On August 27, coinciding with the 34th anniversary of Moldova’s independence, the leaders of the “Weimar Triangle” – French President Emmanuel Macron, German Chancellor Friedrich Merz, and Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk – made a rare joint visit to Chisinau. This marked a significant moment, as it is uncommon for the leaders of the Weimar Triangle to travel abroad together. With Moldova set to hold parliamentary elections on September 28, their visit, occurring just a day before the official start of the election campaign, serves as a clear sign of political support for the pro-Western president, Maia Sandu.
Why is this election important?
The outcome of the parliamentary elections will shape the future of Moldova’s EU integration process, which gained momentum after Russia’s full-scale military aggression against Ukraine began in February 2022, and seeing Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia submitting their applications for EU membership on March 3, 2022.
Since June 2024, Moldova has been actively pursuing its accession to the European Union. The advancement of the European integration process hinges on whether Sandu’s political team can retain its parliamentary majority. In this, Sandu faces a significant challenge in the upcoming parliamentary elections. She and her party must contend with pro-Russian political forces, both overt and covert, that are backed by the Kremlin, and whose aim it is to either obstruct Moldova’s pro-Western trajectory, or, at best, to pull the country back into Russia’s sphere of influence. Given the current electoral environment and the escalation of Russian hybrid warfare, there is a considerable likelihood that the elections will alter the political landscape, impacting the pace of EU integration and increasing Russia’s sway over Moldova’s political affairs.
The 2021 and 2024 Elections and the Success of Pro-Western Forces
With the parliamentary elections set for September 28, it is important to recognize that past parliamentary and presidential contests were marked by intense competition between pro-Western and pro-Russian factions, with the pro-Western side ultimately prevailing. Securing a victory for pro-Western forces in the forthcoming elections is crucial for preserving the country’s pro-European foreign policy trajectory and to further its integration into the European Union.
The 2021 Parliamentary Elections: A Victory for Pro-Western Forces
The most favorable scenario for Sandu would be a repetition of the results of the 2021 snap parliamentary elections, during which the pro-Western Action and Solidarity Party – of which she is seen as the informal leader – secured enough votes to take control of the parliament and form a government independently. Her party won 63 out of the 101 seats in the legislature. Historically, no single party had attained a sufficient number of seats, a fact that compelled pro-Western forces to collaborate or form coalitions with pro-Russian parties, such as the Communists and Socialists. The outcome of the 2021 elections consolidated control of the presidency, executive, and legislative branches under one political force, accelerating Moldova’s pro-Western trajectory in the years that followed, and diminishing the influence of pro-Russian actors in political decision-making.
In addition to Sandu’s party, the 2021 parliament also featured the Bloc of Communists and Socialists, led by former presidents Vladimir Voronin (2001–2009) and Igor Dodon (2016–2020), which secured 32 seats. Additionally, the Șor Party, headed by the wanted businessman Ilan Shor, was part of the assembly. Shor is associated with an international fraud scheme from 2014, during which one billion US dollars vanished from three Moldovan banks. He is currently residing in Moscow, where he aims to promote Russian interests in Moldova.
The significance of the Moldovan diaspora in the electoral success of Sandu’s party cannot be overstated. The Action and Solidarity Party garnered over 85% of the votes from Moldovans residing abroad. Additionally, Sandu secured victories in both the 2020 and 2024 presidential elections by effectively mobilizing the diaspora vote.
The 2024 Presidential Elections: Sandu’s Second Term
In the 2024 presidential election, Moldova faced a choice between pro-Western and pro-Russian orientations, resulting in Maia Sandu’s victory over Alexandr Stoianoglo. Stoianoglo received support from pro-Russian socialists advocating for the establishment of new relations with Moscow. However, he did not overtly position himself as a pro-Russian politician, and even expressed support for integration into the European Union. Sandu encountered challenges in defeating her opponent in the first round, but ultimately secured her second term in a decisive victory in the second round with 55.3% of the vote.
