Post-Soviet Conflicts Watch analyzes conflicts and post-conflict developments across the post-Soviet region. This document reviews key events and trends in the Russian-occupied areas of Georgia, including Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali region, as well as the breakaway region of Transnistria, the autonomous entity of Gagauzia, and other relevant areas. It also examines progress in Armenian-Azerbaijani peace negotiations after the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War.
Note: The review does not cover issues related to Russia’s military aggression against Ukraine.
Armenia and Azerbaijan
Outcomes of the US Vice President’s Historic Visit
On February 9, 2026, U.S. Vice President J.D. Vance visited Armenia and met with Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan. The following day, he traveled to Azerbaijan to meet President Ilham Aliyev. This was the first official visit by a U.S. vice president to both countries, following recent improvements in their relations facilitated by Washington.
On August 8, 2025, U.S. President Donald Trump hosted a peace summit in Washington with the leaders of Azerbaijan and Armenia, resulting in both trilateral and bilateral agreements. The summit also introduced the “Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity” (TRIPP) transport corridor project. On January 13, 2026, after a meeting in Washington between U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio and Armenian Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan, the six-page “Framework Agreement for the Implementation of the Trump Route” was published, marking progress toward the project’s implementation.
During Vance’s visit to Armenia, the United States and Armenia signed a civil nuclear energy cooperation agreement. This agreement includes the export of $5 billion in U.S. technology, and potential nuclear fuel contracts worth $4 billion. The United States is thereby entering a sector traditionally dominated by Russia, which currently supplies Armenia’s only nuclear power plant.
The nuclear cooperation agreement prompted responses from Russia. Russian Security Council Secretary Sergei Shoigu stated that Russia would consider new risks if Armenia proceeds with the construction of small modular reactors using American technology. Meanwhile, Rosatom Director General Alexei Likhachev offered Armenia comprehensive cooperation in the nuclear sector. These statements reflect Moscow’s dissatisfaction with Yerevan’s new geopolitical direction.
Armenia’s nuclear power plant is the only nuclear facility in the South Caucasus. Located near the city of Metsamor, approximately 30 km from Yerevan, it provides about 40% of Armenia’s electricity. The plant’s operating license has been extended until 2026, with the possibility of another 10-year extension. Armenia plans to build a new nuclear power plant within the next 8–10 years, and various options from the United States, France, Russia, and South Korea are currently under consideration.
After visiting Armenia, Vance traveled to Azerbaijan on February 10 and signed the Charter on the U.S.-Azerbaijan Strategic Partnership with President Ilham Aliyev. The United States and Armenia had signed their own Strategic Partnership Charter on January 14, 2025. In contrast, the U.S.-Georgia Strategic Partnership Charter, signed in 2009, was suspended by the United States in November 2024 due to concerns over Georgia’s democratic backsliding and anti-Western rhetoric.
Following Vance’s visit, the United States will supply military equipment to both countries: $11 million in surveillance drones to Armenia, and maritime patrol vessels to Azerbaijan.
Vance’s regional visit indicates that Washington is taking the ongoing developments in the region seriously and intends to expand its political influence. This engagement demonstrates Washington’s commitment to regional developments and its intention to expand political and economic influence through recently concluded bilateral and trilateral agreements.
Team of Engineers in Armenia
On February 5, 2026, a team of engineers from AECOM, a leading U.S. engineering and consulting firm, arrived in Armenia to begin research for the TRIPP project. Supported by the U.S. Department of State’s Global Infrastructure and Investment Partnership Fund, the team will conduct a feasibility study and develop proposals for railway and other infrastructure. Their arrival marks the start of practical steps toward implementing TRIPP.
Azerbaijani Exports to Armenia
In January 2026, Azerbaijan exported $2.4 million in goods to Armenia, up from $788,800 in 2025. Armenia primarily imports oil products from Azerbaijan and receives cargo from Kazakhstan and Russia transiting through Azerbaijan.
On October 21, 2025, at a joint press conference with Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, President Ilham Aliyev announced that Azerbaijan had lifted all cargo transit restrictions through Armenia imposed after the First Nagorno-Karabakh War. The first transit shipment was Kazakh wheat, followed by oil products from Azerbaijan to Armenia.
Armenia received its first batch of Azerbaijani fuel on December 19, 2025. The shipment included 1,220 tons of AI-95 gasoline produced by SOCAR, transported in 22 railway wagons.
The second batch of fuel arrived in January 2026. On January 9, Azerbaijan shipped 2,698 tons (48 wagons) to Armenia, including 1,742 tons of AI-95 gasoline and 956 tons of diesel fuel. On January 11, an additional 979 tons of AI-95 gasoline (18 wagons) were sent.
