Introduction
Over the past two weeks, the North Caucasus has seen relatively low levels of activity. Even so, several noteworthy developments occurred. The most significant was the commemoration of the Karachai people’s deportation – a reminder that historical memory remains central for the Karachais, who were forcibly displaced under the Stalinist regime. During this fortnight, there were no Islamist insurgent attacks on local law enforcement, though authorities did carry out occasional arrests and searches targeting individuals with alleged links to Islamist groups. In other news, the case of Larisa Tuptsokova continued to evolve, with an attempt by Circassian activists to launch a petition in her support.
Statistical updates
As of 15 November, the total number of North Caucasian residents killed in Ukraine had reached 3,235. This includes: Dagestan – 1,664; Chechnya – 551; Ingushetia – 176; North Ossetia – 512; Kabardino-Balkaria – 329; Karachaevo-Cherkessia – 176; and Adyghea – 127.
Adyghea
The case of Larisa Tuptsokova has continued to draw attention. Around 30 human rights activists have called for an end to her prosecution, arguing that there is no evidence of any criminal wrongdoing. The appeal, initiated by the Human Rights Centre of Kabardino-Balkaria, was addressed to the head of Adyghea, Murat Kumpilov. It stated that Tuptsokova had ended her association with the Circassian Cultural Centre in Georgia before it was designated a terrorist organisation. The signatories stressed that her work was limited to translating literature and could in no way be construed as criminal activity. Authorities in Adyghea have not responded to the statement. However, some of the signatories fear that pressure may now be exerted on others who have had contact with the Circassian Cultural Centre, particularly those of Circassian descent. Human rights activist Valeriy Khatazhukov commented: “That’s why we are trying to bring this criminal case to an end. It could set a precedent for others who previously had ties with the centre. We hope no such precedent will emerge, but we cannot rule out the possibility.”
The prosecution of Tuptsokova risks setting a precedent for future pressure on Circassian activists. Since the establishment of the Circassian Cultural Centre in Tbilisi in 2011, at least a thousand ethnic Circassians have taken part in its activities, ranging from cultural events to online meetings. Many of them now work in the education sector in Kabardino-Balkaria, Karachayevo-Cherkessia, or Adyghea. This means that, should the authorities choose to target any of these individuals, their previous attendance at Circassian cultural events in Tbilisi could easily be used to compromise them. Moreover, as the Circassian Cultural Centre has a long history of cooperation with diaspora communities in Turkey, the United States, Jordan, Syria, and Israel, these connections could also serve as grounds for denying entry to Russia for Circassian activists from abroad.
Karachaevo-Cherkessia
On 2 November, residents of Karachayevo-Cherkessia marked the 82nd anniversary of the deportation of the Karachai people to Central Asia. The local administration in the city of Karachaevsk organised memorial gatherings and related events. The head of the republic, Rashid Temrezov, emphasised the significance of the day for the Karachai people, stating: “Eighty-two years ago, tens of thousands of our innocent compatriots were stripped of their right to live and raise their children in their ancestral homeland.” Temrezov also announced the completion of the reconstruction of a memorial dedicated to the victims of the deportation.
The Karachai people were deported by the Soviet regime under Stalin between 2 and 22 November 1943, accused of collaborating with Nazi Germany. In total, more than 68,000 people were deported. 653 died during transportation. After Stalin’s death, in 1957, the Karachais were rehabilitated and permitted to return to what is now Karachayevo-Cherkessia. The deportation remains a central element of the Karachai people’s historical memory, and the trauma of Soviet repression continues to leave a deep mark on the community. Notably, unlike memorial events concerning the Circassians, commemorations of the Karachai deportation face no interference from security services, with local authorities actively participating in the ceremonies.
Kabardino-Balkaria
The informal educational initiative Youth Against Violence continues to operate across Kabardino-Balkaria. Organised by the non-governmental organisation Galaktika, with financial support from the republic’s Ministry of Youth Affairs, events have been held in the city of Nalchik as well as in the Baksan, Lesken, and Tersky districts. The programme aims to equip school pupils with the skills to “navigate the modern information environment with confidence and resist negative influences.” Training sessions, led by psychologists, focus on three key areas: analysing information and identifying manipulative techniques; managing emotions; and making conscious, well-considered decisions.
These training courses resemble media literacy initiatives run by pro-Western NGOs across the post-Soviet space. The decision to focus on Kabardino-Balkaria is hardly coincidental. Russian authorities are concerned that local youth may be influenced by two ideologies: Circassian nationalism, which has long been strong in the republic, and Salafi Islam, which has gained considerable ground in recent years. These influences are not mutually exclusive and have increasingly converged. This overlap helps explain why the training sessions have been conducted mainly in areas with predominantly Circassian populations.
North Ossetia
The reopening of the cable car at the Mamison ski resort has been postponed until December. Initially closed for technical reasons, it was scheduled to resume operations on 1 November. However, according to an official statement from the resort, “the cable car will reopen on 1 December, so that you can experience real winter.”
