Introduction
Over the past two weeks, the Caucasus has seen a number of notable developments. The case of Larisa Tuptsokova remains ongoing, and Georgian activists have signed a petition in her support. The court proceedings against Akhmad Batlukhsky in Dagestan also continue. There were several Ukrainian drone attacks in the region, the most significant of which targeted a military residential area in the city of Gudermes, Chechnya. There were also occasional reports of arrests of individuals linked to jihadi movements. No new rumours have emerged regarding Ramzan Kadyrov’s health. Aside from this, developments in the North Caucasus remain largely centred on the war in Ukraine.
Statistical updates
As of 29 November, the total number of North Caucasian residents killed in Ukraine had reached 3318. This includes: Dagestan – 1707, North Ossetia – 522, Kabardino-Balkaria – 329, Chechnya – 251, Karachaevo-Cherkessia – 167, and Adyghea – 127.
Adyghea
A 23-year-old resident of Maykop, Shamil Aliyev, has been sentenced to 14 years for recruiting a citizen into a terrorist organisation. Aliyev is originally from Dagestan. According to the court, while a member of a banned international terrorist organisation, he communicated with foreign nationals on behalf of ISIS. During these exchanges, he justified the organisation’s cause and attempted to persuade them to provide logistical support to the militants.
As noted in the previous issue of The North Caucasian Review, the Aliyev case was not the first instance of a resident of Adyghea being detained on charges of supporting international terrorism. In 2023, a resident of Adyghea and citizen of Uzbekistan, Sirozhiddin Tukhtaev, was arrested on similar charges. However, in most such cases, the detained individuals originate from elsewhere and are not ethnically Circassian. This indicates that jihadi ideology has not gained traction among Circassians in Adyghea.
Karachaevo-Cherkessia
The case of Rauf Arashukov, a former senator from Karachayevo-Cherkessia who is serving a life sentence, has seen a new development. According to investigators, Arashukov attempted to bribe the administration of the “Black Dolphin” prison in order to be placed in the same cell as Bashir Khamkhoev, who is serving a life sentence for assisting the suicide bomber in the 2011 Domodedovo terrorist attack. This is not Arashukov’s first attempt to obtain improved living conditions in the “Black Dolphin” prison, which is known for its strict regime, in exchange for a bribe. In October 2024, he transferred 3 million roubles to the prison administration in return for better conditions, but his request was ultimately refused. As noted in an earlier issue of The North Caucasian Review, Arashukov also made several attempts to join the Russian armed forces and be deployed to Ukraine in exchange for a pardon—requests that were likewise rejected.
This case illustrates an intriguing pattern. A former Russian official from the North Caucasus is prepared to bribe the prison administration in order to share a cell with an individual who supports jihadi ideology and has been convicted for a terrorist attack. The Domodedovo attack was organised on the orders of Doku Umarov, the leader of Imarat Kavkaz, and was carried out by the Ingush branch of the North Caucasian insurgency, the Velayat Ghalghayche. The fact that Arashukov, known for his close ties to Circassian nationalists, appears to find common ground with a jihadi suggests that, in times of necessity, jihadis and nationalists in the North Caucasus may be able to converge around shared interests.
Kabardino-Balkaria
The father of 19-year-old Kazbek Yemkuzhev has released a video statement in which he describes the unjust treatment of his family by the local law enforcement authorities. He stated that his son, who was arrested on charges of membership in a terrorist organisation, was tortured and threatened with the arrest of his mother and sister. Over the course of one week, the video received more than 31,000 views, 610 likes, and 411 comments. The majority of social media users expressed their support for Kazbek Yemkuzhev’s father. Yemkuzhev disappeared on 9 April 2024 and was found in an interrogation room on 3 May[U1] . As a result, the investigation classified him as a kidnapping victim, and the authorities acknowledged procedural misconduct.
This case demonstrates that, despite the silencing of critical media in Kabardino-Balkaria, there remains a degree of solidarity with individuals who have been subjected to unjust treatment by the local police. The fact that the detainee was accused of membership in a terrorist organisation did not lead to his demonisation. Two factors may explain this. First, local residents increasingly distrust the authorities and the terrorism-related charges they bring; many believe such accusations are frequently misused and applied to innocent individuals. Second, the rise of Salafism in Kabardino-Balkaria may also account for the solidarity shown towards Yemkuzhev.
North Ossetia
An ethnic Ossetian and citizen of Tajikistan, Alan Gatsoev, was denied entry into Russia at the Lars border crossing on the Georgian–Russian border, and has been living in the neutral zone since the summer. He was refused entry due to previous violations of migration regulations. Gatsoev has been living in his car and is not permitted to enter either Russia or Georgia. In a video statement, Gatsoev noted that he has relatives in North Ossetia and that his parents are buried there. He also stated that he suffers from diabetes and a heart condition, meaning he will struggle to survive the winter.
In general, there have been multiple reports of ethnic North Caucasians being denied entry to Georgia. For example, during the first wave of partial mobilisation in Russia, a large number of North Caucasians, predominantly from Chechnya and Dagestan, were refused entry and became stranded in the neutral zone. This approach by the Georgian authorities can be explained by security concerns and efforts to prevent the infiltration of individuals adhering to jihadi ideology. North Caucasians are not the only group of citizens occasionally denied entry to Georgia. For example, in 2025, a group of Ukrainian citizens attempting to enter Georgia via Russia were also stranded at the border. This frequently occurs with individuals who are residents of the occupied Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson, and Zaporizhzhia regions.