Russia engaged in significant interference during the presidential elections, which may have impacted the outcomes. Senior officials from the EU characterized the election as experiencing “unprecedented Russian interference.” With backing from Moscow, arrangements were made for buses and charter flights to transport voters to polling stations. Additionally, there were bomb threats at polling stations in the UK and Germany, intended to disrupt the electoral process.
The elections held added significance as they coincided with a referendum on constitutional amendments aimed at supporting Moldova’s accession to the European Union. Sandu achieved a narrow victory, with a mere fraction of votes separating supporters (50.35%) from opponents (49.65%). Approximately 10,000 votes ultimately determined the outcome of the referendum. The balance shifted towards the supporters at the last moment, after which Sandu claimed there was evidence of an attempt to buy 300,000 votes. To garner negative votes in the referendum, individuals were recruited from particularly vulnerable groups and compensated through various international payment platforms or cryptocurrencies. Despite the prevalence of vote buying, the referendum succeeded mainly due to contributions from the diaspora, whose votes secured the final majority. The votes from Moldovan residents alone would not have been sufficient for its passage.
The 2025 Parliamentary Elections and Main Political Groups
In the context of the September 28 parliamentary elections, only one political group stands out as a distinctly pro-Western entity, with an unequivocal orientation toward the West. In contrast, other political forces tend to present their commitments to enhancing relations with Western nations primarily as part of their electoral strategies.
The primary political force on the pro-Western front is the Party of Action and Solidarity (PAS), led by President Maia Sandu and Prime Minister Dorin Recean. This party emerged victorious in the 2021 parliamentary elections and currently holds control over all branches of government. It seeks to replicate its previous success in the upcoming elections. However, the dominance of PAS as the sole strong pro-Western party poses certain risks to the sustainability of Moldova’s pro-European trajectory. The party’s main objective is integration into the European Union: under Sandu’s leadership, Moldova achieved EU candidate status and initiated accession negotiations. To support these ambitions, the European Union has earmarked 1.8 billion euros to strengthen the Moldovan economy from 2025 to 2027. Additionally, during Sandu’s tenure, significant reforms aimed at combating corruption and improving the judiciary have been implemented.
Sandu’s primary adversary is a political alliance of former presidents that is openly aligned with pro-Russian sentiments. The Patriotic Electoral Bloc was officially registered on August 3, 2025, and comprises the Socialists (PSRM), led by Igor Dodon; the Communists (PCRM), led by Yuri Voronin; Heart of Moldova, headed by Irina Vlah, the former leader of Gagauzia autonomy (2015–2023); and Future of Moldova, led by Vasile Tarlev, who previously served as prime minister from 2001 to 2008. The bloc’s core electorate is pro-Russian, and its members advocate for closer ties with Moscow and a reassessment of relations with the West. To mask their pro-Russian stance, the bloc’s leaders refrain from discussing Russia’s role in the war in Ukraine, instead asserting that they are acting in Moldova’s best interests, and positioning themselves as “pro-Moldovan.” It is worth noting that they do not explicitly declare themselves anti-European. In fact, during the presidencies of Voronin and Dodon, relations with the European Union remained intact – a pragmatic decision, considering that Moldova’s economic ties with the EU have consistently strengthened over the years.
Pro-Russian leaders are leveraging the situation in Georgia as part of their election campaigns. For instance, Igor Dodon responded to Romanian President Nicușor Dan, who had raised concerns about the developments in Georgia and warned of the potential implications for Moldova if pro-Russian forces gain power, by referencing various statistics regarding Georgia. He asserted that “despite external criticism, Georgia is demonstrating stability, growth, and investor confidence. In contrast, Moldova, under the leadership of the Party of Action and Solidarity, is not only stagnating, but is also rapidly descending into an economic and social abyss.”
