarily the UN Charter, and the formation and development of allied relations with the Russian Federation and the “Republic of Abkhazia.”
The third point declares Russia as the main priority in military-political cooperation, where “South Ossetia” aims to ensure a unified defence and security domain based on the agreement between the two “on Alliance and Integration,” signed in 2015.
Dissecting the Key Messages
A Local War
One of the subjects concerns the perception of threats for so-called South Ossetia, where the Russian legal definitions of different types of military conflict play a crucial role. Specifically, the “South Ossetian” doctrine states that the likelihood of “South Ossetia” being involved in a Local War has significantly decreased. A “local war” for “South Ossetia” would mean the renewal of active hostilities against Georgia. As mentioned above, “local war” in Russian legal terms means a war waged between two states, where the goals of the hostile parties are contained within their own territories.
This is the first important point that Russia seeks to make through this document: the reframing of the 2008 Russo-Georgian War as a conflict not between Georgia and Russia, but between an allegedly aggressive and militarised Georgia and a sovereign “South Ossetia.” In this interpretation, Russia is depicted as a peacekeeping force that intervened on behalf of a victimised friendly “nation” and, through military action, restored peace by compelling Georgia to cease hostilities. This narrative was pushed by the Russian government and Russian media outlets even before the beginning of large-scale hostilities in 2008, setting the ground for the justification of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Georgia in 2008.
The “Hybrid” Concepts
According to the document, Georgia is applying hybrid concepts to assert control over “South Ossetia” and obstruct its integration into Russia. Since Ossetians claim that the probability of a Local War has decreased, the hybrid concepts have spiked. These combine information warfare, active intelligence operations, and counteractivities from Georgia’s special services to hinder the proper integration of the Akhalgori, Sinaguri, and Karzmani settlements into “South Ossetia.” Further, one of the biggest threats to the security of “South Ossetia” is Georgia trying to establish a peaceful dialogue with the Ossetian population without recognising the independence of “South Ossetia.”
The main targets of the “South Ossetian Military Doctrine” are foreign and foreign-funded NGOs, which “aim to undermine the integrity of the ‘South Ossetian’ population by influencing their youth.” The document clearly states that the NGOs operating in Georgia seek to weaken the “historical, spiritual, and patriotic traditions” of “South Ossetia.” This message alleges that, while Georgia’s partners and the foreign NGOs operating in Georgia are committed to this “destructive” cause, Russia is the only counterpart that shares these values with “South Ossetia” and is capable of defending it from this influence.
This illustrates one of the reasons why arguments based on “hybrid” concepts are not sustainable. The “South Ossetian Military Doctrine” was signed in June 2026. Yet, in April 2025, the current Georgian government adopted the Foreign Agents Registration Act, requiring non-governmental organisations to register in a state-maintained registry and declare themselves as agents of foreign influence. As a result, most influential Western-funded NGOs effectively ceased operations, while a significant number of employees left the sector due to fears of potential prosecution. Under the new framework, working on issues directly or indirectly related to Georgia’s internal or external affairs while receiving foreign funding became a criminal offence. As such, against this background, Ossetian claims that Western NGOs operating in Georgia are undermining the country’s political, military, and social integrity appear to be largely unfounded.
Another claim advanced in the “South Ossetian” doctrine is that Georgia, together with its “partners,” is engaged in destabilising hybrid activities directed against “South Ossetia.” However, the domestic political and legal environment in Georgia has already significantly constrained the operational space of organisations largely funded by the governments of the United States, Germany, the United Kingdom, Sweden, and Norway, and other Western partners. Combined with a broader set of foreign policy shifts, these developments have contributed to Georgia’s increasing distance from the European Union and the wider Euro-Atlantic framework.
These circumstances, in themselves, call into question the validity of the “South Ossetian” assertion. Given that the Russian Federation remains the sole external actor explicitly supporting “South Ossetia,” and that Georgia has simultaneously slowed or obstructed aspects of its Euro-Atlantic integration, it becomes increasingly unclear which external partners are alleged to be assisting Georgia in undermining the region’s integration into Russia.