Ingushetia
Supyan Payzulayev, a member of the Chechen Akhmat-1 unit, was arrested in Nazran on charges of robbing a taxi driver. The 36-year-old resident of Chechnya, together with an accomplice, allegedly threatened the taxi driver with his service Stechkin pistol, and stole his cash and mobile phone. A criminal case has been opened against Payzulayev under Article 162, which carries a prison sentence of up to 10 years.
Payzulayev’s case was not the first instance of armed robbery committed by members of Chechen units fighting in Ukraine. For example, in 2024, members of the Akhmat unit carried out acts of robbery in Russia’s Kursk region. Akhmat-1, led by Zamid Chalaev, has been actively involved in Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Chalaev has been placed under EU sanctions. According to the official EU document, “Chalaev actively participates in Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, taking part in, inter alia, the Russian capture of the city of Mariupol and the storming of the metallurgical plant “Azovstal.” Moreover, Zamid Chalayev is directly involved in the forced re-education and military training of Ukrainian children. He actively contributes to the organisation of “military re-education” camps based in the Chechen Republic. One particular indoctrination camp forces Ukrainian teenagers to follow a “young fighter course,” which teaches Ukrainian children to operate military equipment. Zamid Chalayev is one of the key persons involved in the illegal deportation of Ukrainian children to the Republic of Chechnya. Zamid Chalayev’s actions violate the rights of Ukrainian children, and infringe Ukraine’s law and administrative order.
The fact that the robbery was committed in Ingushetia by an ethnic Chechen could further inflame tensions between Chechens and Ingush people. The territorial dispute and the protests of 2018–19 were clear examples of such strains. Despite the subsequent crackdown and the arrests of the protest organisers, the underlying sentiments and resentments among Ingush society have not disappeared.
Chechnya
Ramzan Kadyrov announced the deployment of a new Chechen unit to the Russian–Ukrainian war. A contingent of fighters was flown to the conflict zone from Grozny airport. As Kadyrov stated, “For some of them, this is the second, and even the third time in the zone of the special military operation. Among the volunteers there are not only Chechens, but individuals from other regions of Russia.” All fighters reportedly underwent military training at the “Special Forces University” in Gudermes. According to Chechen authorities, the republic has sent 61,221 fighters to the conflict, of whom 22,321 are classified as volunteers. At present, more than 13,000 Chechen fighters are deployed in the conflict zone.
Chechnya is one of the leading regions of the Russian Federation in terms of sending troops to Ukraine. Unlike other parts of Russia, there have been numerous reports of the forced mobilisation of Chechen civilians. In many cases, employees of law enforcement bodies, as well as individuals facing punishment — such as drug users or critics of Kadyrov’s administration — and their male relatives, are forcibly sent to Ukraine. Two factors may explain the Chechen authorities’ enthusiasm for deploying fighters to Ukraine. First, Kadyrov’s administration needs to demonstrate its loyalty to the federal centre. Given the strong competition and hostility towards Kadyrov within certain circles of the Russian elite, particularly within the military and security services, Kadyrov must continually reassure Putin of his allegiance. Secondly, Kadyrov — and any potential successors — requires a large number of armed men with combat experience to maintain control over the republic.
Dagestan
The banner of Imam Shamil was vandalised on Imam Shamil Avenue in Makhachkala. According to local Telegram channels, unknown individuals tore down the banner, threw stones at the bas-relief of Imam Shamil, and shouted that displaying such banners is haram (forbidden in Islam). The local authorities condemned the incident, installed a surveillance camera near the site, and promised to restore the banner promptly. The act of vandalism was also condemned by State Duma deputy Saygidpasha Umakhanov, known for lobbying Avar nationalism: “Imam Shamil is a symbol of bravery, resilience, and spiritual strength, not only for Dagestan, but for the entire Caucasus. Any attempt to disrespect him is absolutely unacceptable.”
Imam Shamil is an important symbolic figure for Dagestan. Although he was a leader of the anti-Russian, anti-colonial struggle in the nineteenth century, he is regarded as a hero in Dagestan, even by the pro-Russian authorities. The act of vandalism was most likely carried out by a Salafi activist. Salafism is known for its intolerance towards certain forms of art that depict human and animal figures. The movement still retains a strong presence in Dagestan. Although most Salafis are now politically inactive, there are still isolated cases in which some attempt to challenge the status quo and take action.
Diaspora
On 23 November, the 9th general assembly of the Federation of Abkhaz Associations (ABHAZFED) was held in the city of Düzce. At the meeting, a new leader of ABHAZFED was elected — Yavuz Atryshba (İlkuçar), who won against Elif Tapshypha (Berkkan). The de facto Minister of Foreign Affairs of Abkhazia, Oleg Bartsyts, congratulated Atryshba. As he stated: “Such great trust is clear evidence of your authority, energy, and commitment to preserving our culture, language, and traditions abroad. You have always remained close to your ancestral homeland, and, like a true son of your country, you took up arms to defend Abkhazia in the patriotic war of 1992–1993.”
Düzce province has long been an important centre of Abkhaz activism in Turkey. Dozens of Abkhaz settlements are situated in this province, which hosts the second-largest Abkhaz community after Sakarya. Many Abkhaz activists who played a significant role in Abkhaz volunteer efforts during the 1992–93 war in Abkhazia were originally from Düzce. Among them were the foreign fighter and hijacker of the Russian ferry “Avrasya,” Muhammed Emin Tokcan (Gabliya), and the former Muslim spiritual leader of Abkhazia, Adil Gabliya.