Post-Soviet Conflicts Watch monitors ongoing conflicts and post-conflict developments throughout the post-Soviet region. The publication analyses key events and trends in Georgia’s Russian-occupied regions of Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali region (so-called South Ossetia), as well as in Transnistria, Gagauzia, and other areas. It also covers the Armenian-Azerbaijani peace process after the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War.
Note: This review does not cover developments related to Russia’s ongoing military aggression against Ukraine.
Armenia and Azerbaijan
Azerbaijani export and transit to Armenia
According to the State Customs Committee of Azerbaijan, exports from Azerbaijan to Armenia totalled USD 9.646 million in January-April 2026, accounting for 0.08% of Azerbaijan’s total exports during the period.
On October 21, 2025, President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev announced at a joint press conference with President Ilham Aliyev that Azerbaijan had lifted all transit restrictions on goods passing through Armenia, restrictions that were imposed after the First Nagorno-Karabakh War.
The first transit shipment was Kazakh wheat. Armenia then began receiving regular deliveries of petroleum products from Azerbaijan. The initial shipment of Azerbaijani fuel arrived on December 19, 2025, comprising 1,220 tonnes of AI-95 gasoline produced by SOCAR, transported in 22 railway tank cars.
Fuel deliveries and other transit shipments continued throughout May 2026. On May 9, Azerbaijan shipped 479 tonnes of diesel fuel to Armenia in eight railway tank cars, followed by 986 tonnes in 16 tank cars on May 10.
In addition to fuel, Azerbaijan exported non-fuel goods to Armenia. On May 26, 1,496 tonnes of thermal insulation material for the construction sector were shipped, valued at approximately USD 6,000.
Transit shipments from Russia to Armenia via Azerbaijan also continued. On May 4, 678 tonnes of fertiliser were transported in 10 wagons. Additional shipments included two wagons of aluminum and nine of grain on May 7, 977 tonnes of wheat in 14 wagons on May 14, 126 tonnes of urea fertiliser in two wagons and 67 tonnes of flour in one wagon on May 28, and 280 tonnes of wheat in four wagons along with 277 tonnes of fertiliser in four wagons on May 29.
The regular transit of wheat, fertiliser, fuel, and other goods through Azerbaijan to Armenia demonstrates the ongoing normalisation of transport and trade links in the region, with the reopening of transport routes and progress in their implementation expected to positively influence that normalisation process and help reduce Armenia’s economic isolation. While full regional connectivity will take time and require significant investment in infrastructure, growing cross-border transit and continued official engagement suggest that momentum is building. If this trend continues, it could reshape regional transport networks across the South Caucasus and alter the region’s geopolitical dynamics.
When is Direct Trade with Turkey Expected to Begin?
The Armenian Ministry of Economy announced that direct trade between Armenia and Turkey began on May 11, 2026. The ministry advised Armenian businesses that, when shipping goods to third countries, they may officially list either Armenia or Turkey as the country of origin or final destination. On May 13, the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs confirmed that all preparations for direct trade with Armenia were complete. Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan also noted that the Akhalkalaki–Kars railway line is now available for both exports and imports.
Despite these developments, the Armenia–Turkey land border remains closed to regular cross-border traffic. Currently, efforts are focused on facilitating trade and transit under the existing bilateral framework. Gradual economic cooperation may eventually lead to the opening of direct transport links and further progress in the normalisation process.
AECOM Specialists in Armenia
On May 13, 2026, Armenian Deputy Prime Minister Mher Grigoryan met with specialists from AECOM, who are part of a delegation from the U.S. State Department’s Global Infrastructure and Investment Partnership Fund. Their goal is to survey the TRIPP project construction site and conduct preliminary assessments required for implementation.
On August 8, 2025, U.S. President Donald Trump hosted a peace summit in Washington with the leaders of Armenia and Azerbaijan, resulting in both trilateral and bilateral agreements. During the summit, the “Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity” (TRIPP) transport corridor project was announced. On January 13, 2026, after a meeting in Washington between U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio and Armenian Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan, the “Framework Agreement for the Implementation of the Trump Route” was published.
