“Post-Soviet Conflicts Watch” offers a comprehensive analysis of ongoing conflicts and post-conflict developments across the post-Soviet space. This report presents an overview of significant events and trends in the Russian-occupied regions of Georgia, Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali region, as well as the breakaway region of Transnistria, the autonomous entity of Gagauzia, and other areas within the post-Soviet space. In addition, the review addresses issues pertaining to the Armenian-Azerbaijani peace negotiation process following the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War.
Note: The review does not cover issues related to Russia’s military aggression in Ukraine.
Armenia and Azerbaijan
Iranian Drone Attack on Nakhichevan Airport
After Israel and the United States commenced military operations against Iran on February 28, 2026, Tehran responded by targeting U.S. allies in the region. Within this escalation, the March 5 drone strike on the airport in the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic of Azerbaijan took the authorities by surprise. One drone hit the Nakhchivan airport terminal, several others landed in various locations, and one crashed near a school, causing reported injuries.
The attack was unexpected given Azerbaijan’s repeated assurances of maintaining good neighborly relations with Iran throughout the conflict. President Ilham Aliyev was among the leaders who offered condolences following the assassination of Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei.
On March 5, the Security Council convened in Azerbaijan. President Ilham Aliyev characterized Iran’s actions as a terrorist act. Azerbaijani media outlets also responded critically, claiming that Iran had “failed to appreciate Azerbaijan’s neutrality.”
On March 6, the State Security Service of Azerbaijan announced the prevention of multiple terrorist and provocative acts attributed to Iranian special services. According to Azerbaijani authorities, the intended targets included the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline, the Israeli embassy in Azerbaijan, a leader of the Mountain Jewish religious community, and an Ashkenazi Jewish synagogue. These alleged plots were said to have been designed to undermine Azerbaijan’s international standing and incite public fear.
To de-escalate tensions, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Iran Abbas Araghchi spoke by telephone with his Azerbaijani counterpart Jeyhun Bayramov on March 5. During the call, Araghchi expressed regret regarding the incident and informed Bayramov that an investigation was underway. On March 8, President of Iran Masoud Pezeshkian delivered a comparable message to Azerbaijan’s President Aliyev. On March 29, Araghchi expressed gratitude to his Azerbaijani counterpart for providing humanitarian assistance and facilitating the transit of aid from third countries, such as the humanitarian aid Iran received from Russia through Azerbaijan.
The attack on the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic airport may have been unintentional; however, it underscores the vulnerability of South Caucasus states to spillover effects from regional conflicts. Additionally, it suggests that, from Tehran’s perspective, any direct or indirect actions by regional countries perceived as hostile could result in their designation as potential military targets.
More Transit Cargo for Armenia
On March 24, 2026, a new shipment of cargo was transported from Russia to Armenia via Azerbaijan, departing from Bilajary station, a key railway junction in Baku. The cargo arrived in Armenia via Georgia, and consisted of four wagons of fertilizer (271 tons) and one wagon of buckwheat (68 tons).
On March 25, an additional 350 tons of wheat, distributed across five wagons, were dispatched from Russia to Armenia. The transportation of wheat, fertilizer, and other goods to Armenia via Azerbaijan has become routine. To date, Armenia has received approximately 23,500 tons of wheat and over 1,000 tons of fertilizer through this corridor.
On October 21, 2025, President Ilham Aliyev announced at a joint press conference with President of Kazakhstan Kassym-Jomart Tokayev that Azerbaijan had removed all restrictions on the transit of goods to Armenia, restrictions which were imposed after the First Nagorno-Karabakh War. The initial transit shipment comprised Kazakh wheat. Subsequently, Armenia also began to receive petroleum products from Azerbaijan.
Armenia received its first fuel shipment from Azerbaijan on December 19, 2025. The delivery included 1,220 tons of AI-95 gasoline produced by the State Oil Company of the Azerbaijan Republic (SOCAR), transported in 22 tank wagons.
The second batch arrived in January 2026. On January 9, Azerbaijan dispatched 2,698 tons (48 wagons) to Armenia, including 1,742 tons of AI-95 gasoline and 956 tons of diesel fuel. On January 11, an additional 979 tons of AI-95 gasoline (18 wagons) were sent.