Sandu’s party is set to encounter competition from the political union “Alternative,” which was founded on January 31. This coalition is led by Ion Ceban, the Mayor of Chisinau and head of the National Alternative Movement (MAN) party. In a notable development, Romania banned Ceban from entering its territory on grounds of national security in July, which also restricts his movements within the Schengen area. The coalition comprises the Party of Development and Consolidation of Moldova, led by former Prime Minister Ion Chicu, and the Civic Congress party, headed by former MP Mark Tkachuk. Additionally, it includes former Prosecutor General Alexandr Stoianoglo, who ran against Sandu in the 2024 presidential election. The union officially endorses the development of relations with Russia while simultaneously maintaining a pro-Western stance. However, this positioning is primarily viewed as part of the Kremlin’s strategy, with widespread suspicions that the bloc operates under Russian influence and aims to fragment the pro-Western vote.
Renato Usatii’s political party, known as “Our Party,” is currently showing promise in its potential to surpass the electoral threshold in the upcoming elections. Usatii, who previously served as mayor of Bălți, secured a significant position by finishing third in the 2024 presidential election. Notably, he refrained from endorsing any candidate during the second round of the presidential race, which could impact his party’s strategic positioning and voter base in future electoral efforts.
The election bloc “Victory” also planned to participate in the elections, holding its first meeting in Moscow. The bloc is openly pro-Russian, and even advocates for Moldova’s entry into an alliance with Russia. It is led by businessman Ilan Shor, who is living in exile in Moscow. In July, the Central Election Commission deregistered the bloc, followed by the banning of other parties founded by Shor. He had designated Yevgenia Gutsul, head of the Gagauzia autonomous territorial unit, as the leader of the electoral list. In March 2024, Gutsul met with Vladimir Putin, requesting his assistance in defending the “legitimate rights” of Gagauzia. However, on August 5, she was sentenced to seven years in prison for using illegal Russian funds for political activities. According to the court, Gutsul – who served as secretary of Șor’s party from 2019 to 2022 (declared unconstitutional by Moldova’s Constitutional Court in 2023) – regularly brought money into the country from a “Russian organized crime group.” These funds were primarily used to organize protests and demonstrations. She is accused of receiving approximately 42.5 million Moldovan lei (about $2.4 million) from Russian handlers. Moscow quickly reacted to Gutsul’s prison sentence. Russian Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova declared that “Sandu is the next Saakashvili (President of Georgia from 2004 to 2013), only worse.”
The European Union imposed sanctions on July 15 against several individuals and organizations connected to Shor. According to the European Council, the measures targeted seven people and three entities “responsible for actions aimed at destabilizing Moldova.”
A total of 23 political entities are participating in the elections, although most of them have little chance of success.
Russia’s Threat and the Kremlin’s Interests
Security Services Warning
The primary challenge facing Moldova’s pro-Western government is Russia’s interference in the country’s domestic politics and electoral processes. In Chișinău, there is a strong belief that the Kremlin will actively engage in these upcoming elections, mirroring its involvement in the 2024 presidential elections and referendum. Alexandru Musteata, the director of the Moldovan Security and Intelligence Service, alerted deputies about this threat as early as December 2024. He delivered a comprehensive report detailing the Kremlin’s strategy, which is grounded in political and electoral corruption, disinformation, manipulation, and the incitement of street protests and unrest.
Historically, the Moldovan government has accused pro-Russian media outlets and activists of disseminating disinformation, resulting in the closure of several publications and Telegram channels. Musteata indicated that Moldovan security services would enhance their oversight of organizations suspected of having ties to Russia. He identified vote buying as Moscow’s primary tool of influence, pointing to Ilan Shor as a significant figure in this scheme. Allegedly, Shor has utilized banking networks to facilitate financial transfers for vote buying. The security services’ report describes him as the central figure in the Kremlin’s operations, and provides specific details regarding the bribery scheme.