Preparatory work for the TRIPP project is underway. The arrival of AECOM specialists signals the start of the technical assessment phase, but construction and major infrastructure activities have yet to begin.
Strategic Partnership with the USA
During a brief visit to Armenia on May 26, 2026, U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio met with Armenian Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan to sign a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Charter, marking a significant step forward in bilateral relations. The two officials also initialled a Strategic Cooperation Framework Agreement on TRIPP and signed a Framework Memorandum of Understanding on Supply Chain Management in the Mining and Processing of Critical Minerals and Rare Earth Elements, highlighting shared economic and strategic interests.
Rubio stated that implementing TRIPP will contribute to peace and stability in the region. His visit, which occurred less than two weeks before Armenia’s parliamentary elections on June 7, was widely seen as a clear demonstration of U.S. support for Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan. Reinforcing this message, U.S. President Donald Trump also issued a statement expressing support for Pashinyan ahead of the elections.
Pashinyan indicated that the framework agreement for implementing the TRIPP project is expected to be formally signed within the next month. The project aims to reopen the Meghri railway line and develop new transport and infrastructure links across Armenia. Pashinyan expressed hope that the Meghri railway would benefit both Azerbaijan, by connecting Nakhchivan with the rest of the country, and Armenia, by enabling transportation between its northern and southern regions. Currently, Armenia lacks a direct railway connection between its northern and southern parts.
Landmines in the Liberated Territories
According to the Azerbaijan Mine Action Agency (ANAMA), search and clearance operations in April uncovered 344 anti-personnel mines, 116 anti-tank mines, and 3,410 pieces of unexploded ordnance in the recently liberated territories. In the same month, 7,788.8 hectares of land were cleared. Since the end of the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War, landmine contamination has remained one of the most significant barriers to the return of displaced persons and regional infrastructure development. Access to and movement within the former conflict zone continue to require authorisation from Azerbaijani authorities. After Azerbaijan regained full control over the territory in 2023, demining activities have intensified. Despite these efforts, the ongoing presence of mines and unexploded ordnance poses severe risks, and clearance operations have resulted in numerous casualties.
Transnistria
On May 15, 2026, Russian President Vladimir Putin issued a decree introducing a simplified procedure for grantingRussian citizenship to residents of Transnistria. Under this new policy, applicants are exempt from examinations in the Russian language and Russian history, and orphaned children may obtain citizenship through their legal guardians. The decree claims the measure was adopted “to protect the rights and freedoms of man and citizen, guided by universally recognised principles and norms of international law.” Applicants are also no longer required to reside in Russia for five years before obtaining citizenship.
Out of Transnistria’s approximately 470,000 residents, more than 202,000 already hold Russian citizenship. The region’s de facto leader welcomed the decision and thanked Putin, emphasising that “Accepting citizenship of any country is a voluntary act. No one should prevent a person from making a democratic choice of their own free will.”
According to Moldova’s Public Services Agency, 97 percent of Transnistria’s residents held Moldovan citizenship in 2025. For many in the breakaway region, Moldovan citizenship offers practical benefits, such as greater freedom of movement and access to public services.
Moldovan Prime Minister Alexandru Munteanu suggested that the expansion of Russian citizenship in Transnistria could be connected to efforts to recruit more personnel for Russia’s war in Ukraine, while Moldovan President Maia Sandu asserted that the Kremlin opposes her government’s reintegration efforts and also suggested that Moscow’s broader goal is to recruit Moldovan citizens with Russian passports for military service in Ukraine. Sandu noted that since 2022, residents of Transnistria have increasingly applied for Moldovan citizenship, viewing it as a source of greater security. She also stated that many young people have moved from the left bank of the Dniester to government-controlled areas since the war in Ukraine began, motivated by fears of potential military mobilisation.
Large-scale distribution of Russian citizenship has long served as a key instrument of Russian policy in the post-Soviet space. Moscow has previously used passportisation campaigns in Georgia’s Abkhazia and Tskhinvali (so-called South Ossetia) regions to justify political pressure and military intervention, most notably during the August 2008 war against Georgia. In this context, the expansion of Russian citizenship in Transnistria is likely to heighten concerns in Chisinau about Moscow’s use of similar tactics to increase its influence in Moldova.