The third batch, totaling 4,500 tons of diesel fuel, departed for Armenia on February 25.
Russian Wheat for Armenia
On February 4, 2026, eight wagons loaded with Russian wheat (totaling 560 tons) departed for Armenia via transit through Azerbaijan. In total so far, Armenia has received 20,660 tons of Russian wheat transported through Azerbaijani territory.
According to Sergey Pavlov, First Deputy General Director of Russian Railways, rail transportation of wheat from Russia to Armenia is now regular.
The opening and swift implementation of new transport routes could positively influence the peace process and help Armenia address its isolation. While full implementation will take time and require infrastructure development, statements from both governments and frequent bilateral meetings show that the process is underway, and that both parties are committed to expanding transport links.
This development is expected to reshape regional transport corridors and support the emergence of a new geopolitical landscape.
Third Civil Sector Meeting
On February 13-14, 2026, in Tsaghkadzor, Armenia, a bilateral roundtable as part of the “Bridge of Peace” initiative brought together civil sector representatives from Armenia and Azerbaijan. The Azerbaijani delegation arrived in Armenia via the newly delimited and demarcated border, following all required procedures.
Twenty Armenian and nineteen Azerbaijani experts, including representatives of civil society and the media, participated in the meeting. This was the third meeting under the initiative. The program focuses on two main areas: engagement with Armenian and Azerbaijani societies and the development and implementation of joint projects.
The first meeting was held in Yerevan in October 2025, followed by a second in Baku in December 2025. At the two-day event, the civil sector representatives discussed topics aligned with official bilateral negotiations, including the peace agreement, lifting restrictions on regional transport, economic opportunities to be garnered from the peace process, border delimitation, unblocking transport routes, and societal expectations.
The participants met with Armenia’s Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Vahan Kostanyan, and the Secretary of the Security Council, Armen Grigoryan. The meeting concluded with a joint press conference.
Alongside high-level political negotiations, these meetings play a key role in the peace process by involving broader segments of society and fostering improved relations between the two countries.
The EU Monitoring Mission in Armenia
Markus Ritter, Head of the European Union Monitoring Mission (EUMA) in Armenia, announced that Armenia and the European Union will discuss the mission’s future in Brussels this autumn. The current mandate expires in February 2027. Armen Grigoryan, Secretary of the Security Council of Armenia, supports extending the mission. Satu Koivu, previously with the Finnish police, became the mission’s head on February 20.
The European Union Civilian Mission in Armenia (EUMA) began on February 20, 2023, with a two-year mandate under the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). On January 30, 2025, the mandate was extended for two more years. The mission now conducts patrols from six operational bases.
The mission monitors security along the Armenian-Azerbaijani border. Western involvement is especially important for Yerevan, which, following its recent defeat, cannot independently ensure border security.
Gagauzia
On February 11, 2026, in Comrat, the capital of the Gagauz autonomous region, Moldovan President Maia Sandu emphasized that preserving the Gagauz language and culture should be a strategic priority for the autonomy and for its scientific and educational sectors. She delivered these remarks at the 35th-anniversary celebration of the Comrat State University.
In late 2025, the Ministry of Education launched a national plan to support the study and development of the Gagauz language. Currently, around 12,000 students in 44 schools study Gagauz, and about 5,000 children attend 56 kindergartens where the language is taught.
The Gagauz are a Turkic-speaking people, many of whom also speak Russian, and a significant share of the population holds pro-Russian political views. President Sandu’s Party of Action and Solidarity has limited electoral support in the region. The Moldovan government believes that strengthening the Gagauz language and culture could help reduce Russian influence in the autonomy.
Transnistria
A state of economic emergency
The state of emergency in Transnistria’s economy will remain in effect until March 17. This measure, introduced on December 18, 2025, followed a reduction in natural gas supplies. The decree was issued by separatist leader Vadim Krasnoselsky.
Transnistria’s energy crisis began in early 2025, when Russia cut off gas supplies to the region. Since then, the energy situation has remained unstable. The region no longer receives gas directly from Russia, and unclear supply arrangements and payment mechanisms continue to cause disruptions. As a result, the de facto authorities have periodically reduced gas supplies to local businesses and households.
The region is also facing challenges with salary payments. According to local authorities, “due to economic difficulties and declining budget revenues,” employees of budget-funded organizations will receive their salaries in two installments each month throughout 2026.
Officials Stripped of Moldovan Citizenship
By order of Moldovan President Maia Sandu, nine officials from Transnistria, including members of the separatist parliament, were stripped of their Moldovan citizenship. According to the decree, the revocation of citizenship was due to the commission of particularly serious actions that harmed the Republic of Moldova. According to Stanislav Secrieru, Adviser to the President of the Republic of Moldova on Defense and National Security, the individuals whose citizenship was revoked “acted in the interests of a foreign state that violates the neutrality of our country and which is waging an aggressive war against neighboring Ukraine.”