Additional deliveries continued. On February 25, 4,500 tons of diesel fuel were sent to Armenia. On March 5, 31 wagons with 1,984 tons of diesel fuel and two wagons with 135 tons of Russian fertilizer were dispatched. On March 9, a freight train with seven wagons of Russian wheat departed. On March 11, 11 wagons carrying 1,023 tons of wheat were sent, followed by seven wagons with 488 tons of wheat on March 19.
On March 13, 2026, the Azerbaijani Parliament addressed the export of Azerbaijani oil products to Armenia during discussions on the “Report on the Activities of the Government of Azerbaijan for 2025.” The report stated that these exports are commercial and represent an important step toward establishing economic and trade relations between the two countries.
The opening and rapid implementation of transport routes are expected to positively impact the peace process and help Armenia overcome its isolation. While full realization will require time and the completion of key infrastructure projects, statements from both governments and frequent bilateral meetings indicate that progress is underway and both sides are prepared to develop new transport links. This is likely to reshape regional transport routes and contribute to a new geopolitical reality.
When Will the Gyumri-Kars Railway Line be Restored?
Minister of Foreign Affairs of Armenia Ararat Mirzoyan stated that Armenia and Turkey are discussing the restoration of the Gyumri-Kars railway line. He indicated that negotiations have addressed both the railway and the potential reopening of road connections. A bilateral working group has been formed to oversee the restoration process and has convened twice. Both parties have jointly inspected the railway infrastructure. The reestablishment of direct transport links with Azerbaijan and Turkey would be strategically significant for Armenia, reducing transport isolation and strengthening economic relations with external partners. Economic exchanges with Azerbaijan and Turkey currently rely on Georgia’s transport infrastructure.
Diplomatic relations between Armenia and Turkey were severed in 1991, and the state border has remained closed since 1993. In December 2021, following the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War, both countries appointed special representatives to normalize bilateral relations: Ruben Rubinyan, Deputy Speaker of the Armenian Parliament, and Serdar Kılıç, former Turkish Ambassador to the United States. On January 1, 2023, direct cargo air transportation between Armenia and Turkey commenced.
Armenian Citizenship for Refugees from Nagorno-Karabakh
Arpine Sargsyan, Minister of Internal Affairs of Armenia, reported that 34,576 refugees from Nagorno-Karabakh have been granted Armenian citizenship, with no applications rejected. Nevertheless, various reports indicate that thousands of refugees have chosen to leave Armenia. For many individuals, acquiring Armenian citizenship raises concerns about potentially losing their connection to Nagorno-Karabakh and their refugee status. Armenian authorities are implementing measures to facilitate the timely integration of refugees into society.
The refugee crisis began after the near-total displacement of the Armenian population of Nagorno-Karabakh following the Azerbaijani military operation conducted on September 19 and 20, 2023. Approximately 115,000 ethnic Armenians departed the region.
Transnistria
On March 5, 2026, Maia Sandu addressed the energy crisis in Transnistria during a local television broadcast, emphasizing that Chisinau and its European partners possess limited capacity to intervene, as key decisions on the left bank of the Dniester are determined by Russia. Sandu identified the presence of the Russian military in Transnistria as the primary obstacle to resolving the crisis. Currently, the ongoing war in Ukraine prevents Russia from rotating or adequately supplying its military contingent in the region.
Transnistria has faced an energy crisis since last year, leading to strict gas consumption restrictions in the separatist region. Chisinau, supported by the European Union, offered assistance contingent upon the fulfillment of specific conditions, but the proposal was rejected. Chisinau is currently leveraging the crisis in Transnistria to promote conflict resolution and diminish Russian influence over the breakaway region as part of a newly developed reintegration strategy.
Central Asia
China has committed $59.4 million to finance the construction of nine border facilities in Tajikistan’s regions adjacent to Afghanistan. The Tajik parliament approved the agreement on March 4. Murodali Rajabzoda, First Deputy Chairman of the State Committee for National Security of Tajikistan, stated that the total construction area will encompass 17,109 square meters. The project aims to enhance the material and technical capacity of Tajikistan’s border troops. Comparable facilities have previously been constructed with Chinese funding.