A Smuggling Route from Abkhazia
Ukrainian intelligence agencies, including the Main Intelligence Directorate (HUR) and the Security Service (SBU), report that a major Russian smuggling route from Russian-occupied Abkhazia across the Black Sea has been dismantled following a year-long joint operation. The operation also involved Ukraine’s Naval Forces.
The operation disrupted an organised criminal group allegedly engaged in the smuggling of excise goods, the illegally transportation of individuals across Ukraine’s border, and transferring explosives from Russian-occupied Abkhazia. According to investigators, civilian vessels carried large quantities of tobacco products while hiding Russian-made weapons and unmanned aerial vehicles. The organisers also attempted to exploit resources in Ukraine’s security and defence sector to facilitate the movement of illegal cargo near Zmiinyi (Snake) Island. The group planned to smuggle additional goods and move people illegally across the border.
Searches in the Odessa and Chernivtsi regions led to the seizure of 1,800 boxes of smuggled tobacco, communication equipment, documents, illegally modified automatic weapons, and a Russian-made unmanned aerial vehicle with concealed ammunition.
Ukrainian authorities claim the detained smugglers acted on instructions from Russia’s Federal Security Service (FSB), tasked with delivering a fibre-optic-controlled attack drone and explosives to Odessa. Investigators believe the goal was to facilitate a terrorist attack in the city. The smuggling route reportedly utilised international waters near Zmiinyi Island, transferring cargo from larger vessels to smaller boats for covert delivery to the Odessa coast.
Four suspects were detained near the Port of Odessa while transporting ammunition concealed within excise cargo. Investigators identified the organiser as an Odessa-based businessman living abroad who is involved in commercial activities in Russian-occupied Abkhazia. Authorities allege he cooperated with the FSB in exchange for support for his smuggling operations. The businessman recruited three Odessa residents and a local border guard to facilitate the arrival of vessels. The group also planned to use a return voyage to bring the businessman’s brother out of Ukraine by sea.
Since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, periodic concerns have arisen in Abkhazia that the conflict could spill over into the breakaway region. Reports of unmanned aerial vehicles entering Abkhazia’s airspace have increased, with many allegedly targeting southern Russia. Several drones have been shot down over Abkhazia this year.
Ukrainian allegations that Russian-occupied Abkhazia served as a smuggling hub mark a significant development. If confirmed, these claims could raise the region’s strategic profile in the Russia–Ukraine war and heighten security risks for Abkhazia.
Increase in Cargo Traffic
According to the de facto authorities of occupied Abkhazia, approximately 1.1 million tonnes of freight were transported by rail in 2025, a 28.7 percent increase over 2024. Over the last five years, rail freight volumes have surged by 160 percent, accompanied by significant growth in railway revenues. The railway network links directly to the port of Ochamchire, a key hub for exporting goods from the territory. Over the past year, the port’s infrastructure has been upgraded to include a new container terminal and improved berths, boosting its cargo-handling capacity.
Maritime cargo traffic saw similar growth in 2025. Shipments passed through the ports of Ochamchire, Sokhumi, and Bichvinta (Pitsunda), with Ochamchire handling 86 percent of all maritime cargo. In total, 1.028 million tonnes of goods were shipped by sea, a 12.7 percent rise from 2024.
The recent expansion of Abkhazia’s transport infrastructure and rising cargo volumes appear closely tied to Russia’s efforts to diversify logistics networks under Western sanctions. Russia has increasingly relied on Abkhazia’s railway and ports, which, despite limited capacity, offer Moscow alternative shipping routes and help ease congestion on other corridors.
Tskhinvali Region
Agreement on the Deepening of Allied Cooperation
On May 9, 2026, the de facto president of the occupied Tskhinvali region, Alan Gagloev, and Russian President Vladimir Putin signed the agreement “On Deepening Allied Cooperation.” While considered historic in Tskhinvali, the agreement raised concerns elsewhere about Russia’s potential annexation of the region.