Previously, Moldovan passports enabled Transnistria residents to travel freely in Europe. This measure may exert pressure on the separatist authorities in Chisinau and could affect ongoing negotiations.
The “1+1” Meeting
On February 26, 2026, following a lengthy hiatus, Chisinau and Tiraspol resumed their “1+1” format meetings at the OSCE office in Tiraspol. The last meeting of this kind occurred in April 2025.
Representing Chisinau was Deputy Prime Minister for Reintegration of Moldova, Valeriu Chiveri. Tiraspol was represented by the self-proclaimed Minister of Foreign Affairs, Vitaly Ignatiev.
Chisinau focused on several key issues:
- Reintegration and economic integration: Chisinau announced the creation of a fund to support social and infrastructure projects in Transnistria;
- Freedom of movement, human rights, and media access: Chisinau urged the resolution of humanitarian issues, specifically calling for the removal of checkpoints restricting movement and for unrestricted access to the left bank for journalists and human rights defenders;
- School instruction in Romanian language: Starting September 1, 2026, all Moldovan schools on the left bank of the Dniester are expected to transition to Romanian-language instruction.
In response, Ignatiev raised several points reflecting Tiraspol’s perspective:
- The negotiation process, he argued, should reflect the interests of Transnistria’s population.
- Ignatiev demanded the abolition of Moldova’s “On Separatism” law, citing incidents in which Transnistrian residents were detained at border crossings or at Chisinau International Airport.
A follow-up meeting might be held as soon as March. Significantly, talks resumed after the Moldovan government announced a reintegration plan. On December 3, 2025, Valeriu Chiveri confirmed that, with support from the European Union and the United States, Moldova was developing a reintegration strategy, though details remained undisclosed. Moscow fears that Moldova’s pro-Western government is seeking to sideline Russia from the Transnistrian conflict resolution process. Following the pro-Western victory in Moldova’s parliamentary elections, and the ongoing economic and energy crisis in Transnistria, the Moldovan government appears to have gained greater leverage over the separatist authorities. The absence of a direct land connection between Transnistria and Russia further complicates Moscow’s ability to support the region.
Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali Region
Rehabilitation of the railway line and prospects for restoring railway connections between Russia and Georgia
Ongoing peace negotiations between Armenia and Azerbaijan have renewed interest in restoring railway communications across the region. Recently, Russian officials and commentators have increasingly discussed re-establishing the railway connection between Russia and Georgia through the occupied territory of Abkhazia. Notably, intensive rehabilitation of Abkhazia’s railway infrastructure has been underway in recent years with Russian support.
Rehabilitation efforts are currently focused on the Sokhumi–Ochamchire railway line in occupied Abkhazia. In December 2025, repairs commenced on the segment between Kelasuri and Ochamchire stations. Four Russian work teams are involved, with all necessary materials and equipment supplied from Russia. In total, a 55-kilometer stretch from Sokhumi to Ochamchire is undergoing work. At Ochamchire station, the main hub for cargo reception, a 950-meter section of track has been rehabilitated. This upgrade is expected to boost the station’s capacity for handling railway equipment and cargo. Work continues on the Sokhumi–Kelasuri and Kelasuri–Drand sections, with completion scheduled for March 2026.
The upgraded railway line will support larger cargo volumes, including container shipments. To boost throughput, significant infrastructure rehabilitation has been undertaken in recent years. Over the past five years, major repairs and capacity upgrades on the Sokhumi–Psou section have enabled the line to accommodate modern trains. Correspondingly, the port of Ochamchire has become more active, with a container terminal in operation for almost a year already.
A key objective of the railway rehabilitation in Abkhazia seems to be the eventual reconnection with Georgia’s railway network. While Georgian officials deny ongoing negotiations, Russian officials have openly discussed such plans.
On February 12, 2026, Russian Deputy Prime Minister Alexei Overchuk announced that Russia is exploring the restoration of railway connections with Georgia via occupied Abkhazia.
“Efforts are underway to restore all severed transport routes in the Caucasus, including the railway between Russia and Georgia through Abkhazia,” Overchuk stated. He emphasized that reopening this route is vital for “ensuring transport and logistics stability in the Caucasus.”
Overchuk further stressed that “the stability and economic development of the peoples of Azerbaijan, Armenia, Georgia, Iran, Turkey, and Russia are critically important for the world,” expressing hope for “constructive engagement from all regional states in addressing this common goal.”