Sandu’s Assessments
President Sandu has expressed significant concerns regarding the threat of Russian interference in Moldova. On July 30, she stated that Russia aims to exert control over Moldova and is preparing for unprecedented meddling in the upcoming parliamentary elections. This includes tactics such as vote buying and illegal financing through cryptocurrency, with an allocation of €100 million for these efforts. Sandu noted that the Kremlin intends to launch an “information manipulation campaign,” execute cyberattacks, organize funded “violent” protests, and exploit established religious institutions.
Sandu views Ilan Shor as a key figure representing Moscow’s interests, and has accused him of orchestrating a “criminal group” aimed at destabilizing the country through protests and vote-buying systems. Earlier this year, law enforcement reported that over 140,000 individuals were allegedly implicated in a “money-for-votes” scheme during the 2021 presidential election.
In a speech delivered to the European Parliament in Strasbourg on September 9, Sandu addressed the threats posed by Russian interference. She likened this interference to a virus, stating that it seeks out vulnerable areas to exploit. Sandu revealed that in 2024, Russia employed illegal financing methods, utilizing cryptocurrency and specially created companies to further its agenda. She noted that Russia invested the equivalent of 1% of Moldova’s GDP to manipulate the outcome of the 2024 elections.
Sandu has accused Russia of utilizing priests and bots to sway the outcomes of the September elections. She contends that Moscow has focused on the diaspora, employing priests from the Russian Orthodox Church to disseminate propaganda, and leveraging the “Matryoshka” bot network to spread disinformation. Since April, the “Matryoshka” bots have been targeting Sandu, leveling accusations of corruption, stifling dissent, and manipulating electoral processes. Additionally, several false narratives have circulated against her, including a fabricated investigative report that Sandu profits from selling Ukrainian children to pedophiles.
Kremlin Handler
The election results in Moldova are garnering significant attention in Russia, particularly with the appointment of Sergei Kiriyenko, the first deputy head of the Russian Presidential Administration, as the Kremlin’s new “handler” for Moldovan affairs. This transfer of responsibility to a prominent figure like Kiriyenko highlights the importance the Kremlin places on the outcome of the Moldovan elections. Notably, Kiriyenko also manages relations with Armenia, where crucial parliamentary elections are scheduled for 2026, and oversees the occupied territories of Georgia: “South Ossetia” and Abkhazia. In the spring of 2025, Kiriyenko facilitated the victory of the Kremlin-backed candidate Badra Gunba in the illegitimate presidential elections held in Abkhazia. Kiriyenko took over this portfolio from Dmitry Kozak, another deputy head of the administration, who was previously responsible for the post-Soviet space and was known for his active interference in Moldova’s internal affairs. Media reports indicate that Kozak even met with Moldovan oligarch Vladimir Plahotniuc prior to the 2024 presidential elections and referendum, despite Plahotniuc’s ongoing criminal case in Russia.
Plahotniuc is a significant figure in the upcoming elections. The Moldovan oligarch, once the most powerful person in the country, has just been extradited to Moldova. He left Moldova in 2019 after a deal between pro-Russian and pro-Western parties diminished his political influence. Like Ilan Shor, Plahotniuc is associated with the $1 billion bank fraud case. He was arrested at Athens Airport in July and extradited to Moldova on September 25 where he was detained.
Shoigu’s Letter
The heightened interest of the Russian authorities in the Moldovan elections is reflected in the article “Moldova at a Crossroads” by Sergei Shoigu, a former Russian Defense Minister and current Secretary of the Security Council, published on August 11. According to Shoigu, a decisive event in Moldova, one which will determine the country’s geopolitical trajectory for the next four years, will be the parliamentary elections scheduled for September 28. He argued that the outcome will largely depend on whether the pro-Western regime led by the incumbent president retains power, or whether political forces “focused on national interests” come to power.