The agreement outlines strategic cooperation between the parties in the fields of security, economics, and social development. It also calls for the gradual creation of a unified economic space, legal harmonisation, infrastructure development, and expanded cooperation in social, labour, and humanitarian areas.
The signing and ratification of the May 9 agreement in the Tskhinvali region received strong approval and were widely regarded as historic steps towards unification with Russia. De facto president Alan Gagloev stated that the agreement demonstrates that “our close allied relations are entering a new stage of development,” and described it as “another step towards the rapprochement of our countries and peoples.” In his address to the de facto parliament before ratification, he highlighted the potential for uniting the Ossetian people in a single state.
Following ratification by the de facto parliament, both current and former de facto presidents attended the session in person. Only the first de facto president, Ludwig Chibirov, was absent due to ill health.
The May 9 agreement is not the first to address deeper integration between the occupied Tskhinvali region and Russia, as an agreement on alliance and integration was signed in 2015. The new agreement builds on the 2015 framework, providing more specific provisions. The Tskhinvali region remains de facto dependent on Russia, with its “independence” largely nominal. If implemented, the agreement would unify the region’s legislation with Russian law, further aligning Tskhinvali with Russia, and potentially facilitating annexation if Moscow decides to proceed.
The Kremlin’s ‘man’ in Tskhinvali
On May 27, 2026, the de facto president of the occupied Tskhinvali region, Alan Gagloev, appointed Marat Kambolov as “State Advisor to the President of South Ossetia.” In this capacity, Kambolov will oversee the implementation of the economic and social provisions of the Agreement on the Deepening of Allied Cooperation signed between Moscow and Tskhinvali on May 9, 2026. His responsibilities will also include coordinating joint projects related to integration, investment cooperation, and infrastructure development.
Kambolov is a seasoned official with extensive experience in the Russian state administration. Over the course of his career, he has held senior positions in several federal institutions, including the Ministry of Education and Science and the Ministry for Nationalities and Federal Relations. He also served in a leadership role at the National Research Centre The Kurchatov Institute. The President and Chairman of the Supervisory Board of the Kurchatov Institute is Mikhail Kovalchuk, whose brother, Yuri Kovalchuk, is a close associate of Russian President Vladimir Putin and is widely regarded as one of Russia’s most influential figures.
Kambolov is described by supporters as a specialist with extensive experience in public administration, strategic planning, and implementing large-scale federal projects, as well as expertise in interregional relations, investment policy, and the management of scientific and technological programs.
His appointment is also being viewed through the prism of a potential future transfer of power in the occupied region. De facto presidential elections are scheduled for 2027, and Kambolov’s appointment has fueled speculation that the Kremlin may be positioning him as a future candidate for the de facto presidency. According to this interpretation, his appointment as State Advisor could serve as a stepping stone to a future appointment as de facto prime minister and eventual participation in the presidential election.
The May 9 agreement explicitly allows Russian officials to hold senior positions in the occupied region. In practice, however, the appointment of Russian citizens to key posts in the Tskhinvali region is not unprecedented. Previous de facto prime ministers have held Russian citizenship, while the appointment of Russian citizens to senior positions within the de facto Ministry of Defence and the so-called State Security Committee has long been a common practice. Against this backdrop, Kambolov’s appointment may be viewed as part of a pattern of Russian influence over the political and administrative structures of the occupied region.
Transfers to China and Iran
The “National Bank” of so-called South Ossetia in the occupied Tskhinvali region has partnered with Russian bank VTB to allow residents and legal entities to make cross-border financial transfers. Currently, transfers are available to China and Iran. As part of this cooperation, VTB has opened a Chinese yuan correspondent account for the so-called National Bank. Plans are underway to introduce transfer services to India and Vietnam.
A representative office of Russian Promsvyazbank operates in the Tskhinvali region, facilitating the distribution of Russian government pensions to residents of the occupied territory.
The banking system in the occupied region remains heavily dependent on Russian financial institutions and technical support, and is highly integrated with Russia’s financial infrastructure.