China’s heightened involvement is associated with two incidents that occurred along the Tajik-Afghan border in the fall of 2025. On November 26, a drone strike originating from Afghanistan killed three Chinese workers employed by a mining company, and injured one. On November 30, gunfire from across the border resulted in the deaths of two Chinese workers involved in a road construction project and injured two others.
China maintains active involvement in infrastructure development throughout Central Asia, with a particular focus on Tajikistan, and prioritizes the security of its citizens and business interests. Consequently, China has expanded its engagement beyond economic support to incorporate aspects of security assistance. Historically, China has prioritized economic engagement in post-Soviet countries and has refrained from deeper involvement in the security sector, in part due to Russia’s strategic interests in the region. Russia’s 201st military base remains stationed in Tajikistan; however, since 2005, Russian border guards have not been directly responsible for securing the state border.
Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali Region
Round 66 of the Geneva International Discussions
The 66th round of the Geneva International Discussions was held on March 18-19, 2026. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia stated that, “after a long pause,” delegations returned at a high level. It was describing as “an important step toward stabilizing the negotiation format.” According to the ministry’s press release, “for the first time since 2018, the U.S. delegation was led by Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Sonata Coulter, while the UN side was co-chaired by Mohamed Khaled Khiari, Assistant Secretary-General responsible for the Middle East, Europe, the Americas, Asia, and Oceania.” The statement also noted that the Georgian delegation “placed primary emphasis on key agenda items, including the need for Russia to fully implement its international obligations under the August 12, 2008 ceasefire agreement, and to ensure the safe and dignified return of internally displaced persons and refugees from the occupied territories to their homes.”
Mikhail Galuzin, Deputy Foreign Minister responsible for relations with post-Soviet countries, led the Russian delegation. According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia, the participants reaffirmed their commitment to ongoing discussions and reiterated the significance of Tbilisi signing a non-use-of-force agreement with Sokhumi and Tskhinvali.
Representatives from Tskhinvali and Sokhumi justified their refusal to address the issue of internally displaced persons (IDPs) in the second working group by referencing Georgia’s annual submission of a resolution on IDPs to the United Nations General Assembly, which they characterized as an effort by Tbilisi to politicize the matter. The Abkhazian delegation was led by its de facto Foreign Minister, Oleg Bartsits. Bartsits stated, “Georgia must accept the new reality. Two sovereign states have appeared on the political map. This is not a subject for negotiation or discussion: it is an established fact.”
The next round of international negotiations in Geneva will be held in June 2026.
In the aftermath of the August 2008 Russo-Georgian War, the Geneva International Negotiations format was established between Georgia and Russia. This initiative was undertaken in accordance with the August 12, 2008 ceasefire agreement.
Unprecedented Drone Strike
In March 2026, incidents involving unmanned aerial vehicle violations of airspace increased in occupied Abkhazia. Throughout the month, authorities declared a ‘drone threat’ regime on several occasions, resulting in the temporary closure of the Abkhazian section of the Russian-Georgian state border.
On March 4, approximately 30 foreign drones were detected in Abkhazia’s airspace. Lieutenant General Adgur Gumba, commander of the Air Force and Anti-Air Defense Forces of occupied Abkhazia, described the incident as an “unprecedented” use of drones. He reported that coordinated efforts by Abkhazian and Russian anti-aircraft forces had resulted in the destruction of nearly all the drones, which crashed across 11 settlements. The wreckage of one drone was recovered in the village of Pokveshi, Ochamchir district, while another caused damage to a high-voltage power line.
De-facto President of Abkhazia Badra Gunba reported that the military had previously intercepted five to six drones per day; however, these incidents were not publicized to prevent public panic. He indicated that Abkhazia was not the primary target of the attacks, but rather a potential area of interest for third-party intelligence operations. Gunba stated that the drones are being neutralized using both physical methods and electronic warfare.
A security council meeting was convened in response to the March 4 incident. Subsequent reports indicated that 14 out of 30 drones reached land, while the remainder were neutralized and fell into the sea.
A drone threat alert was issued multiple times on March 5, but was later lifted. Comparable incidents were also reported on March 8 and March 19.