Statement of the Intelligence Services
The recent Moldovan elections have garnered attention from the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service, which released a public statement on July 14. In this statement, the service claimed that NATO is actively preparing to involve Moldova in a potential armed conflict with Russia. They suggested that Brussels has decided to expedite the transformation of Moldova into “the alliance’s advanced bridgehead on the Eastern Front.” Furthermore, the service alleged that Chișinău anticipates that President Sandu’s party will receive material and organizational support from NATO member states during the parliamentary elections. They warned that if Sandu’s party were to win, she would remove Moldova’s neutrality from the constitution.
Key Narratives Ahead of the Election
Local and international experts warn about the escalating threat of foreign information manipulation and interference from Russia, which has been employing a number of hybrid warfare tactics to shift Moldova’s geopolitical trajectory. Since Moldova was granted EU candidate status in 2022 and commenced accession negotiations in 2024, Russian hybrid interference has intensified. The objective is to destabilize the nation and hinder its European integration by shaping public sentiment. Techniques utilized include propaganda and information manipulation, cyberattacks, the deployment of illicit funds to foster instability, and the mobilization of so-called proxy actors to bolster pro-Russian and anti-Western political movements.
The Sandu government is actively addressing the increasing threats it faces. Sandu has not hesitated to make difficult decisions, such as banning pro-Russian media outlets. However, Russia has demonstrated an ability to quickly adapt and exploit unregulated environments, particularly by utilizing social media platforms like Facebook, TikTok, and Telegram as starting points for its activities.
According to a report published in September by the Digital Forensic Research Lab (DFRLab), three main narratives of Russian disinformation have emerged: anti-Western and anti-EU, anti-state, and pro-Russian.
- Anti-Western narratives can be categorized into several sub-narratives: EU = war; if Moldova becomes a member of the EU, involvement in war is inevitable; EU and NATO enlargement cause war; Western institutions are authoritarian and corrupt; the West/EU seeks to control Moldova and interfere in its sovereign affairs; European values are immoral and threaten the identity of Moldovans.
- The central theme of the anti-state narratives is the portrayal of the Moldovan government as weak and corrupt. President Sandu is the focal point of ongoing propaganda, which suggests that she is a puppet of Western interests. These narratives claim that Sandu is an illegitimate president who manipulated the elections, and they warn that she might incite civil unrest among the populations of Transnistria and Gagauzia.
- Pro-Russian narratives spread anti-Ukrainian disinformation and promote messages such as: Russia is the guardian of Moldovan traditions, values, and identity; the Moldovan government oppresses Transnistria and Gagauzia and, as such, they need Russian protection; claims of Russian interference in Moldovan affairs are a myth created by the West, and pro-Russian parties and actors are genuine protest movements representing the Moldovan population rather than being controlled by Russia.
Based on interviews with the Moldovan expert community, several additional disinformation narratives have been identified that Russia generally employs in other target countries, which it then adapts to Moldova’s specific context.
For example, since 2024, there has been a strong promotion of a narrative concerning Moldova’s reliance on energy resources from Russia. The energy crisis and dependence on Russian gas continue to be significant challenges, and Russia leverages this issue to promote pro-Russian sentiment among the population. Since 2023, Moldova has been receiving gas through alternative routes via the EU energy infrastructure. However, a portion of this supply still comes from Russia, and the overall cost is considerably higher than the Russian gas that was previously imported through Ukraine. This situation has led many to believe that the price of achieving energy independence is an unbearable burden for Moldovan households. Although the government has implemented compensation measures and the European Union has provided additional support, many in the population still find cheap Russian gas to be more appealing.