The Mamison ski resort is no ordinary Russian resort: it carries a clear geopolitical significance. Located in the Alagir district near the Georgian border, it was established by executive order of then–Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev. The project is widely seen as part of Russia’s broader strategy to strengthen control over the mountain passes linking the North and South Caucasus. The Mamison Pass is considered one of the potential sites for constructing an alternative route connecting Russia and Georgia, which, if realised, would allow Russian goods to reach the Black Sea ports of Batumi and Poti more quickly than via the existing route through Lars.
Ingushetia
Two ethnic Ingush footballers, Adam Markhiev and Khalid Doltmurziev, were called up to represent the Finland senior national team and the Georgian U19 team respectively in the qualification matches scheduled between 12 and 18 November. Markhiev, born in Nazran, moved to Finland at the age of seven and now holds Finnish citizenship. He plays for Germany’s FC Nürnberg, and made his debut for Finland’s national team in September 2025. Doltmurziev was born in Belgium and began his career in the youth system of Club Brugge KV. His family chose for him to represent Georgia internationally. He currently plays for Dinamo Tbilisi and has scored four goals in the UEFA Youth League.
These recent call-ups reflect a broader trend among ethnic North Caucasian footballers, who were either born abroad or emigrated at a young age, to decline to represent the Russian national team. For example, Dagestani-born Manchester United youth player Amir Ibragimov has chosen to play for England’s U19 team, while Jamal Kaishvili, born in Chechnya and raised in Germany, represents Georgia and plays for Bayern Munich’s youth squad. This pattern indicates that members of the North Caucasian diaspora abroad feel little attachment or loyalty toward Russia.
Chechnya
Chechnya’s Mufti (spiritual leader) Salah Mezhiev sparked controversy with a statement made on local television. During the broadcast, Mezhiev used derogatory language toward Jews, calling them “enemies of Allah” and accusing them of promoting atheism. The remarks prompted a swift response from Russia’s Jewish community. The Chief Rabbi of Russia, Berl Lazar, condemned Mezhiev’s comments as offensive to Jewish people and harmful to Russia’s multiethnic and multi-religious harmony. Lazar also urged other Muslim leaders in Russia to publicly reject Mezhiev’s statements. Subsequently, Mezhiev issued another statement, in which he blamed “European atheists” and “Ukrainian satanists” for instigating the controversy.
Antisemitic rhetoric is not new to the North Caucasus. The anti-Jewish riots in Makhachkala, along with a series of smaller protests across the region against the potential resettlement of Jews, illustrate a persistent trend. Such sentiments have intensified since the beginning of Israel’s military operation in Gaza. Moreover, these views are not limited to insurgent or clandestine Islamist groups — members of the official, Russian-loyal Islamic clergy have also repeatedly made anti-Semitic statements. This trend can be attributed to their efforts to win the sympathy of the North Caucasus’s Muslim population, many of whom express strong solidarity with the Palestinians.
Dagestan
A court in Dagestan has issued an arrest warrant for prominent Dagestani religious figure Akhmad Batlukhskiy. A follower of the Naqshbandiya school of Sufism, Batlukhskiy has been a vocal critic of the Dagestan Muslim Spiritual Directorate. Following the publication of his critical videos, his house was burned down, his mother was expelled from their village, and he was forced to flee Russia. Last spring, he was placed on the wanted list in connection with a defamation case involving accusations against an individual of committing a serious or especially serious crime. According to Chernovik, Batlukhskiy was arrested on 8 November at Moscow airport.
Akhmad Batlukhskiy’s critical videos represent the first case in two decades of a Sufi preacher publicly opposing the official Muslim clergy in Dagestan. Previously, criticism of the Dagestan Muftiate typically came from Salafis, which made it easier for authorities to justify securitisation measures against them. The emergence of dissenting voices within the Sufi community has therefore raised concern among the authorities, which may explain the campaign against Batlukhskiy.
Diaspora
The KAFFED Abkhazia Working Group met on Sunday, 2 November, in the village of Balbalı in Sakarya province, which is populated by ethnic Abkhaz. The meeting was attended by KAFFED Vice Presidents Muharrem Saran and Öner Yılmaz. Discussions initially centred on the presidential election process in Abkhazia, participation in the Abkhazian Presidential Inauguration Ceremony on 2 April, the World Circassian Union Executive Board meeting held in Sukhumi on 18–20 July, and the youth camps organised in Abkhazia and Turkey over the summer. It was agreed that an online meeting would be convened in the coming days to coordinate the planned activities.
KAFFED is the largest Caucasian association in Turkey, with branches in more than 50 regions. The organisation is primarily dominated by Circassian and Abkhaz activists. Despite the split between Abkhaz and Circassian organisations that has been seen in Turkey over the past two decades, Abkhaz activists continue to hold strong positions within KAFFED, and the association has not turned into an exclusively Circassian body. Although loyal to the Turkish political establishment, it maintains close ties with the de facto authorities in Abkhazia, as well as with the regional governments of Adyghea, Kabardino-Balkaria and Karachaevo-Cherkessia. This can be explained by KAFFED’s desire to preserve cultural links with its historical homeland. At the same time, there is a notable lack of reciprocity in support for Circassian and Abkhaz causes. For example, the Circassian faction of KAFFED unconditionally backs separatism in Abkhazia, whereas the Abkhaz faction does not support recognition of the Circassian genocide or other key issues related to the Circassian question. This has led many Circassian activists to withdraw from KAFFED and establish their own associations.