North Caucasus in the last two weeks
The social and political landscape of the North Caucasus is currently dominated by the war in Ukraine. Regional leaders and local strongmen compete over how many recruits they have sent to the front, while local Telegram channels continue to report on soldiers from the region who have been killed in action. As a result, the North Caucasus remains heavily securitized, with virtually no signs of independent political activism.
Rumours about the health of Chechnya’s leader, Ramzan Kadyrov, continue to circulate in the media. Nonetheless, he tries to maintain his public presence and strongman image in the republic. His fiery statements against Russian generals and the awarding of new medals to his son, Adam Kadyrov, serve as examples of this effort. Meanwhile, Chechen Prime Minister Magomed Daudov has been consolidating his position and is increasingly cited by analysts as Kadyrov’s most likely successor.
The persecution of Circassian activists and the securitisation of the Circassian issue remain ongoing. Through such actions, Russian security services aim to prevent the revival of Circassian activism on the scale seen in the early 2010s. At the same time, residents of Circassian-populated republics are increasingly appearing in terrorism reports, facing arrest for various alleged extremist activities. This suggests that, although the organisational infrastructure of clandestine jihadist groups has largely disappeared from the region, a significant number of individuals still adhere to their ideology.
Here are the main developments that recently took place in the North Caucasus.
General statistics
War in Ukraine
As of 6 October, official figures indicate that 3,041 fighters from the North Caucasian republics have been killed in the war in Ukraine. The breakdown by region is as follows: Dagestan – 1,586; North Ossetia – 490; Kabardino-Balkaria – 291; Chechnya – 249; Karachayevo-Cherkessia – 152; Ingushetia – 145; and Adyghea – 109.
Jihadism in the North Caucasus
In the third quarter of 2025, five people were killed and four injured as a result of jihadist or counter-insurgency operations. No casualties were reported in September.
Adyghea
On 24 September, Russian authorities opened a criminal case against Tbilisi-based journalist Larisa Tuptsokova, who hails from Adyghea, accusing her of involvement in an extremist organisation. The charge followed the appearance of a fake website purporting to represent the Circassian Cultural Centre in Tbilisi — an organisation recently added to Russia’s list of terrorist groups — which carried fabricated articles falsely attributed to Tuptsokova.
Tuptsokova has been closely involved with Circassian Media, an online project and YouTube channel well known in Circassian-populated regions of Russia for its coverage of social, cultural, and political issues affecting the Circassian people. Notably, the channel came under attack at least twice in August this year from Adyghea’s state-run television station, ChGTRK “Adyghea”. Alongside her journalistic work, Tuptsokova is also an active language advocate, writing poetry and offering online courses in the western dialect of the Circassian language.
The case highlights the ongoing securitisation of the Circassian issue by Russian authorities in recent decades. It forms part of a broader pattern of repression targeting Circassian nationalist activists, including the arrest of Martin Kochesoko and raids on the Humanitarian Institute of Kabardino-Balkaria. Further legal action against Circassian activists is likely, particularly in Adyghea, where Circassians constitute an ethnic minority.
Karachaevo-Cherkessia
Rauf Arashukov, a former senator from Karachayevo-Cherkessia who is serving a life sentence, reportedly made several attempts to join the Russian armed forces and be deployed to Ukraine in exchange for a pardon — requests that were ultimately rejected. Arashukov, together with his brothers Raul and Ruslan, was detained in 2019 and charged with a series of serious offences, including the theft of natural gas worth 30 billion rubles from a regional branch of Gazprom, involvement in organised crime, and conspiracy to commit murder.
The rejection of Arashukov’s proposal came as little surprise. An ethnic Circassian, Arashukov is known to have close ties with local religious, nationalist, and criminal circles. Allowing him to take part in the war in Ukraine would have given him and his associates access to weapons and military training — developments that could ultimately threaten the balance of power in Karachayevo-Cherkessia and the wider Circassian community.
Kabardino-Balkaria
A 45-year-old resident of the town of Chegem has been convicted of justifying terrorism on social media. The Southern Regional Military Court sentenced the individual to pay a fine of 450,000 rubles. In addition, he was banned from managing or operating any internet websites.
Arrests on charges of “justifying terrorism” are nothing new in Russia. Notably, prominent journalist Nadezhda Kevorkova was detained on similar grounds after sharing articles about the 2005 raid on Nalchik and the Taliban. The latest case also points to a renewed interest among some residents of Kabardino-Balkaria in jihadist movements. Although the organised Islamist insurgency largely faded by the mid-2010s, a significant number of people in the republic remain sympathetic to such ideologies, with occasional lone-wolf attacks still occurring.