Russia’s tried and tested method is to manipulate the public’s mood through fear of war. According to this narrative, if Moldova joins the EU, the country will forfeit its neutrality, become part of a military alliance, and will inevitably become embroiled in conflict. The “ReArm Europe” initiative, introduced by the European Commission in March 2025 as a strategic plan to enhance defense funding and industrial capacity across Europe, was portrayed as further evidence of Moldova being drawn into war. The initiative’s provisions – such as the expansion of the Security and Defense Partnership, reinforced resilience, financial support for military modernization, and access to EU defense initiatives – were framed as a direct threat to Moldova’s neutrality. Fear of war is a dominant concern within Moldovan society, and Russia, alongside its allied political groups, actively exploits this anxiety, much like its tactics in other nations. Pro-Russian actors in Moldova emphasize the importance of maintaining neutrality, urging the West to “officially recognize Moldova’s neutrality.” Yet, while Western partners already acknowledge Moldova’s neutral status, these groups do not impose similar demands on Russia.
The narrative of sovereignty gained prominence during the 2024 referendum, when opponents claimed that if the population supported EU membership, Moldova would lose its sovereignty. Following Donald Trump’s election as U.S. president, pro-Russian parties, normally vocal critics of the United States, began praising Trump and his decisions, among them the closure of USAID. In contrast, the idea of neutrality has recently lost some of its appeal. Support for NATO membership, while still limited, has increased amid the backdrop of Russian military aggression in Ukraine. Although public support for NATO remains relatively low, the topic is no longer considered taboo, and discussions surrounding it have become more open. Additionally, Moldova’s government has begun to evolve its approach to military issues, reflected in the consistent growth of the defense budget. Once minimal, Moldova’s defense spending has changed, and is projected to reach 1% of GDP by 2030. In comparison, the defense budget was 0.39% of GDP in 2022, and increased to 0.55% in 2023.
After their defeat in the referendum, Moldova’s pro-Russian parties again pushed their claim that the majority of Moldovans living in Moldova opposed EU integration, and that only 42% of them supported joining the EU. Additionally, they increased their calls to revoke voting rights for the diaspora, arguing that Moldovans living abroad should not have a say in decisions affecting Moldova.
The disinformation campaign targeting the EU aims to influence various segments of the population. For instance, during the opening of accession negotiations with the EU, land ownership became a prominent issue. A statement made by some EU representatives, suggesting that if Moldovans can buy land in Europe, then Europeans should also have the right to purchase land in Moldova, was quickly followed by a disinformation narrative claiming that Moldovan land would be sold to foreigners. Another narrative aimed at the religious population alleges that the EU intends to shut down churches. To support this claim, propagandists reference events in Ukraine, where the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Moscow Patriarchate), influenced by the Russian Patriarch, lost control over certain religious buildings.
Disinformation narratives are propagated by political figures, as well as through media outlets and social networks. Detecting this disinformation has become increasingly challenging due to the Kremlin’s use of modern technologies, including artificial intelligence, encrypted mobile applications, so-called “deepfakes,” and the creation of fake social media profiles or forged documents. Various actors also produce counterfeit versions of legitimate news websites, building credibility by replicating genuine content for months before suddenly shifting to disseminate propaganda. One example of this occurred when a fake version of the well-known British magazine OK! published an article claiming that Maia Sandu had purchased sperm samples from famous LGBT figures like Elton John and Ricky Martin, and brought them to Moldova.
A hybrid intervention includes activities like mobilizing voters and creating fake activist groups through substantial illegal funding. Moldovan law enforcement agencies have repeatedly exposed financial fraud schemes that have funneled money to pro-Russian political forces. These schemes have utilized Russia’s Promsvyazbank, which is currently under Western sanctions, as well as various Russian mobile applications. Illegally obtained funds are used not only to create areas of destabilization, but also to bribe voters.
Moldovan experts also highlight the practice of organizing paid protests, a tactic frequently used by pro-Russian political actors. For example, the pro-Russian oligarch Ilan Shor, who fled the country, promised in a video message to pay $3,000 per month to anyone willing to participate in a “tent protest” set up in the center of the capital.
The effective use of IT technologies has significantly increased the scale of hybrid interference, making it easier to target specific audiences both within Moldova and among the diaspora. However, this has also complicated the authorities’ efforts to identify and contain malicious actors. Despite the current government’s active efforts, the fight against hybrid threats remains largely reactive, and poses a serious challenge ahead of the upcoming elections. This is particularly concerning, given the growing polarization in Moldovan society and the increasing influence of pro-Russian politicians.
