The Russian Geostrategy Monitor is a monthly brief that tracks Russian geostrategy worldwide employing the framework set in The Structure of Modern Russia’s Foreign Strategy. Russian geostrategic activities are also tracked on the regularly updated interactive Russian Geostrategy Map.
Issue 40 covers the Russian geostrategy for the month of April 2026. The numbering and contents of the Outcomes, Goals and Objectives follows The Structure of Modern Russia’s Foreign Strategy framework.
Objective 2: Strengthening the Western political forces considered by Moscow to be inimical to the Western-led international order, and the Kremlin’s relationships with such forces
- Reports emerged on 10 April that “content creators and distributors who are Russian or affiliated to Russia account for a significant share of the pro-Orban content disseminated via Telegram,” with Moscow attempting to help Orban in Hungary’s general election.
- Washington Post reported on 19 April that the electoral campaign of a pro-Russian political leader in Bulgaria, Radev, “was bolstered by a network of former senior Bulgarian military officers who have connections to Russian military intelligence and have backed Radev by promoting his views against support for Ukraine,” while many media outlets were “amplifying content that originated in Russia and that backed Radev’s campaign.”
Objective 3: Enhancing internal political instability and polarization within Western states
- Intelligence Online reported on 16 April that Russian actors linked to the GRU military intelligence agency were conducting cyber reconnaissance operations targeting the continuity mechanisms of France’s strategic nuclear deterrent communications networks, including infrastructure, personnel, and service providers involved in deterrence.
Objective 5: Thwarting policies of the US and its allies in the MENA region
- On 6 and 7 April, Russia was reported to be “providing Iran with a detailed list of 55 critical energy infrastructure targets within Israel,” aiming to enable Iran “to launch precision missile strikes against Israel’s energy grid,” as well as “supplying Iran with a growing amount of drone equipment and expertise.”
Objective 8: Undermining US Foreign Policy in the Western Hemisphere
- On 24 April, Moscow said it stood “in solidarity with Cuba” and would continue to give it humanitarian aid, rejecting “what it described as blackmail and threats from Washington” and “the targeted and malicious escalation against Cuba.”
Objective 9: Achieving de-sovereignization of Ukraine
- In the Russo-Ukrainian War, in April 2026, both sides attacked at various sections of the frontline. The front south and east of Zaporizhzhya was particularly active in this regard. Heavy fighting was taking place in and around Kostyantynivka, while Russians launched multiple attacks across the international border in the Sumy and Kharkiv administrative regions of Ukraine.
Objective 16: Entrenching Russian influence in sub-Saharan Africa
- Since the start of series of offensive operations by the Tuareg and Islamist rebels against the pro-Russian military junta of Mali on 25 April, Russian troops have been participating in combat operations against them.
- On 28 April, Russia delivered 20,000 tons of mineral fertilizers to Niger as humanitarian aid at an official ceremony in Niamey, continuing a pattern of assistance that previously included 20,000 tons of wheat and over 350 tons of sunflower oil.
Objective 20: Alignment with China
- In meetings with the Chinese leadership on 14 and 15 April, the Russian foreign minister Lavrov said it was in the two powers’ mutual interest for the West’s attempts “to retain and even renew its hegemony” to fail. Lavrov also accused the West of seeking to contain both China and Russia in the region of East Asia.
Following Armenia’s geopolitical realignment away from Russia’s sphere of domination, Moscow has begun issuing a consistent stream of activities directed against this course of Armenian foreign policy, and against the government of Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan. Russia’s purpose is to take Armenia back into its sphere of geopolitical domination, eliminating Yerevan’s sovereignty in its foreign policy choices. Therefore, we are adding a new objective to the Structure of Modern Russia’s Foreign Strategy framework, which Moscow seeks to achieve with this stream of activities. Objective 28 serves Goal 3: Restoration of Russian imperial control over the countries formerly occupied by the USSR.
Objective 28: Achieving decisive influence over Armenia
- In April 2026, Russia banned the import of Armenian mineral water and Armenian brandy.