North Ossetia
Yulia Melnichenko, a resident of Mozdok, was summoned by an FSB officer for questioning after staging a solo protest outside the Russian Prosecutor General’s Office in Moscow, though her complaints have led to no official action. She has been campaigning for justice for her brother, Rostislav, who was allegedly beaten by security officers in 2019 and again in 2023, yet investigations into the incidents have repeatedly been dismissed. Melnichenko has also reported receiving threats, facing falsified evidence, and experiencing pressure on her family, including attempts to seize a relative’s land. She believes the harassment is partly driven by their Ukrainian background.
Although this protest was not political in nature, Russian security services tend to securitise even small-scale solo demonstrations — particularly when the protester is from the North Caucasus. This trend has intensified since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
Ingushetia
The international battalion Erzi, established in Ingushetia, has begun recruiting volunteers from outside the region to be sent to Ukraine. The unit was created on the initiative of Yuri Chaika, the Russian President’s Envoy to the North Caucasian Federal District, with the backing of Ingushetia’s head, Makhmud-Ali Kalimatov. The battalion takes its name from a well-known national park in Ingushetia, a choice intended to inspire patriotic sentiment and attract Ingush volunteers. However, due to limited local enlistment, recruitment efforts have since expanded to other regions of Russia.
The creation of Erzi mirrors the approach taken in neighbouring Chechnya, where numerous battalions with patriotic names have been formed and large numbers of fighters sent to the front — both voluntarily and under pressure. However, some experts argue that Erzi’s establishment is less about rivalry with Chechnya and more about Yuri Chaika’s attempt to demonstrate his initiative and compliance to the federal authorities.
Chechnya
On 25 September, Russia’s State Duma discussed a proposal to rename three settlements in Chechnya: Sernovodskoye to Sernovodsk, Naurskaya to Nevre, and Shelkovskaya to Terek — all formerly Russian Cossack settlements. The move drew criticism from Russian General Vladimir Shamanov, a veteran of both Chechen wars, who condemned it as an attempt to erase the Russian-Cossack heritage of the region following the ethnic cleansing of its Russian population.
The Chechen authorities swiftly responded to Shamanov’s remarks. On 2 October, Chechnya’s leader Ramzan Kadyrov branded Shamanov a criminal who should face a tribunal, also referring to him as a “hyena”. Shamanov is widely known for his alleged involvement in atrocities committed against Chechen civilians during the Chechen wars.
This dispute highlights the Chechen authorities’ complex attitude towards senior Russian military figures implicated in war crimes. On one hand, Kadyrov’s administration displays unwavering loyalty to President Putin and the federal government. On the other, it has occasionally expressed open disdain for Russian generals who fought in the Chechen wars. For example, when Yusup Temirkhanov — who was convicted of assassinating Russian Colonel Yuri Budanov in revenge for the rape of a Chechen girl — died in prison in 2018, Kadyrov and several senior officials attended his funeral and paid him high respect. This suggests that, despite formal allegiance to Moscow, strong anti-Russian sentiments persist even within Chechnya’s ruling elite.
Dagestan
On 9 October, elections for the mayor of Makhachkala were held, resulting in Djambulat Salavov’s appointment to the post. All 45 members of Dagestan’s regional parliament voted unanimously in his favour. The early elections followed the resignation of former mayor Yusup Umaev on 19 July, after which Salavov had been serving as acting mayor.
Djambulat Salavov, an ethnic Avar from the Kizilyurt district, previously served as head of the Khasavyurt district from 2009 to 2022 and as Dagestan’s minister of transport and road infrastructure from 2022 to 2025. He is known to be a close ally of Saygidpasha Umakhanov — a State Duma deputy and influential Avar strongman from Khasavyurt. Salavov’s election marks another step in Umakhanov’s bid to strengthen his influence in Dagestan and gain the upper hand in the ongoing rivalry between the republic’s powerful ethnic clans.
The position of mayor of Makhachkala is one of the most influential in Dagestan. Around one-fifth of the republic’s population lives in the capital, where rapid population growth, urban expansion, and widespread high-rise construction create lucrative opportunities for financial gain and corruption.
Diaspora
A so-called Victory Day, marking the occupation of Sukhumi by Abkhaz separatists, was celebrated across Abkhaz communities in Turkey. One of the largest events took place in the İnegöl district of Bursa Province, home to several sizable Abkhaz villages. On 28 September, the İnegöl Abkhaz Society organised festivities in the village of Ruştiye, attended by local officials including İnegöl Deputy Mayor Hasan Aydın and the Head of İnegöl Subprovince from CHP party Zemci Şahin. Representatives from other Caucasian diaspora associations in Bilecik and Eskişehir also took part in the event.
The participation of Turkish officials highlights the lobbying influence of Abkhaz diaspora communities in Turkey. This is not the first instance of indirect support for Abkhaz separatists by Turkish representatives. In the past, Turkish officials have visited the occupied territories, while so-called Abkhaz elections have been organised in Turkey, with polling stations set up in Istanbul and Sakarya Province.