Findings of Sociological Research
The 101 members of the Moldovan Parliament are elected through a proportional list system, with an electoral threshold of 5% for parties, 7% for electoral blocs, and 2% for independent candidates.
According to sociological polls, it will be difficult for Sandu to replicate the results of the 2021 elections. A survey conducted by iData, published on September 8, shows the distribution of electoral votes as follows:
- “Patriotic Electoral Bloc” – 25.2%.
- “Party of Action and Solidarity” – 24.3%.
- Renato Usatii’s “Our Party” and the electoral bloc “Alternative” also have a chance to overcome the electoral threshold.
- The remaining election subjects will not be able to overcome the threshold.
- 30% of voters are undecided.
This does not take into account the votes of the diaspora and those residing in the separatist region of Transnistria. Generally, the diaspora in Europe tends to support pro-Western parties, while those in Transnistria are more aligned with pro-Russian parties. The involvement of the diaspora is essential for Sandu, as experience has shown the votes from residents in Moldova alone are insufficient for her success. A total of 301 polling stations are planned to be set up abroad, with the most significant number (75) located in Italy. Sandu is counting on the support of Moldovans living in Western countries, and maximizing voter turnout among them will be crucial for her success.
Notably, a representative from Sandu’s party has raised concerns about the reliability of the iData poll results, as a survey conducted by the International Republican Institute in August revealed varying conclusions. According to September data from CBS Research, Sandu’s party is projected to receive 29.7% of the vote, while the Patriotic Electoral Bloc is expected to get 13.2%, and Renato Usatii’s Our Party is estimated at 7.5%. Other political groups, it says, are unlikely to surpass the electoral threshold. Notably, the survey indicates that 28% of voters remain undecided. Despite the differences in results from various organizations, all suggest that Sandu will face challenges in achieving an outright victory. Much will depend on the final days of the election campaign, the choices of undecided voters, and the level of participation from the diaspora in Western countries.
Post-Election Outlook: What to Expect
The results of the parliamentary elections on September 28 will shape Moldova’s political landscape for years to come. To ensure the country maintains its pro-Western stance and accelerates its integration into the European Union, President Sandu’s Party of Action and Solidarity must secure a majority and retain control of parliament. However, recent sociological surveys in Moldova present a somewhat bleak outlook for PAS. Yet, the involvement of the diaspora may still be a decisive factor in their success. Supposing the party can achieve a parliamentary majority with the support of the diaspora, pro-Western forces will maintain influence over all branches of government in the years ahead, a development that is vital for the country’s European future.
A significant setback for Sandu and Moldova’s European future would occur if the pro-Russian Patriotic Electoral Bloc, along with its political allies, were to gain control of parliament in the upcoming elections. As Moldova is a parliamentary republic, a pro-Russian majority could obstruct Sandu’s pro-Western agenda. In this scenario, a political confrontation and severe crisis would likely arise, potentially forcing Sandu to call for early parliamentary elections.
If Sandu’s party fails to win an outright majority but manages to form a coalition—excluding the pro-Russian Patriotic Electoral Bloc—this would still be a relatively favorable outcome for her. Such a coalition would allow Sandu to maintain her pro-Western course. However, with only a fragile majority, she would face constant negotiations with partners holding divergent views on relations with Russia and the West. This internal tension could result in an unstable government and potentially push Moldova into a period of political crisis.
It is crucial for Russia that Sandu’s political team loses its sole control of parliament. To achieve this, Moscow is conducting an unprecedented interference operation in the electoral process, with the Kremlin and its allied Moldovan political groups investing substantial resources. If Sandu loses control of parliament, it will open the door for Moscow to reassert its grip on Moldova’s political direction and severely undermine, if not completely derail, the country’s pursuit of European integration.