The Second Front
Point 11 of Section 2 of the “South Ossetian Military Doctrine” directly states the following: “There is a probability of the activation of radical pro-Western and revanchist forces within Georgia planning the resumption of combat operations in the South Ossetian direction, with the aim of restoring the ‘territorial integrity’ of Georgia and providing assistance to Ukraine, which includes opening a second front against the Russian Federation.”
The topic of the “second front” has been spotlighted regularly in Georgia since the beginning of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. The phrase has been used by the representatives of Georgia’s ruling party Georgian Dream, the Government of Georgia, the Parliament of Georgia, and pro-government media outlets to accuse the opposition, Georgia’s western partner states, and civil activists of attempting to “drag Georgia into war with Russia,” and to open a “second front” against Russia (the first being that in Ukraine).
Such messages, now also disseminated by Russia through “South Ossetia,” trace back a number of years. On February 2, 2023, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, praising the current Georgian government, stated: “Today in Georgia there is a government, well, I do not want anyone to think that I wish to compromise this government with positive words about what it is doing, but I will simply quote the Prime Minister of Georgia and other ministers who, regarding the unprecedented pressure to join the sanctions (against Russia) and open a second front, says ‘we (Georgian Dream) are guided by our national interests, we have trade with Russia, we have tourism, and we receive energy resources.’” Lavrov then continued that he had no doubt that the West “wants to turn Georgia into an ‘irritant’ once again and take the situation back to the aggressive times of Saakashvili.”
In 2023, the chief of Russia’s Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR), Sergey Narishkin, stated: “We see continuous attempts by Washington, Brussels, London, and other Western capitals to convince the Georgian government to open a ‘second front.’ The Georgian authorities are being persistently pressured that this is the moment of opportunity to regain control over the territories of South Ossetia and Abkhazia.”
According to Narishkin, Western capitals intend to support Ukraine, and he claimed that, seeing developments on the battlefield as unfavourable for Kyiv, they are thus resorting to measures aimed at pressuring Georgia into entering a military conflict with the Russian Federation.
Yet Georgia’s ruling party went so far as to directly accuse the then-US Ambassador to Georgia, Kelly Degnan. In July 2022, the founder of the Georgian Dream party, Bidzina Ivanishvili, issued an open letter in which he stated that, despite significant challenges, the ruling team had acted correctly and maintained a principled position. He argued that the most difficult phase of the threat had already been overcome and that, through these efforts, the immediate risk of Georgia being drawn into the war had been minimised as much as possible. In the same letter, in the same context, he confirmed he had held a three-hour long meeting with US Ambassador Kelly Degnan. The current President of Georgia, Mikheil Kavelashvili, who was then a member of parliament, stated that Ambassador Degnan herself pressured Georgian Dream to have Georgia “dragged into war” with Russia.
The term “revanchist” has been used in a similar context in Georgian politics since at least 2018. The prime ministers of the ruling party, among them Mamuka Bakhtadze, Irakli Garibashvili, and Irakli Kobakhidze have repeatedly called its adversaries “revanchists.” Another term, “western radicals,” has found even more versatile use in the ruling party’s political narrative.
Georgia’s NATO Integration
The “South Ossetian Military Doctrine” states that Georgia is increasing its military potential and deepening military cooperation with NATO, that regular military training and drills are carried out involving NATO forces on Georgian territory, including in proximity to the “state border” of “South Ossetia.” It also claims that Georgia’s joining NATO remains a possibility, along with the deployment of weapons and military equipment able to interface/integrate with elements of its strategic missile defence.
However, Georgia does not possess strategic missile defence, nor does it have any modern air-defence capabilities. In fact, Georgia mostly relies on MANPADS (Man-Portable Air-Defense System), much like the Soviet-made Igla, French MBDA Mistral 3, and the US-made FIM-92 Stinger. There have been no indications of Georgia’s potential integration with the NATO air defence system.