The drone activity is likely connected to the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Although the precise origin of the attacks remains undetermined, it is possible that the drones were launched by Ukraine, targeting southern regions of Russia, particularly the city of Sochi. The airspace over Abkhazia may have served as a transit corridor.
Response to Developments in Iran
On February 28, 2026, the United States and Israel released statements concerning airstrikes in Iran, which elicited responses from authorities in the occupied regions. In a statement dated March 1, the de facto Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Abkhazia indicated that it was closely monitoring developments in the Middle East, and expressed concern regarding what it characterized as an unprovoked attack by the United States and Israel on Iran. On March 2, the same institution advised “Abkhazian citizens” residing in Middle Eastern countries to exercise caution, report their whereabouts to the “ministry,” and contact Russian consulates if necessary. Additionally, on March 1, the de facto Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Tskhinvali Region issued a general statement addressing the situation.
In recent years, several meetings have been recorded between representatives of Iran and the occupied regions, which may indicate certain changes in Iranian policy. Consequently, statements expressing support for Iran from these regions should be interpreted in light of these evolving dynamics.
Russia – Abkhazia’s Main Trading Partner
According to the de-facto Customs Committee of Abkhazia, Russia remained Abkhazia’s primary trading partner in 2025. In the most recent reporting period, Russia accounted for 75% of Abkhazia’s foreign trade, totaling 45.383 billion rubles. In 2025, trade turnover with Russia increased by 9.9% (4.9 billion rubles) compared to 2024. This trade turnover has demonstrated consistent growth, rising from 27 billion rubles in 2021 to a 68% increase by 2025. Russia has served as Abkhazia’s principal economic partner since the Abkhazia War (1992-1993), with therelationship intensifying after the 2008 Russo-Georgian War. Economically, Abkhazia remains highly dependent on Russia.
Turkey is Abkhazia’s second largest trading partner, accounting for 7.5% of trade. Despite Turkey’s recognition of Georgia’s territorial integrity, certain private individuals engage in economic activities with Abkhazia via maritime transport.
131st IPRM Meeting in Ergneti
The 131st meeting of the Incident Prevention and Response Mechanism (IPRM) convened in Ergneti on March 31, 2026, representing the second session of the mechanism in 2026. Representatives of the State Security Service of Georgia reiterated demands for accountability regarding the killing of Georgian citizen Tamaz Ginturi. On November 6, 2023, near St. George Church in the village of Kirbali (Gori Municipality), Ginturi was fatally wounded by Russian military personnel during an attempted detention.
The Georgian delegation also addressed the issue of individuals held in unlawful detention. According to Irakli Antadze, Deputy Director of the Information and Analytical Department of Georgia’s State Security Service (SSSG), 11 persons remain detained, and seven new cases of so-called “borderization” have been recorded.
Authorities further called for the safe and dignified return of activist Tamar Mearakishvili, who was reportedly expelled from Tskhinvali.
Restrictions on freedom of movement remained a central topic of discussion. Participants engaged in extensive dialogue regarding crossing procedures, particularly in anticipation of upcoming religious holidays.
The delegation representing the de facto authorities of the Tskhinvali region, led by Egor Kochiev, reiterated demands for the removal of what they described as an “illegal Georgian police post” near the village of Chorchana. Kochiev stated that this issue remains a consistent agenda item. He also noted what he described as “positive trends” in the negotiation process, attributing these to evolving positions in Tbilisi. Specifically, he referenced an investigation into former Georgian Prime Minister and Interior Minister Giorgi Gakharia concerning the establishment of the Chorchana police post.
Kochiev further stated that the Tskhinvali side continues unilateral measures to reinforce the occupation line. He assessed the situation along the line as stable since late January, with relatively few incidents reported. According to his remarks, several Georgian citizens are currently detained in a facility in Tskhinvali for alleged violations related to crossing the occupation line.
Kochiev also positively assessed cooperation regarding irrigation water distribution. The irrigation canal traverses both the Tskhinvali region and areas under the control of the central government of Georgia, necessitating coordination between the parties. This remains one of the few areas in recent years where practical cooperation has persisted. The next IPRM meeting is scheduled for May 14, 2026.