Overchuk also commented on the restoration of railway lines in Armenia. He stated that Russia will begin substantive negotiations to rebuild two sections of the Armenian railway: one connecting Armenia’s network to Azerbaijan near Yeraskh, and another linking to Turkey near Akhuryan. The sections to be restored measure approximately 1.6 km and 12.4 km, respectively. Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan has previously noted that Armenia’s railway infrastructure is largely in place, requiring only the restoration of missing sections and modernization. Russia currently manages Armenia’s railway system.
Moscow believes that Armenia and the United States are attempting to restore links with Azerbaijan and Turkey without Russian participation. Overchuk’s remarks can thus be seen as a signal that Moscow is prepared to take an active role in reviving regional transport routes and becoming a key stakeholder in new infrastructure projects.
Overchuk’s statements prompted a response from Georgia, with Georgian Railways denying any involvement in such negotiations. The company stated: “Regarding media reports that the Russian side is considering restoring railway traffic with Georgia via Abkhazia, we clarify that Georgian Railways is not engaged in any negotiations on resuming railway traffic between Russia and Georgia. Therefore, we do not understand why this issue has been raised.”
Following Overchuk’s comments, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail Galuzin, responsible for relations with post-Soviet countries and occupied territories, also addressed the issue. On February 19, Galuzin stated: “We should discuss restoring the railway line between Russia and Georgia through Abkhazia. If both parties are interested, why not? Given the complexities of relations between Abkhazia and Georgia, and between Georgia and Russia, if there is mutual interest, there should be dialogue.”
Drone Attacks and the Closure of “Borders”
In February 2026, following Ukrainian drone attacks in Russia’s Krasnodar region, the so-called Psou Checkpoint, the crossing between occupied Abkhazia and Russia, was temporarily closed multiple times. The first closure occurred on February 15, followed by another on February 23. That same day, drone debris was found near the village of Gantiadi in the Gagra district, marking Abkhazia’s first recorded drone crash. In response, the de facto Ministry of Defense of Abkhazia stated that “any violation of Abkhazian airspace by drones will now and in the future be prevented by air defense systems and electronic warfare forces.” The crossing was closed again on February 24.
Since the onset of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the crossing was also closed in July 2025 due to drone-related security concerns. Similar security incidents have been reported repeatedly since then. Drone activity near Abkhazia suggests the region could become a military target in the broader context of the Russia–Ukraine war, underscoring its security vulnerabilities.
A New “Prime Minister” and a New “Government”
On February 11, 2026, the de facto parliament of occupied Tskhinvali region endorsed Dzambolat Tedeev for the post of “Prime Minister.” De facto president Alan Gagloev appointed Tedeev to the position by decree later that day.
The position of “Prime Minister” had been vacant since January 21, when Konstantin Dzhusoev was dismissed as “Chairman of the Government of the Republic of South Ossetia” by Gagloev, reportedly at Dzhusoev’s own request. Until the new “government” was formed, Tedeev served as acting chairman. Dzhusoev’s resignation surprised many observers, prompting several theories. One view is that Dzhusoev, appointed by earlier Kremlin curators, managed the region’s budget independently of Gagloev’s circle. Another interpretation suggests Gagloev is preparing for the 2027 “presidential elections” and needs a more loyal “prime minister.” Tedeev is seen as such an ally.
Tedeev is part of a younger generation of politicians. Born in Tskhinvali in 1990, he graduated from the Faculty of Economics at Stavropol State University in 2012, later earning a law degree and, in 2018, a Candidate of Economic Sciences title. He began his career in the Ministry of Economic Development in 2013. Tedeev served as Deputy Minister of Economic Development (2017–2021), Vice Prime Minister (2021–2023), and, since 2023, he has held the position of Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Finance.
Following Tedeev’s appointment, the composition of the new de facto government was announced on February 24. Security and law enforcement officials kept their posts: Russian officer Yuri Yarovitsky remained “Defense Minister,” Erislav Mamiev continued as “Minister of Internal Affairs,” Akhsar Dzhioev remained “Minister of Foreign Affairs,” and Ibragim Gaseev was reappointed “Minister of Emergency Situations.” Former “Prime Minister” Konstantin Dzhusoev was appointed State Adviser to the de facto president.
Moldova’s Rejection of a Representative of the Occupied Tskhinvali Region
On February 17, 2026, Vitaly Yankovsky, the so-called representative of occupied Tskhinvali region in Transnistria, was banned from entering Moldova for five years. Yankovsky has held this position since April 10, 2017, and previously held various posts within the separatist authorities of Tskhinvali.
Transnistria and the occupied Tskhinvali region have recognized each other’s so-called “independence” since 2006. However, their relations remain largely symbolic, serving mainly to imitate diplomatic engagement between unrecognized territories.