Furthermore, the highest representatives of the current government of Georgia have stated on numerous occasions that the war in Ukraine was sparked by NATO’s expansion in the east and that Georgia knows it would meet a similar fate if it entered the organisation. Such comments come with the broader understanding that this signals a change in Georgia’s aspirations and a clear statement that Georgia, under the current ruling party, is no longer interested in becoming a member of NATO.
As such, it is more likely that “South Ossetia” is deliberately and falsely continuing the war rhetoric so as to keep its population “alert” to Georgia by framing it as consistently militarising and hostile.
The Militarisation of Youth
Like the Russian Federation, the so-called “South Ossetian” de facto government has been implementing numerous policies and activities related to the “military-patriotic upbringing” of “South Ossetian” youth.
The fourth section of the document specifically states that “South Ossetia” must commit itself to perfecting pre-conscription training and the military-patriotic education of its citizens. Pre-conscription training here means the training of school-aged students, since the formal conscription age in Georgia’s occupied Tskhinvali region is 18.
Moreover, according to the same section, they must unify efforts from “state,” society, and individuals towards elaboration and realisation of activities to raise the efficiency of the military-patriotic upbringing of their youth, and “to prepare them for military service.” This concept has been widely applied within the Russian Federation for a number of years. “Military-patriotic games” such as Zarnitsa, Zarnitsa 2, Orlyonok, Zarya and others, organised and held in Russia on the federal level, have long included school pupils from Georgia’s occupied regions of Abkhazia and Tskhinvali.
Russia as “South Ossetia’s” Security Guarantor
While the “doctrine” meticulously scrutinises all aspects of “South Ossetia’s Armed Forces” and its security domain, covering areas such as military exercises, defence organisation, command and control, etc., it directs crucial responsibilities towards the Russian Federation, specifically through the treaties between the two “on Military-Technical Cooperation” of 2010 and “on Alliance and Integration” of 18 March 2015.
The “doctrine,” so like the Russian document, defines “military policy” as an activity of a state directed towards ensuring the defence and security of “South Ossetia,” as well as its allies.
The third section of the document states that “the primary task of the armed forces is to repel aggression against ‘South Ossetia’ and its allies.” It claims that the aggressor must be compelled to peace under conditions acceptable to “South Ossetia” and its allies. The responsibilities are shared and delegated to “South Ossetia’s” allies, where the sole and decisive actor is the Russian Federation.
In reality, Russia and “South Ossetia” have signed over 100 agreements covering every aspect of the social, economic, military, and political domain. The Russian Federation controls the so-called borders (occupation line) of the occupied Tskhinvali region through the FSB Border Force, and has its 4th Military Base deployed there in two primary locations: Java and Tskhinvali. Aside from these major military facilities, Russia has constructed dozens of relatively smaller compounds and military training ranges throughout the occupied regions of Georgia since the 2008 Russo-Georgian War.
Of note is the fact that the Russian Federation effectively absorbed the so-called “armed forces” of “South Ossetia” under a process that was accelerated when Russia’s President Vladimir Putin issued a decree on March 14, 2017, allowing separate “South Ossetian” military units to join the ranks of the Russian military base in the occupied Tskhinvali region. As a result, the absolute majority of “South Ossetian” soldiers began service at the Russian base, with the expectation of better pay and social benefits, although the “South Ossetian Army” retained a Special Forces Unit and Honorary Guards Unit. Russian officers have headed the de facto Defence Ministry of “South Ossetia” for over two decades now.
As such, any claim by “South Ossetia” on it having any degree of sovereignty or decision-making capacity over its security and defence sector would be profoundly baseless, leading to the “South Ossetian Military Doctrine” being a blunt reproduction of the Russian Military Doctrine, and created by Russia itself.